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Introduction
1.1. Aims of the study
The present monograph is a study of the system of obligation expression in
Old English with a proviso that the focus is on verbs only. As such it aims to
contribute to the vastness of literature devoted to modality. Situated as it is in
the center of interests of legions of contemporary linguists, modality has been
extensively studied as a notional category with reference to English (for
example, PALMER 1974, 1979, 2001; LYONS 1977; HERMERÉN 1978; COATES
1983; PERKINS 1983; NUYTS 1994; WESTNEY 1995; HOYE 1997, contributions in
FACCHINETTI, KRUG and PALMER, eds., 2003), from a historical perspective (for
example, BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA 1994, articles in HART, ed., 2003;
TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005), as well as from a contrastive viewpoint (for
example, MATTHEWS 1991; SALKIE 1996; DE HAAN 1997; ČERMÁK and KLÉGR
2004, papers in FACCHINETTI and PALMER 2004; WÄRNSBY 2006). There is also
no shortage of studies that cut across these categories, e.g. papers in
KAKIETEK, ed. (1991), van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998). In light of the
proliferation of contributions to the field, while approaching the topic of
modality I can hear the words of PERKINS (1983: 4) issue a warning that
“doing research on modality is similar to trying to move in an overcrowded
room without treading on anyone else’s feet.” Today, over twenty years after
Perkins’s study, despite even more feet taking up whatever is left of the free
space left in the room, I consider the effort worthwhile since, as we learn
from LASS (1997: 278), “extensive talk about something is no guarantee we
understand it.”
One of the preliminary queries that needs to be raised is what kind of
obligation is meant in the title of this study, which will help specify the focal
semantic area to be investigated. A check of OED turns up the fact that the
word “obligation” (Latin obligatio ‘an engaging or pledging, a binding
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agreement or bond,’ derived from obligare ‘to bind or tie around, bind up, bind
by an oath, promise or a moral or legal tie.’ Obligare itself is a prefixed form:
ob ‘towards’ + ligare ‘to tie, bind,’ ligare going back to PIE leig- ‘to bind’ (cf.
OED 1989 and WATKINS, ed. 2000)) has a number of meanings in Present-Day
English, the most important of which seem to be 1) “an agreement whereby
one person is bound to another,” 2) “moral or legal constraint, or constraining
force or influence,” 3) “an action, or an act, to which one is morally or legally
obliged.” It is fair to say that a context of obligation in every day use of
English depicts a situation in which somebody, who is sometimes referred to as
an obligee, finds his or her actions influenced by a usually unpleasant
constraint originating in a source outside of the obligee. When transferred to
the plane of modal theories, the situation construed as shown is describable in
terms of deontic necessity (see LYONS 1977; PALMER 2001). True as it is that
deontic necessity provides a springboard for the present exposition, it is not the
sole object of the following discussion. Even a superficial overview of deontic
necessity makes it reasonable to extend the discussion so that it would also
cover a scenario in which the constraint comes from the obligee himself or
herself, that is, the meanings of participant-internal necessity (cf. van der
AUWERA and PLUNGIAN 1998) as well as permission and prohibition. The
inclusion of participant-internal necessity stems from the semantic affinity
between deontic necessity and participant-internal necessity in that they differ
in the location of the source of the constraint only. As for permission and
prohibition, these two notions can be placed in a broader context alongside
deontic necessity by showing that prohibition is by and large synonymous with
deontic necessity when the latter occurs with negated proposition (cf. LYONS
1977; DE HAAN 1997). It should then be borne in mind that the term
“obligation” as used in the title is a catch-all label which centrally stands for
deontic necessity but which also embraces the related meanings such as
participant-internal necessity, prohibition and permission.
Central to the thesis of this study is the fact that in Present-Day English
studies of obligation coincide with and focus on the study of the modal verbs.
It appears that talking about the modals as a vehicle for obligation is
indispensable when talking about obligation in Present-Day English, which
works such as JACOBSSON (1978), NEY (1978), PALMER (1979, 1986), MYHILL
(1996, 1997) and others stand to prove. Even if some other exponents of
“obligation” are analyzed, they are usually shown to play a secondary role and
to be somewhat less attractive. Part of the reason why linguists tend to be
much taken with studying the PDE modals is that they bring along the
attractive lure of the morphosyntactic peculiarities with them, the roots of
which can be sought in the past. The morphosyntactic features of the modals
together with their semantic characteristics lead PERKINS (1983) and WESTNEY
(1995) to argue that the modals are unmarked, other modal expressions being
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marked. The unmarked status of the modals in the area of semantics translates
into “their essentially vague or minimally specified meanings” (WESTNEY
1995: 214).
Given the above considerations, I intend to seek tokens of obligation among
the OE predecessors of the PDE modals, the so-called pre-modals. The task
looks promising and challenging as it, among other things, involves juxtaposing
well established and frequent items such as sceal with brand-new additions to
the pre-modals of obligation such as agan. Inspired by the bias cherished by
the researchers of Present-Day English, I devote most of space available to the
pre-modals, yet I consider the obligation carried by OE lexical verbs in its own
right as well.
An overarching aim is to elucidate the types and shades of the meaning of
obligation as expressed by the two kinds of OE verbs and traceable to OE
texts. The semantics of the pre-modals in this study is viewed essentially
diachronically. In scrutinizing a sample of the corpus occurrences of
a pre-modal, I take the meanings of the verb to be a reflection of a process of
semantic change rather than a synchronic state. Such an outlook has the
advantage of providing a more in-depth insight into, for example, the
differences between the obligation of sceal, agan, and other pre-modals. In the
case of the lexical verbs, the approach is less detailed and hence largely
synchronic, which should not, however, preclude me from verifying the
tenability of the bias in favor of the pre-modals in Old English.
1.2. The layout of the study
Five chapters converge to make up the body of this monograph. Chapter 2 lays
down the theoretical grid, introduces the terminology to be utilized throughout
the ensuing chapters and designates the pre-modals as the focal object of the
study. I begin with delineating the semantic notion of modality in section 2.1
and show how it can be realized in a language in section 2.2. With the focal
realization of modality being the verb, in 2.3 I proceed to fish out theories of
modal meanings relevant for the further research. This section also sets out the
methodological guidelines for data analysis, which combine elements of
cognitive and functional theories. Sections 2.4 through 2.5.3 are where the
problem of the semantic change in modal meanings appears on the scene. In 2.6
the semantic change is joined by syntax in the issue of grammaticalization as
vital for the modal verbs in English. Starting with section 2.7 I delve into Old
English so as to include consideration of the types of OE verbs. With the class
of the pre-modals being highlighted, section 2.7.1 takes up the theme of the
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controversial syntactic status of the pre-modals in Old English and the later
periods.
Chapters 3 and 4 constitute a research part of the present study. The former
undertakes a corpus analysis of five pre-modals whose meanings center on the
expression of obligation-related notions: agan, þearf, sceal, mot, and mæg,
each verb being discussed in a separate section. Eleven lexical verbs, which
split into two groups, that is, verbs of necessity and verbs of permission, take
prominence in Chapter 4. The results of the research are assembled in
Chapter 5 and illustrated by showing the meanings of the pre-modals and the
lexical verbs on the continuum of deontic modality. Inevitably, the obligative
semantics of the pre-modals and the relevant lexical verbs is also analyzed
from a comparative perspective.
The approach to data retrieval adopted in the present research is
a corpus-based one. I make use of two corpora of Old English texts: the Old
English part of the Helsinki Corpus and the Dictionary of Old English Corpus
(DOE). With each verb I look into a sample of examples made available by the
searching and concordancing program Wordsmith Tools. The details of the
codification of examples retrieved from both corpora are elaborated on at the
beginning of Chapter 3.
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The framework
A proper study of obligation cannot but start with an insight into the theory
of modality, where obligation naturally belongs. A commonly acknowledged
difficulty to struggle with in the course of any undertaking of this type is the
vague nature of modality. Hence the multiplicity of approaches to modality.
The focal points of attention in this chapter are three-fold: a pursuit of the
notion of obligation in the semantic category of modality as seen by various
scholars, introduction of the nomenclature to be made use of throughout the
research, which will determine the direction of the research, and, finally,
elucidation of some issues pertaining to the semantic and syntactic change in
the case of the OE pre-modals.
2.1. A traditional view of modality
The most influential conceptualizations of modality in linguistics have been
contributed by LYONS (1977) and PALMER (1986; 2001). Both build on earlier
tradition when it comes to making internal divisions within the domain of
modality. The names of special importance here are JESPERSEN (1924) and von
WRIGHT (1951). The former is ascribed somewhat symbolic significance by
virtue of introducing two categories of mood: one “containing an element
of will” and the other “containing no element of will” (JESPERSEN 1924:
320—321). The premise that underlies this division has been recast on
numerous occasions. Von WRIGHT (1951: 1—2) arrives at a more elaborate
system of modality within which he identifies four modes:
the alethic modes or the modes of truth (necessary, possible,
contingent, impossible)
15
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the epistemic modes or the modes of knowing (verified, undecided,
falsified)
the deontic modes or the modes of obligation (obligatory, permitted,
indifferent, forbidden)
the existential modes or the modes of existence (universal, existing,
empty)
Still, PALMER (1986: 11) observes that central to this classification of the modal
modes are epistemic and deontic modes “which correspond, very roughly, to
JESPERSEN’S (1924) two types.” The very terms “deontic” and “epistemic” both
filter through to LYONS’S (1977) and PALMER’S (2001) theories. The
fundamentals of Lyons’s (1977) stance on modality are in essence based on the
laws of logic. With the distinction being drawn between modality and
proposition, he points to possibility and necessity as the core of modality. The
two ingredients are intertwined due to a fine-grained logical relationship
holding between them which is formulated by LYONS (1977: 787) in the
following way: “if p is necessarily true, then its negation, ~p cannot possibly
be true; and if p is possibly true, then its negation is not necessarily true.” The
relation can be represented by means of modal operators, as shown below:
nec p ≡ ~poss ~p
poss p ≡ ~nec ~p
Both in logic and language possibility and necessity have two dimensions:
deontic and epistemic. While deontic modality has to do with what people do,
it “is concerned with the necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally
responsible agents” (LYONS 1977: 823), epistemic modality focuses on the state
of people’s knowledge and belief. The two-dimensional nature of modality
brings about internal divisions which are graphically represented in Table 1:
Dimension
Modality
Deontic Epistemic
Possibility deontic possibility = permission epistemic possibility
Necessity deontic necessity = obligation epistemic necessity
Table 1. A graphic representation of modality according to LYONS (1977)
The two areas of epistemic modality, i.e. epistemic possibility and epistemic
necessity, define different degrees of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of
the proposition. The speaker can qualify a proposition as possibly or
necessarily true. Within the realm of deontic modality, the possibility and
necessity receive the respective labels of permission and obligation. This
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implies that deontic modality comprises the acts of granting/refusing
permission, imposing obligation, etc. Performative in nature, a deontic
utterance is a directive whereby the speaker shows their attitude to the
proposition by allowing or obliging someone to act. Optionally, rather than
authorizing permission or obligation, the speaker can produce a deontic
statement by acknowledging that either is binding on someone. What then
figures prominently as a difference between epistemic and deontic modality,
one of a few differences to be precise but one of special relevance for this
study, is that deontic possibility and necessity each time originate in what
LYONS (1977: 843) calls “a deontic source.” In a performative utterance, the
deontic source would be the speaker, a deontic statement usually implicating
some other source, be it a set of legal regulations, religion or another person.
PALMER (1986; 1987; 2001; 2003) further advances this model of modality.
First of all, he sees the need to recognize dynamic modality besides deontic
and epistemic. The meanings of willingness and ability are subsumed under
this heading. In his earlier work, PALMER (1979) speaks of dynamic possibility
and dynamic necessity, which are illustrated in (2.1) and (2.2):
(2.1) Signs are the only thing you can observe.
(2.2) If the ratepayers should be consulted, so too must the council
tenants.
(both examples from PALMER 1979: 71, 91)
Dynamic possibility can be either subject-oriented (then it equals ability) or
neutral. Example (2.1) is a case of neutral possibility as the ability to observe,
rather than stemming from the subject, is conditioned by external, if
non-specific, circumstances. Dynamic necessity, which can only be neutral, is
brought into existence when, as in (2.2), there is no specific deontic source. On
second thoughts, however, PALMER (1986) hesitates to include neutral
possibility and necessity under dynamic modality as they, in fact, exhibit so
much affinity with deontic modality that indeterminate contexts are not out of
place. After all, neutral dynamic modality and deontic modality seem to differ
only in respect of the specificity of the deontic source, which leads PALMER
(1986) to the issue of subjectivity. What undoubtedly shapes up as
a differentiating factor behind deontic, neutral and dynamic contexts is
subjectivity or lack thereof.
Parallelism between modality and subjectivity is a deep-seated construct in
linguistics. As has been noted earlier, if epistemic modality centers on the
expression of the speaker’s certainty, belief, opinion and if through deontic
modality the speaker reveals their attitude toward acts to be preformed,
subjectivity must be part of this system. Indeed, a question arises whether
modality exists without subjectivity. As PALMER (1986: 16) observes, “modality
2.1. A traditional view of modality 17
2 — Expressing...
in language is [...] concerned with subjective characteristics of an utterance,
and it could even be further argued that subjectivity is an essential criterion for
modality. Modality could, that is to say, be defined as the grammaticalization
of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions.” This being said, literature
abounds in attempts at coping with the problem of not every modal utterance
being equally subjective. It seems obvious that each of the following sentences
carries a different amount of subjectivity:
(2.3) He must be a cousin of mine. (I am sure he is) — epistemic
necessity
(2.4) He must be a cousin of mine. (it is the only logical option) —
epistemic necessity
(2.5) You must be back by 10. (said by a mother to her child) —
deontic necessity
(2.6) You have to be back by 10. (repeated by a sister to her brother)
— deontic necessity
Intuitively, examples (2.3), where the speaker shows her conviction as to the
truth of the proposition He be a cousin of mine, and (2.5), where another
speaker issues a directive that binds the subject to be back by 10, embrace
more subjectivity than examples (2.4), where the speaker draws a logical
conclusion based on evidence available, and (2.6) which has the speaker
dissociating herself from the obligation imposed by someone else. In (2.1) and
(2.2), with the respective speakers making a judgment of necessity and
possibility contingent on external circumstances, the level of subjectivity is
substantially decreased. LYONS’S (1977, 1982) remedy is to draw a sharp
distinction between subjective epistemic and deontic modality, as in (2.3) and
(2.5) respectively, and objective epistemic and deontic modality — examples
(2.4) and (2.6). TRAUGOTT (1989: 36), while subscribing to the very nature of
the distinction, questions the term “objective modality:”
[...] I prefer to refer to ‘less’ and ‘more’ subjective modality, or
‘weakly’ and ‘strongly’ subjective. Thus, LYONS’S four way ambiguity
for You must be very careful (1982: 109) can be restated as:
(2.7) a) You are required to be very careful. (deontic, weakly
subjective)
b) I require you to be very careful. (deontic, strongly subjective)
a) It is obvious from evidence that you are very careful.
(epistemic, weakly subjective)
b) I conclude that you are very careful. (epistemic, strongly
subjective)
TRAUGOTT (1989: 36)
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PALMER (1986; 2001) also conjectures that the key to subjectivity is the
speaker’s involvement. Thus, in his view, epistemic modality is primarily
subjective, deontic modality admits some non-subjective contexts (with no
speaker’s involvement, as in (2.6)), neutral possibility and necessity being
“more problematic, for they are not always clearly distinct from deontic
modality, in the strictly subjective sense. There is thus indeterminacy, leaving
completely indeterminate the dividing line between what is modal (and
subjective) and what is non-modal (and objective, declarative)” (Palmer 1986:
103). It is only ability and volition that are marked as non-subjective domains
within modality as in these contexts the speaker’s involvement is usually ruled
out.
Also, cognitive research sheds new light on subjectivity in modality.
SANDERS and SPOOREN (1997) argue that two different types of subjectivity are
involved in deontic and epistemic modality. Deontic meanings become
subjective via perspectivization, which means that in a default case the modal
content generated by the speaker is directed to “a subject in the discourse”
(SANDERS and SPOOREN 1997: 105), that is, the obligee or permisee in a given
context. Subjectivity in epistemics is achieved by means of subjectification —
the modal content arises in “a subject of the discourse” (p. 106), i.e. the
speaker, as their assessment of probability or necessity of a proposition.
Subjectivization, being confined to the speaker themselves, their opinion,
belief, etc., signals more subjectivity than perspectivization which binds the
attitude of the speaker with another participant in the discourse. Drawing on
LYONS’S (1977) and PALMER’S (1986) tradition, SANDERS and SPOOREN (1997)
allow for more and less subjective instances within both deontic and epistemic
modality. Thus, for instance, deontic examples with the source of obligation
other than the speaker contain less subjectivity than performatives but more
than those in which obligation follows from objective circumstances. It is also
conceded that instances of ability and physical necessity, since they involve no
perspectivization or subjectivization, must be regarded as non-subjective.
Indeed, it turns out that no study of modality, be it synchronic or
diachronic, comes into play without taking subjectivity into account. While
I will return to the question of subjectivity viewed from a diachronic
perspective shortly, a reader is referred to STEIN and WRIGHT (eds., 1995),
WESTNEY (1995), and VERSTRAETE (2001) for a more in-depth treatment of
subjectivity inside and outside modality.
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2.2. Representation of modality
So far modality has been present in this study as a semantic category and I have
not made any explicit reference to the ways in which it can be realized in
a language. Some implicit bonds between modality and the PDE modal
auxiliaries can be gathered from the fact that in all the preceding examples the
presence of modality coincides with the use of the modals. Indeed, the modals
in Present-Day English constitute what PALMER (2003: 2) calls “a modal
system,” one of two possibilities, the other being presence of “mood,” when it
comes to the materialization of modality in the grammar of a language.
A rationale behind the modal system in Present-Day English is that it comprises
a number of grammaticalized items, i.e. modal auxiliaries, which express
modality. The grammatical side of the system permeates the formal properties
whereby the modals are set apart from main verbs (cf. HUDDLESTON 1976: 333
on the NICE properties of the modals) as well as from other auxiliaries (cf.
PALMER 1979: 9 on the modal criteria). Crucially, as PALMER (2003) sees it, the
system does not preclude graded membership — there are more and less central
members of the system. The system is also active — some items may leave it in
the course of demodalization (cf. van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN 1998) and new
items can enter it via grammaticalization (cf. e.g. BOLINGER 1980; KRUG 2000;
VERPLAETSE 2003). The modal system as the one in Present-Day English, which
contains only modal auxiliaries, is just one of a few possibilities attested
cross-linguistically. In the group of Western Nilotic languages, as shown by
BAVIN (1995), a modal system in Lango includes modal verbs romo ‘can,’ twero
‘be able to’ as well as the indeclinable particle myero ‘must’ developed out of
the former lexical verb myero ‘to be fitting for.’ In another language of the
group, i.e. Dhopadhola the verbal prefix ripo ‘must’ is part of the modal system.
Modal mood, on the other hand, rather than being confined to a set of verbs, can
be marked on any verb whenever a modal meaning is called for. A well known
instantiation of a modal mood is the subjunctive, or, more precisely, “mood is
exemplified by the contrast between indicative and subjunctive in many classical
and modern languages of Europe. A very similar contrast is made for other
languages, especially in the Native American languages and the languages of
Papua New Guinea in terms of »realis« and »irrealis«” (PALMER 2003: 2). As for
the features characteristic of a modal mood, PALMER (2003: 2) notes that:
a) a verb when used in a context is either marked for the mood, say,
the subjunctive, or not
b) a modal mood can in time come to serve strictly grammatical
purposes and is then devoid of any semantic modality, as it
frequently happens in the Romance languages.
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As the present study is concerned with the emerging modal system in Old
English, there is no point in dwelling on the modal mood in any significant
capacity. Nevertheless, it is of some theoretical interest that the two remain in
a state of mutually exclusive dependency. According to PALMER (2003), the
development of a modal system at a given time in a given language usually
takes place at the expense of a modal mood and vice versa.
It should also be remembered that modality in a language extends beyond
its grammatical representation. Most of literature on modality in Present-Day
English deals with the ins and outs of the modal system and only a handful of
scholars reach for an account of modality in other areas. PERKINS (1983), for
instance, writes about the linguistic expression of modality by means of the
modal auxiliaries, lexical verbs, adverbs, tense, IF-clauses and questions,
MATTHEWS (1991), applying an utterance-based approach, considers modality
(Mod) a structural part of an utterance, a whole range of expressions, including
the modals, being eligible to fill Mod, and HOYE (1997) looks into the
reinforcement of modality through adverbs which accompany the use of the
modals. As made clear by COMRIE (1991), languages can be encountered, e.g.
Haruai or Japanese, where no grammatical category or lexical items are
reserved for modality. In Haruai, for example, a modal interpretation can arise
from a pragmatic situation-based reading of a sentence marked for the future
tense.
In this study the focus is two-fold: I take into account elements of the
modal system as well as lexical verbs which lie outside the system yet also
converge to express obligation in Old English. Admittedly, a question arises
whether one is entitled to speak about a modal system in Old English, whether
the predecessors of the PDE modal auxiliaries exhibit enough morphosyntactic
independence to collectively merit the name “a modal system.” I seek to
answer this question by presenting a plethora of linguists’ views on the
morphological and syntactic standing of the pre-modals in relation to main
verbs in Old English in 2.7.1. Meanwhile, I proceed to highlight different
aspects of the nature of modality, aspects discussed with reference to the PDE
modals and, thus, crucial for this research.
2.3. Concepts of modal meanings
The view of a modal meaning that will be utilized in my study draws
inspiration from COATES (1983). It seems that COATES (1983) once and for
good does away with the notion, which is entertained by LYONS (1977) and
PALMER (1974; 1979) for example, that modal meanings are discrete. As she
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empirically shows, a feasible way of representing the meaning of a PDE modal
is to show that it is structured like a fuzzy set, the concept of fuzzy sets being
lifted from ZADEH (1965; 1970; 1971; 1972). What a fuzzy set implies is that
a modal meaning has its center (“core”), transitional area (“skirt”) and
borderline area (“periphery”). The occurrences of the verb emblematic of the
core are describable in terms of a number of features which define the core.
The further away from the core an occurrence is, the smaller number of the
features are conformed to. Understandably, peripheral examples share the
smallest number of features with the core and, hence, they may be subject to
interpretation as indeterminate between this and another meaning. The
discrepancy between the nature of the core and periphery needs emphasizing:
the core membership is contingent upon the fulfillment of strict conditions.
Failure to comply with one or two of such conditions pushes an occurrence
away from the core. The periphery, on the other hand, is blurred. The
periphery of one meaning may resemble the periphery of another meaning,
hence the overlapping of fuzzy modal meanings. The skirt is understood to be
filled with occurrences of the modal not eligible for the core any more yet too
obvious for the periphery at the same time. The range of the degrees of the
fuzziness, with the core and periphery as the two opposite poles, receives the
label “gradience” (COATES 1983: 13, see also LEECH and COATES 1980).
In COATES’S (1983: 21) view, fuzziness does discriminate between
non-epistemic and epistemic meanings. The occurrences of any PDE modal
form a cline of subjectivity yet a modal with non-epistemic semantics
additionally forms a gradient of modal strength. The modal strength of an
example depends on its positioning in relation to the core, the core examples
being strong and the peripheral examples being weak. It also bears remarking
that COATES (1983) chooses, following HOFMANN (1976) and other scholars
such as NEY (1978) for example, to handle all the non-epistemic modality
under the collective heading “root modality.” The justification of her choice
rests on the argument that the meaning of a particular modal often cuts across
the deontic/dynamic division. Thus the term “root modality” helps “capture the
fact that all the meanings of non-Epistemic MUST (for example) are related
and can be shown to lie on a cline extending from strong »Obligation« (the
core) to cases at the periphery where the sense of »Obligation« is extremely
weak (where a more appropriate paraphrase would be »it is important that...«)”
(COATES 1983: 21). Importantly, the adoption of the alternative nomenclature is
far from implying that the concept of modality is essentially different. Quite
the opposite, COATES (1995) makes it clear that, in much the same mode as
LYONS (1977) or PALMER (1986; 2001), modality is based on the notions of
possibility and necessity extending through the root and epistemic domain. For
the purposes of this study, however, the root/epistemic distinction is not
sufficient. Since I seek to integrate the diachronic aspects into the description
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of the obligation expressions in Old English, a more detailed division within
the sphere of non-epistemic modality will be called for. The notation adopted
will be explained presently.
Another perspective that has a bearing on the present study is TALMY’S
(1985; 2000) treatment of force dynamics as a category that underpins an
understanding of a large portion of semantics, including modality. It is made
explicit, however, that the force dynamic framework, as developed by TALMY
(2000), applies primarily to deontic modality. Thus in compliance with the
pivotal premises of force dynamics, a given deontic modal meaning is a scene
of the clash of two opposite forces. The forces are brought into existence by
two participants, called Antagonist and Agonist, who are indelibly etched in
the deontic context. In example (2.8)
(2.8) John can’t go out of the house.
(example taken from TALMY 2000: 412)
John, the person subjected to the force of prohibition, would be the Agonist
and he is understood to be willing to leave the house. The presence of the
Antagonist, the other participant, although prototypically not shown overtly in
the sentence with a modal, can be inferred from the context. The Antagonist
might be John’s father who insists on the boy’s staying home. Inevitably, the
opposite inclinations of the participants clash thereby producing a result
dependent on the strength of the two forces. In the context of can’t of
prohibition, the implication is that the force of the Antagonist prevails, that is
to say, in (2.8) John stays home. Also, TALMY (2000) integrates instances of
internal necessity, as with must or need, into his scheme. In such cases, the
force opposition is played out within the subject’s self, one part of the self, the
Antagonist, pressing the subject to act in a particular way and the other part,
i.e. the Agonist, being determined not to act. TALMY (2000: 431) refers to such
a situation as “the self divided.”
While TALMY (2000) generalizes the operation of force opposition over
deontic contexts, it is SWEETSER (1990) who takes the theory one step forward
and claims that it spills over epistemic modality as well. Concurring with
TALMY’S (2000) idea of force opposition underlying deontic modality,
SWEETSER (1990) believes that the operation of forces in language has
a metaphorical basis. Just as the operation of physical forces is metaphorically
extended to the social interaction (deontic modality), so are the social forces,
such as permission or obligation, subsequently projected upon the world of
reasoning (epistemic modality). This point is explained using the example of
may of permission and may of epistemic possibility:
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Given that the epistemic world is understood in terms of the socio-
physical world, we can see why general sociophysical potentiality, and
specifically social permission, should be the sociophysical modality
chosen as analogous to possibility in the world of reasoning. May is an
absent potential barrier in the sociophysical world, and the epistemic
may is the force-dynamically parallel case in the world of reasoning.
The meaning of epistemic may would thus be that there is no barrier
to the speaker’s process of reasoning from the available premises to
the conclusion expressed in the sentence qualified by may. My claim,
then, is that an epistemic modality is metaphorically viewed as that
real-world modality which is its closest parallel in force-dynamic
structure. (SWEETSER 1990: 59)
While I will return to the issue of the significance of metaphor in the
change of modal meanings in 2.5.3, at this point I should remark that
a force-dynamic reading of deontic modality will figure significantly in my
research. It is also of importance that the presence of an intentionally generated
force “that has an interest in the event either occurring or not occurring” has
been noticed outside cognitive linguistics by HEINE (1995: 29) and COATES
(1995). Curiously enough, in HEINE’S (1995) view, the operation of the force is
what helps distinguish between deontic modality (his agent-oriented modality),
where the force is actively present, and epistemic modality, which is free from
it. Although I consider SWEETSER’S (1990) force-dynamic treatment of
epistemic modality sound reasoning, which in its own right has inspired further
research (cf. LOUREIRO-PORTO 2003; 2005), epistemic modality falls largely
outside the scope of this monograph and will be dealt with only marginally.
Another theoretical ingredient of the present study is DE HAAN’S (1997:
47—54) “continuum model.” According to this line of reasoning, which goes
back to HENGEVELD (1987) and SIEWIERSKA (1991), modal meanings form
a continuum, separately in the deontic and epistemic domains. Obviously, it is
the deontic continuum that is of interest here. The deontic continuum which
stretches from weak modality to strong modality is made up by three notions:
permission, weak obligation, strong obligation. The modal system of the PDE
modals, when confronted with the deontic continuum, yields the following
sketch:
————————————————————————————————————————————
Weak Strong
may should must
(permission) (weak obligation) (strong obligation)
Figure 1. The continuum of deontic modality (based on DE HAAN 1997: 49)
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DE HAAN (1997: 15) digresses that, say, may on the weak end of the continuum
is used to represent the notion of permission rather than instantiate any
particular occurrence of the verb. Hence the absence of can or ought. The
position of the three notions on the continuum depends on the intensity of
these notions. “The analysis relies on the fact that there is a gradual difference
in intensity among the modals. For instance in [Present-Day] English, must is
stronger in intensity than may and can” (DE HAAN 1997: 48). Although DE
HAAN (1997) does not specify exactly what is meant by this intensity, I suggest
that we view the intensity of permission and obligation through
a force-dynamic perspective. Permission is less intensive than obligation in the
sense that it involves a force which the Agonist perceives as favorable. The
attitude of the Antagonist, which SWEETSER (1990) sees as a barrier withheld,
does not restrict the Agonist’s freedom of choice, rather, it leaves the Agonist
carte blanche to act as they wish. In a context of obligation, be it weak or
strong, there is a force generated by the Antagonist that significantly impinges
on the Agonist’s freedom to act. Consequently, the force is prototypically
considered unpleasant by the Agonist. Weak obligation, as in the ease of
should, is less intensive than strong obligation in that the Agonist is in
a position to oppose it much more efficiently than in the case of strong
obligation. The fact that obligation ranges from weak to strong depends, then,
on the strength of the force exerted by the Antagonist. The fuzziness of the
modal meanings guarantees that the borderlines between the meanings on the
continuum are blurred, so we can expect some amount of indeterminacy. In
other words, it may not always be clear what kind of a force, weak or strong,
favorable or unfavorable, is involved in a particular case.
Armed with this model of modality, I can finally unveil the nomenclature
and the details of the division of non-epistemic modality to be used in the
present study. For the purposes of this research, which are both synchronic and
diachronic in nature, I have selected the theory of modality formulated by van
der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998). The theory divides the field of modality in
the way shown in Figure 2.
Essentially, van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S (1998) division is a recasting
of LYONS’S (1977) notion that modality pivots on possibility and necessity. The
novelty of the approach can be seen in the treatment of non-epistemic
possibility and necessity. The major split within non-epistemic modality occurs
between two domains described as participant-internal and participant-external.
Witness that these terms have a special compatibility with the force dynamic
view of modality. Thus there are four types of non-epistemic modality:
1. Participant-internal possibility (henceforth PI possibility) is taken
here to involve an agent whose physical, mental and psychological
characteristics act as the Antagonist while some part of the agent’s
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self is the Agonist. The Antagonist generates a force of “positive
enablement” (SWEETSER 1990: 53) which makes it possible for the
agent to proceed in a given situation. The decision whether to
proceed or not depends on the Agonist.
2. Participant-external possibility (henceforth PE possibility) casts two
different entities in the roles of the Antagonist and Agonist. When
the Antagonist is circumstantial, we have to do with non-deontic
possibility or general PE possibility. In the case of the Antagonist
being a person or some other institutional or doctrinal body, we
speak about deontic possibility. Deontic possibility is logically
equated with permission. The force of possibility, seen as a barrier
withheld by the Antagonist, prototypically coincides with the
Agonist’s desires and is viewed as favorable.
3. Participant-internal necessity (henceforth PI necessity) covers the
contexts of the self divided. One part of the Agent’s self considers
an action necessary and is determined to impose its inclination
upon the other part of the self. In other words, PI necessity is
concerned with an agent’s internal needs.
4. Participant-external necessity (henceforth PE necessity) again has
the Antagonist and Agonist incarnated as two different participants.
As with possibility, depending on whether the Antagonist is to be
linked with objective external reality or a particular person,
including the speaker, a code of law, etc., two types of necessity
come into play: general PE (non-deontic) and deontic. Since the
transition from PE necessity to deontic necessity rests on the
specification of the Antagonist, deontic necessity is subsumed
under PE necessity. With both kinds of necessity, the force exerted
by the Antagonist stands in strong opposition to that of the Agonist.
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Possibility
Non-epistemic possibility
Epistemic possibility
(Uncertainty)
Participant-internal
possibility
(Dynamic possibility,
Ability, Capacity)
Participant-external possibility
(Non-deontic
possibility
Deontic possibility
(Permission)
Participant-internal
necessity (Need)
(Non-deontic
necessity)
Deontic necessity
(Obligation) Epistemic necessity
(Probability)Participant-external necesity
Non-epistemic necessity
Necessity
Figure 2. Types of modality according to van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998: 82) and van der
AUWERA (1999: 55)
When set against the background of the continuum of deontic modality shown in
Figure 1, the notion of permission gravitates toward the weak end as it contains
a rather non-intensive non-restrictive force generated by the Antagonist. The
middle and upper stretches of the continuum are taken up by the necessity-based
types of modality. General PE necessity and weak deontic necessity, as typically
indicative of less restrictive forces, take up the middle area of the continuum.
Strongly subjective, performative contexts of deontic necessity which contain
highly restrictive forces indicate the strong end. Needless to say, the idea of the
continuum allows a whole range of intermediate cases. To explore the verbal
means of expressing the necessity part of the continuum in Old English is
a primary objective of this research. I seek to identify the location of OE verbs of
necessity and permission on the continuum of deontic modality.
2.4. Semantic change in the English modal system
It has been commonly recognized that the particular members of the PDE
modal system, i.e. the modal verbs, can be employed for the expression of
different types of modality (cf., for example, COATES 1983; PALMER 2001).
Moreover, as shown by BYBEE and PAGLIUCA (1985), BYBEE, PERKINS and
PAGLIUCA (1994); PALMER (2001), and others, there is a cross-linguistic
tendency for a given grammaticalized markers of modality to convey more than
just one modal meaning. Also encountered are contrastive studies
independently indicating that such multifunctional uses are available to the
equivalents of the English modals in French (cf. SALKIE 1996), GREEK (cf.
TSANGALIDIS 2004) or the Slavic languages (cf. HANSEN 2004). Crucially,
different modals vary in the range of modal meanings expressed. NUYTS (1994:
100), who focuses on English and Dutch, says that:
In fact, while the category of the modals in general allows expression of
these three types of modality mentioned above [i.e. participant-internal,
participant-external and epistemic in the nomenclature adopted here —
J.N.], this is not true for each single modal auxiliary in those languages.
Most individual modals can only express two (and in some cases even
just one) of these qualificational categories, and in general, only
a limited number of them allows the expression of epistemic modality.
Also, in many cases the epistemic usage turns out to be only the
secondary or less frequent one, which means that this qualification is
certainly not the most prominent of all semantic categories expressed by
the modals [...]. (NUYTS 1994: 100)
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TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 107) add that cognates of a modal in related
languages frequently differ in the variety of meanings that they can be used
with.
Prompted by the fact that possibility and necessity are intertwined in terms
of logic, scholars tend to regard the various meanings of a given modal as
a case of polysemy (cf. HERMERÉN 1978; PALMER 1986; TRAUGOTT and DASHER
2005; NYKIEL 2006). A somewhat different, that is, monosemantic, stance, is
offered by PERKINS (1983), WIERZBICKA (1987), and KLINGE (1993). The former
two argue in favor a modal expression having an identifiable core meaning and,
accordingly, seek to isolate it. Working with the Relevance Theory, KLINGE
(1993) goes one step further in that he proposes that the PDE modals should be
seen to cover one semantic field of potentiality. Depending on the modal,
potentiality can have different shades yet, in essence, all of them serve to
furnish the hearer with the speaker’s assessment of the viability of the relation
between the propositional content of a sentence and it being verified in
practice. A common thread binding all the monosemantic approaches
mentioned above is the assumption that the meaning of the modal is stable. It
is the semantic and pragmatic context of the utterance that brings out the
difference between, say, an epistemic and non-epistemic use of a modal. In this
study I adhere to the polysemic view of the meanings of modal verbs, which
finds further support in diachronic research.
Literature abounds in accounts of the English modals which are shown to
originate in verbs of non-modal or pre-modal semantics and only subsequently
do they acquire non-epistemic meanings first and epistemic meanings later.
There emerges a deep-seated tendency for participant-internal and
participant-external uses of the modals to precede epistemic applications, which
has induced linguists to consider non-epistemic modality as somewhat basic
(cf. SHEPHERD 1982). In English the tendency has been attested and/or
acknowledged by GOOSSENS (1982), SHEPHERD (1982), PLANK (1984), TRAUGOTT
(1989), SWEETSER (1990), KYTÖ (1991), DENISON (1993), WARNER (1993),
JACOBSSON (1994), TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005), and others. GAMON (1994)
observes a similar diachronic propensity in the case of the German modals
mögen and müssen while SHEPHERD (1982) detects largely the same scenario in
the history of the modals in Antiguan Creole. That the notion of such
unidirectionality is indeed sound reasoning is additionally borne out by the
process of language acquisition by children. As noted by SHIELDS (1974),
SHEPHERD (1982), and PERKINS (1983), side by side with the child’s cognitive
development, the non-epistemic uses of the modals and other expressions of
modality, being less abstract, come before the epistemic notions. Persistent as
the deontic-to-epistemic tendency is, rare instances of an against-the-stream
development from epistemic to non-epistemic have also been documented.
LIVNAT (2002), for example, looks into the history of the Hebrew modal adverb
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ulay ‘perhaps’ which goes a long way from signaling epistemic possibility
only in Biblical Hebrew to functioning also as a deontic in directive speech
acts in Modern Hebrew.
Two studies devoted to the examination of the evolution of modal polysemy
need to be singled out here, those of BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) and
van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998). It is a central postulate of both that it is
possible to sketch universal paths of the development of modal meanings
traveled by the members of a modal system. Working on a sample of a large
number of the world’s languages, BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) arrive
at three paths of modality which take into account the pre-modal meaning of
a form, its modal evolution as well as its post-modal function. Van der AUWERA
and PLUNGIAN (1998) manage to integrate the single paths into a map which
explicitly marks the developments attested by means of the arrows, as shown in
Figure 3. The central part of the map, enclosed by the square, encompasses the
developments within modality. It is important to notice the pre-eminent trend
for the tokens of participant-internal modality to turn into markers of
participant-external modality and then into those of epistemic modality. To the
left off the square the major groups of the lexical sources of modal markers are
indicated. It can also be seen that the arrows extend beyond the square on the
right hand side, an index to erstwhile modal markers having a post-modal life.
Van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998: 104) refer to this process as
demodalization and it also resembles desemanticization à la GREENBERG (1991).
It takes only a moment’s look at the post-modal uses of modals to recognize
that the labels “future,” “condition,” “complementation” and “imperative” (cf.
BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA 1994: 212—236) have more to do with syntax
than with semantics. This stands to show that the semantic development of
a modal expression is paralleled by its syntactic evolution frequently captured
under the heading of grammaticalization. The correspondence between modal
markers and grammaticalization is discussed in Section 2.6.
2.5. Mechanisms of the semantic change in the modals
Having established the most frequent meanderings of the semantic change
attested in the case of the English modal system and modal systems
cross-linguistically, it is time to account for the apparatus of the change. The
processes that receive attention in the following sections are subjectification,
inferencing, metaphor and metonymy.
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2.5.1. Subjectification
The term “subjectification” as used in this study is intended to imply that the
change of the meanings of the English modals is driven by increasing
subjectivity. It is concluded in 2.1 that the particular areas of modality differ in
the load of subjectivity inherent to each of them. Using the terminology
adopted, it can be said that the subjectivity markedly grows in the direction
presented in Figure 4:
participant-internal modality < participant-external modality < epistemic modality
Figure 4. Increasing subjectivity and types of modality
It has also been remarked that within the epistemic and participant-external
domains we can speak about clines extending from weakly to strongly
subjective instances.
Obviously, that the semantic change of the modals and the growth of
subjectivity proceed along the same lines is nowhere near a coincidence. The
research of TRAUGOTT (1989; 1995; 1997; 1999) and TRAUGOTT and DASHER
(2005) testifies to the meanings of lexical forms, including the modals and
other modal expressions, being sucked into the vortex of growing subjectivity.
In TRAUGOTT’S (1989: 31) own words, “meanings tend to become increasingly
situated in the speaker’s subjective belief, state or attitude toward the
proposition.” The far-reaching operation of subjectification makes TRAUGOTT
(1995: 46) speak about “the ubiquity of subjectification [which] presumably
lies in the speaker’s attempts to communicate the relevance of what is said to
the communicative event, which includes hearers as well as speakers, but
which ultimately depends for its occurrence on the speaker.”
Remarkably, subjectification is extended in time. TRAUGOTT (1982; 1989)
draws three tendencies which reflect three stages of subjectification. By
Tendency I meanings lose objective aspects and become part of the speaker’s
internal set of values, by Tendency II, meanings gain textual and metalinguistic
functions and, finally, by Tendency III meanings become more and more
submerged by the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition. It is further argued
that the English modals gradually come to realize the three tendencies one by
one, with overlapping stages being involved, by giving up objective and
descriptive meanings, acquiring participant-external meanings and eventually
developing epistemic extensions to their meanings. This argument is paired
with the research in which TRAUGOTT (1989) finds that the modals, once
attuned to the expression of participant-external modality, occur in weakly
subjective contexts significantly before they do in strongly subjective ones.
Likewise, with epistemic meanings, strongly subjective instances are preceded
by the appearance of weakly subjective instances. The last point is fine-tuned
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by HANSON (1987) who, while concentrating on PDE epistemic adverbs
borrowed from French into Middle English, shows that initially their meanings
ranged from concrete to abstract, yet, they were nowhere near the epistemic
meaning that the adverbs have nowadays. Also, with the exception of certainly,
they could not serve as sentence adverbs. As yet another example of
subjectification, TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 114—115) invoke the study of
MYHILL (1996, 1997) in which an increase in the popularity of should, got to,
gonna at the expense of ought to, must in the twentieth century American
English is ascribed to speakers’ preference for modals whose meanings imply
an individualized Antagonist rather than modals which assign the role of the
Antagonist to a group of people.
For LANGACKER (1990, 1999), subjectification of the English modals
consists in the shift of the source of potency. In participant-internal cases, the
activator of potency is the subject, hence they are objective. Participant-external
modality locates the source of potency subject-externally up to the point where,
in a performative deontic use, it is the speaker who is the source of potency.
Epistemic modality provides an ultimate case with the potency being dependent
on the speaker’s reasoning processes. A concomitant of this shift is
“attenuation in regard to domain” (LANGACKER 1999: 163). What it means is
that the transition from non-modal meanings through non-epistemic through
epistemic involves change of the domain where the meaning is played out —
from the physical sphere through the social sphere through the speaker’s
mental activity, respectively.
In this study, subjectification and subjectivity, mostly as construed by
TRAUGOTT (1989), will be taken as the other factor, besides the strength of the
Antagonist’s force, that helps determine the location of the verb on the deontic
continuum.
2.5.2. Inferencing
In her highly influential article, TRAUGOTT (1989: 50) conjectures that some
semantic change is triggered by “the conventionalizing of conversational
implicatures.” In other words, the use of an utterance in a context can give rise
to an inference which is not a part of the meaning of any constituent of the
utterance. Still, if pragmatically strengthened, the inference may in time be
accepted by speakers as inseparable from the meaning of an expression. The
theme is picked up by TRAUGOTT and KÖNIG (1991) who, inspired by GEIS and
ZWICKY’S (1971) work on invited inferences, examine a number of expressions
in English, for example, the subordinating conjunctions such as after and since
and markers of concession. They conclude that the meanings of causation and
concession in these expressions develop in the course of invited inferences
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being strengthened. The importance imputed to the role of invited inferences in
semantic change reaches its climax in TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005), who
arrive at The Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change. In accordance
with this theory, the coded meaning of a lexeme may undergo modification
once speakers start initiating a contextual inference or flirting with an
already-existing inference. TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005) caution, however,
that not every single inference is guaranteed to cling to the coded meaning.
Therefore, there is a need to distinguish between invited inferences and
generalized invited inferences. The former category covers “fresh” inferences
before they evolve into an accepted part of the semantic content. Within this
group some inferences fail to affect the meaning in the long run and disappear.
The remaining invited inferences, once established as a significant component
of the coded meaning, turn into generalized invited inferences. A generalized
invited inference contributes to the polysemy of the meaning of a form as the
original pre-inferential meaning also remains in use.
2.5.3. Metaphorization and metonymization
A lot of literature recently has been devoted to the role of metaphor and
metonymy in the change of the meanings of the modals in English. Importantly
both metaphorization and metonymization are types of inferencing
(cf. TRAUGOTT and KÖNIG 1991). As regards the difference between metaphor
and metonymy, let me invoke the words of BARCELONA (2000: 3—4):
Metaphor is the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain
is partially “mapped,” i.e. projected onto a different experiential
domain, so that the second domain is partially understood in terms of
the first one. The domain that is mapped is called the source or donor
domain, and the domain onto which the source is mapped is called the
target or recipient domain. Both domains have to belong to different
superordinate domains. [...] Metonymy is a conceptual projection
whereby one experiential domain (the target) is partially understood in
terms of another experiential domain (the source) included in the same
common experiential domain.
It might be said that the inferential link in metaphor consists in conceiving of
one meaning in terms of another, the two meanings not being related to each
other, and, what is more, as TRAUGOTT and KÖNIG (1991: 212) note, it is only the
target domain that occurs in the context. In the case of metonymy, both
meanings are part of a larger conceptual domain, the source domain being
“present, even if only covertly, in the context” (TRAUGOTT and KÖNIG 1991: 212).
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3 — Expressing...
Among linguists who implicate metaphor in the change of modal meanings
are BYBEE and PAGLIUCA (1985), SWEETSER (1990), and PELYVÁS (2000). In
BYBEE and PAGLIUCA’S (1985) view, metaphorical leaps account for the shift of
the meaning of have to, first from possession to obligation and then from
obligation to epistemicity. SWEETSER (1990), as noted in 2.3, assumes that
epistemic modality becomes a plane onto which the socio-physical forces
operative in non-epistemic modality are metaphorically mapped. Intent on
introducing some improvements to the metaphorical analysis offered by
SWEETSER (1990), PELYVÁS (2000) claims that it cannot be divorced from
subjectification. Overall, however, PELYVÁS (2000) concludes that metaphor as
the key to the understanding of the shift from non-epistemic to epistemic
modality can be upheld. A problem attributed to metaphor is that it makes one
perceive semantic change as abrupt and modal meanings as discrete categories.
Metaphor often follows from a sudden realization that the structure of an
abstract meaning resembles the structure of a more concrete meaning. As
a result, proponents of metaphorical change tend to look “at lexical entries in
their »before« and »after« stages and out of context” (TRAUGOTT and DASHER
2005: 80) and overlook data that indicate that semantic change in the meanings
of modal markers is gradual. HOPPER and TRAUGOTT (1993), on the other hand,
without denying the part played by metaphor altogether, maintain that
grammaticalization, which encompasses the evolution of the modals, is
suggestive of metonymy. In this view, the attested appearance of instances
intermediate between the source meaning and target meaning is illustrative of
the conceptual relatedness of the two meanings, hence the shift can be gradual
rather than abrupt.
Reconciliatory attitudes come to the fore in BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA
(1994) and GOOSSENS (2000). Moreover, when it comes to grammaticalization
in general, HEINE, CLAUDI and HÜNNEMEYER’S (1991b) conclusion is that neither
metaphoric nor metonymic explanation is sufficient when applied single-
handedly. Both explanations are complementary and converge to account for
the discrete and continuous aspects of grammaticalization. Specifically in the
field of modality, BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994: 197) acknowledge the
role of both metaphor and metonymy, the latter being subsumed under
inferencing, and conclude that “the only way to determine the mechanism of
change in any particular case is to find evidence for the way the new meaning
arose.” A far-reaching ramification of GOOSSENS’S (2000) study is the
realization that metaphor can be, in fact, motivated by metonymy. The ultimate
metaphorical leap, say, from deontic necessity to epistemic necessity in the
case of a modal, is made possible due to recurring metonymic extensions.1
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1 A similar idea in the context of grammaticalization occurs in BRINTON and TRAUGOTT
(2005: 28) in that it is argued that “while the result of grammaticalization is often synchronically
Still, an analysis of the actual data, rather than pointing to what he calls
“metaphor from metonymy” (GOOSSENS 2000: 150) as the only mechanism of
change, hints at a variety of points at which a modal change can be initiated. In
a number of contexts the already established meaning can “partially sanction”
a use which is a foray into some other meaning. The foray follows from the
vagueness of the context and contributes to broadening the original meaning. If
such partially sanctioned instances of a modal are multiplied by a large number
of speakers over a period of time, the meaning to which these instances point
becomes part of the semantics of the modal. The idea of partial sanction being
borrowed from LANGACKER (1987/1991), TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 130)
equate the partially sanctioned uses with situations which are hospitable to
invited inferences.
2.6. Grammaticalization
Although only few explicit references to grammaticalization have been made in
the paragraphs above, the idea of grammaticalization has been copiously
present between the lines. In 2.2 mention is made of a modal system, as
construed by PALMER (2003), whose members are grammaticalized forms. It
would be downright fallacy to presume that while the grammaticalized
elements exist all along, it is the semantic change that, in time, renders them
members of the modal system. That semantic and syntactic developments in
the case of modal forms go hand in hand can be gathered from the work of
TRAUGOTT (1982; 1989), PLANK (1984), BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994),
van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998), KRUG (2000), TRAUGOTT and DASHER
(2005), FISCHER (2007), and others galore. Since I side with the view that
a diachronic study of modality lacks a sense of completeness when only the
semantic aspects are highlighted, below I present the basic contours of
grammaticalization theory and its relation to modal markers and subjectifica-
tion.2
Wide-ranging studies of grammaticalization, e.g. HOPPER and TRAUGOTT
(1993), KRUG (2000), FISCHER (2007), are replete with acknowledgments of the
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3*
metaphorical, textual evidence for the development of many grammatical formatives out of
lexical and constructional material is metonymic in the sense that it is highly context-bound and
arises out of the implicatures in the speaker-hearer communicative situation.”
2 More exhaustive accounts of grammaticalization theory, its history and case studies can be
found, for example, in LEHMANN (1982) [1995], HEINE and REH (1982), HEINE, CLAUDI and
HÜNNEMEYER (1991a), HOPPER and TRAUGOTT (1993), HARRIS and CAMPBELL (1995), CAMPBELL
and JANDA (2001), and ŁĘCKI (2010).
eighteenth and nineteenth century roots of the research on grammaticalization.
ŁĘCKI (2010) divides those early studies into the first phase and second phase.
The names invoked in connection with the former include those of such
eighteenth century philosophers as de Condillac, Rousseau and Horne Tooke.
Concurrently, the most prominent figure of the second phase is the twentieth
century linguist Antoine Meillet. On top of the fact that it is him who takes
credit for coming up with the very term “grammaticalization,” his much quoted
definition of the process, i.e. ‘l’attribution du caractère grammatical à un mont
jadis autonome’ [the attribution of a grammatical function to a formerly
autonomous word — J.N.] (MEILLET 1912: 385) remains still valid, with
a proviso, however, that, as observed by KRUG (2000: 13), the focus on a word
has been displaced by the focus on more complex units. It is these units,
initially composed of autonomous lexical forms and gradually fossilized as
grammatical forms, that nowadays constitute the object of grammaticalization
studies.
In this day and age researchers make use of the above notion while trying
to define grammaticalization anew. For BRINTON and TRAUGOTT (2005: 99), for
example, “grammaticalization is the change whereby in certain linguistic
contexts speakers use parts of a construction with a grammatical function. Over
time the resulting grammatical item may become more grammatical by
acquiring more grammatical functions and expanding its host-classes.” Note
that the definition, by emphasizing the conversational and contextual
background of the change, hints at the affinity of the mechanism of
grammaticalization and inferencing. For the sake of clarity, it bears mentioning
that the recent interests in grammaticalization gather momentum in the 1980’s
with the contribution of LEHMANN (1982) [1995] and HEINE and REH (1982),
yet, date back to GIVÓN (1971; 1979). LEHMANN (1982) [1995] explores the
concept of cyclic developments of grammaticalized forms, the concept clearly
articulated in MEILLET (1912) and GIVÓN (1979). According to GIVÓN (1979),
the use of a lexical construction in pragmatic discourse may push the
construction onto the path of grammaticalization until this construction
eventually disappears. The stages intermediate between the lexical status and
the disappearance are depicted in Figure 5:
discourse > syntax > morphology > morphophonemics > zero
Figure 5. Stages of grammaticalization according to GIVÓN (1979: 209)
Needless to say, the elimination of the grammaticalized item generates the
necessity to recruit other lexical items so that they could fill the resultant
vacuum. What is more, grammaticalization is viewed as a gradual process and
LEHMANN (1982) [1995], in an attempt to provide “a measurement of relatively
stronger and weaker grammaticalization” (MCMAHON 1994: 167), goes on to
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specify six parameters that converge to help gauge the degree of the
grammaticalization of an item. In later work on this increasingly popular topic
grammaticalization is associated with and detected through a number of
concomitant properties, which are most loudly voiced in HOPPER (1991: 22):
a) Layering. “Within a broad functional domain, new layers are
continually emerging. As this happens, the older layers are not
necessarily discarded, but may remain to coexist with and interact
with the newer layers.”
b) Divergence. “When a lexical form undergoes grammaticization to
a clitic or affix, the original lexical form may remain as an
autonomous element and undergo the same changes as ordinary
lexical items.”
c) Specialization. “Within a functional domain, at one stage a variety
of forms with different semantic nuances may be possible; as
grammaticization takes place, this variety of formal choices narrows
and the smaller number of forms selected assume more general
grammatical meanings.”
d) Persistence. “When a form undergoes grammaticization from
a lexical to a grammatical function, so long as it is grammatically
viable some traces of its original lexical meanings tend to adhere to
it, and details of its lexical history may be reflected in constraints
on its grammatical distribution.”
e) De-categorialization. “Forms undergoing grammaticization tend to
lose or neutralize the morphological markers and syntactic
privileges characteristic of the full categories Noun and Verb, and
to assume attributes characteristic of secondary categories such as
Adjective, Participle, Preposition, etc.”
Grammaticalization theory has proved attractive for studies of modality. Its
appeal lies in the fact that the process goes beyond mere syntax or semantics
and is concerned with variegated developments responsible for picking up
a lexical element and assigning a functional value to it over time. As
HASPELMATH (2002: 26) notes, “grammaticalization is a particularly interesting
concept [...] because we observe strong correlations between phonological,
syntactic and semantic-pragmatic changes” (cf. HEINE and KUTEVA 2002 and
HEINE 2003 [2005] for similar comments). The status of grammaticalization as
an overarching principle in language change lies at the heart of the
developments shown in van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S (1998: 98) map of
modality. Although, as resorted to in 2.4, the map primarily serves to illustrate
the semantic paths of modal meanings, we cannot escape from the fact that it is
suggestive of some morphosyntactic changes as well. The lexical sources of
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subsequent modal exponents do not make up any grammatical system, unlike
modals which are frequently members of a modals system (cf. PALMER 2003).
Within the field of modality itself, BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994: 242)
demonstrate that cross-linguistically the ratio of free forms in relation to affixes
among exponents of non-epistemic modality is remarkably lower than among
those of epistemic modality. The final stage of the cycle of a modal form is
frequently beset by the loss of a modal meaning with a grammatical function
remaining as the only application of the form. Optionally, some modal forms,
e.g. Chinese děi ‘need’ or English need, have been attested to backslide into
lexical items via degrammaticalization (cf. van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN
1998; TAEYMANS 2004; ZIEGELER 2004). It must then be concluded that the
evolution of modality goes hand in hand with parallel morphosyntactic change,
both developments being conveniently captured under the heading of
grammaticalization. BRINTON (1988), HEINE, CLAUDI and HÜNNEMEYER (1991a),
HOPPER (1991), BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994), ZIEGELER (2002), and
ŁĘCKI (2010) stress that it is the semantic change that provides the spark for
the mechanism of grammaticalization to take off. In ZIEGELER’S (2002: 117)
own words, “grammaticalization begins with conceptual changes, and [...] these
are prior to other changes taking place.” At the same time, I side with FISCHER
(2007: 183) who advances the need “to tie formal change to meaning change
on an equal footing,” as only then do we get a proper idea of how
grammaticalization in general and gramamticalization of modality works.
In order to elucidate the details of the grammaticalization of modality,
FISCHER (2007: 182) adumbrates three clines: semantic, formal and discourse-
pragmatic. The semantic cline, as it runs parallel to and is a recasting of the
notion of the semantic changes presented in 2.4, will not be repeated here. The
other two clines are depicted in Figure 6:
CLINE OF MODALITY (FORMAL)
lexical verb > vector verb > auxiliary > clitic > zero
CLINE OF MODALITY (DISCOURSE-PRAGMATIC)
propositional > (textual) > expressive/attitudinal/interpersonal
socio-physical world > world of reasoning/ > subjective attitude towards the
of speech event world
non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective3
Figure 6. Clines of modality (taken from FISCHER (2007: 182))
A coherent reflection of GIVÓN’S (1979: 209) cycle, shown in Figure 5 above,
the formal cline displays the morphosyntactic stages that modal forms have
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3 The term intersubjective as used here describes a meaning involving a situation in which the
speaker directly addresses the recipient. Such an understanding of intersubjectivity stems from
TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 21—23). In this monograph, however, this nomenclature makes no
further appearance since such interpersonal contexts are treated in terms of strong subjectivity.
been attested to go through over time until their demise. If it is tacitly assumed
that a modal form is simultaneously visited by the semantic and
morphosyntactic developments, at least some correspondence between the
stages can be expected. The increase in bound forms that accompanies the shift
from non-epistemic to epistemic modality (cf. BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA
1994: 242) is then justified. Apart from the semantic and morphosyntactic
clines, FISCHER (2007: 182) explicitly points to the discourse-pragmatic domain
as another dimension along which grammaticalization of modality takes place.
The cline, based primarily on the research of TRAUGOTT (1982, 1989),
SWEETSER (1990), and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005), comprises three paths.
All of them have been already touched upon. In 2.5.1 subjectification is
described in detail since I follow TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 89—90) in
conceiving of subjectification as a trait of semantic change in general, or, in
the body of this monograph, of modal shifts rather than strictly that of
grammaticalization. The first and last paths of the discourse-pragmatic cline
cohere with the growing subjectivity of the respective modal meanings on the
semantic cline and with the three tendencies detected by TRAUGOTT (1989). The
second path is an extended version of the trajectory described by SWEETSER
(1990) which I highlight in 2.3. In compliance with this analysis, the evolution
of the meaning of a modal in English typically involves the following
consecutive phases: non-epistemic modality with a socio-physical background,
epistemic modality played out in the world of reasoning, speech-act modality
involving a conversational background. With each stage respectively, the
conceptual background, or LANGACKER’S (1990; 1999) domain, of modality
changes, each stage being indicative of more subjectivity.
The three clines assembled by FISCHER (2007) are also emblematic of two
widely discussed features of grammaticalization: gradualness (or graduality)
and unidirectionality. Gradualness describes the stages on the clines as
non-discrete, hence a large amount of indeterminacy between them is
warranted. BRINTON and TRAUGOTT (2005: 26) explain the nature of gradualness
in the following way: “[...] this notion refers to the fact that most changes
occur in very small structural steps with innovative uses coexisting along older
ones” (cf. GIVÓN 1975, also LICHTENBERK 1991, on the gradual diffusion of
syntactic categories). Enjoying very wide currency in grammaticalization
studies, the issue of unidirectionality has raised some controversy. Integrated
into the theory of grammaticalization by LEHMANN (1982) [1995],
unidirectionality implies that the stages of the clines proceed in the order
shown rather than in any other order. As HOPPER and TRAUGOTT (1993: 95) put
it, “the basic assumption is that there is a relationship between two stages
A and B, such that A occurs before B, but not vice versa.” Much emphasis is
put on the fact that “there is nothing deterministic about grammaticalization
and unidirectionality. Changes do not have to occur. They do not have to go to
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completion, in other words, they do not have to move all the way along the
cline” (HOPPER and TRAUGOTT 1993: 95). Nevertheless, on top of fervent
supporters of unidirectionality such as HEINE and REH (1984), TRAUGOTT (1982;
1989), HEINE, CLAUDI and HÜNNEMEYER (1991a), BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA
(1994), van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998), HASPELMATH (1999; 2002),
TSANGALIDIS (2002), TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005), the notion has attracted
a remarkable number of opponents, e.g. ROBERTS (1993), NEWMAYER (1998),
LIGHTFOOT (1999; 2002), FISCHER et al. (2000), LASS (2000), CAMPBELL (2001),
JANDA (2001), NORDE (2001), and ZIEGELER (2002) among others. Arguments
that make inroads into or, simply, challenge unidirectionality include:
a) there are a number of exceptions to unidirectionality identified
cross-linguistically, (cf., for example, BURRIDGE 1998, NEWMEYER
1998, JANDA 2001, ZIEGELER 2002),
b) unidirectionality renders viable the notion that all languages were
initially isolating (cf. LASS 2000),
c) unidirectionality is at odds with the fact that language change is
driven by parameter setting (cf. LIGHTFOOT 1999; 2002).
Having addressed these criticisms, HASPELMATH (2000; 2002), nevertheless,
comes out convinced that unidirectionality holds its own “as an important
prerequisite for understanding language change” (HASPELMATH 2002: 35).
I endorse his view that the exceptions to unidirectionality, rare when compared
with the tokens of unidirectionality, fail to invalidate the theory as a whole.
2.7. The verb in Old English
The aim of this section is to introduce the focal exponent of modality in this
study, that is, the OE verb. It is a long standing tradition to divide OE verbs
into four groups of verbs: weak, strong,4 preterite-present and anomalous. The
former two groups comprise the majority of all the verbs at that time. What
underpins the division into strong and weak verbs is the mode of preterite form
creation: strong verbs make use of root vowel variation (also known as “vowel
gradation” or “ablaut”) in their preterites while weak verbs resort to a dental
suffix (see PROKOSCH 1939: 159; MITCHELL 1985: §600; HOGG 1992b: 146;
LASS 1994: 153, 164). Depending on the vowel variation, there are seven
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4 According to PROKOSCH (1939: 159), the nomenclature “strong” and “weak” with reference
to Germanic verbs goes back to Jacob GRIMM (1819).
classes of strong verbs in Old English. Proto-Germanic weak verbs are
assigned to four classes, the criterion being the modification to the stem in the
preterite before the suffix. Class IV of weak verbs, although still relevant for
Gothic, has no morphological impact on Old English where there are only
three classes of weak verbs (cf. LASS 1994: 169). It is generally conceded that
ablaut is older than the dental suffix as a preterite marker. LASS (1990: 153)
speculates that proto-Germanic inherits the ablaut series from PIE aspectual
forms, and, having eliminated the PIE aorist and perfect, “recycles” the
inherited ablaut in new preterites. As for the dental suffix, the motivation for
the form has never been successfully pinned down. A typically Germanic
innovation, the dental suffix is likely to have arisen out of the periphrasis of
a verb stem and auxiliary *dhe–-/dho–, ‘to do,’ a cognate of OE don and PDE
do, later grammaticalized into an inflection (cf. PROKOSCH 1939: 196, LASS
1994: 164). Interestingly enough, ablaut is, generally speaking, no longer
productive in Old English (for exceptions in Old English and later, see WEŁNA
1997). This is connected with the process of the disintegration of the strong
verb system which starts as early as in late proto-Germanic (cf. NEWFIELD
1983; KRYGIER 1994). The disintegration stands for a tendency for original
strong verbs to develop preterites in the weak verb fashion, i.e. with the aid of
the dental suffix as well as for a tendency for borrowed verbs to join the ranks
of weak verbs, which culminates in the demise of the weak/strong verb
distinction in Early Modern English.
As an illustrative example, the conjugation of the strong verb drι–fan (Class I)
and a weak verb lufian (Class II) in Table 2 wraps up this brief section:
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Present Indicative Subjunctive Indicative Subjunctive
Singular 1. drι–fe drι–fe lufie lufie
2. drι–fst drι–fe lufast lufie
3. drι–fð drι–fe lufað lufie
Plural 1—3. drι–fað drι–fen lufiað lufien
Preterite
Singular 1. dra–f drife lufode lufode
2. drife drife lufodest lufode
3. dra–f drife lufode lufode
Plural 1—3. drifon drifen lufodon lufoden
Table 2. The conjugation of drι–fan and lufian in the West Saxon dialect of Old
English
2.7.1. The pre-modals and the preterite-present verbs
The list of the predecessors of the PDE modals comprises seven preterite-
present verbs agan, cunnan, *durran, magan, *motan, *sculan, *þurfan and
one anomalous verb willan.5 In literature there has been little agreement as to
how to refer to this group of verbs. As the relevant verbs are not
morphologically homogeneous, their modal semantics is not fully established
and their syntactic position as auxiliaries has been questioned, the term “modal
auxiliaries” is felt to be rather awkward. MITCHELL (1985: §991) puts the term
“modal” in inverted commas and says that “I call these [predecessors of the
PDE modals] ‘»modal« auxiliaries’ for want of a better name.” In order to
avoid possible terminological caveats, in the following part of this study
I follow LIGHTFOOT (1979) and TRAUGOTT (1992) in applying the term
“pre-modals.” Considering that seven out of the eight pre-modals are
preterite-presents, this morphological class calls for some attention.
As is well known, the seven pre-modals mentioned above are not the only
preterite-present verbs in Old English. Following PROKOSCH (1939) and
CAMPBELL (1959), below I list all the OE preterite-presents assigned to the
classes that correspond to those of strong verbs:
Class I: witan ‘know,’ agan ‘possess, ought’
Class II: deag ‘avail’
Class III: unnan ‘grant,’ cunnan ‘can, know,’ þearf ‘need,’ dearr ‘dare’
Class IV: sceal ‘shall,’ gemunnan ‘remember,’ be-, geneah ‘be enough’
Class VI: mot ‘must’
Uncertain class: mæg ‘may’
WARNER (1993: 140) adds uton to this list although he admits that the verb
“is of debated origin.” This classification is taken from CAMPBELL (1959:
342—346). It should not be overlooked, however, that there are minor
discrepancies between the details of PROKOSCH’S (1939) and CAMPBELL’S (1959)
taxonomy. Thus, in PROKOSCH’S (1939: 192) view, geneah falls under Class V
although he admits that a certain variety of interpretation comes into play in
this case. Another controversial issue is mæg which does not sit comfortably in
any class, as CAMPBELL (1959: 346) notes: “This verb cannot be classified
under any of Classes I—V, for the root appears to have had I—E a (not o), nor
under Classes VI and VII, as these have past tenses in o–, e– and e–o.” PROKOSCH
(1939: 193) overcomes this difficulty saying that “we may assume that the
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5 The asterisk next to the form of the verb indicates that the infinitive form of the verb is
not attested in OE texts. I will hereupon adhere to the practice of using the 1st/3rd person singular
present forms of the verbs with unattested infinitives.
[Gothic] pl. magum was the starting point for this preterite present and that the
singular, theoretically *mo–g, was replaced by mag under the influence of kann,
skal, etc.” Conversely, COLMAN (1992) believes that this traditional taxonomy
is no longer valid for the preterite-presents in Old English. What she postulates
is that the preterite-presents, in the course of what she calls “realignment,”
come to constitute a sub-class of verbs internally divisible into sub-groups
defined by a different set of morphological features.
The origins of the class of the preterite-presents have been alluded to on
numerous occasions. Undoubtedly, the verbs are part of the Indo-European
inheritance. PROKOSCH (1939: 187—188) speaks of two types of perfect in
proto-Indo-European, i.e. reduplicated and non-reduplicated, the latter used to
talk about states occurring as a consequence of past actions. It is the
non-reduplicated perfect that continues on a large scale in the IE family. “The
Gmc languages have preserved this perfect type to a much greater extent than
any other IE language. In fact, they doubtless added to this group in prehistoric
times” (PROKOSCH 1939: 188). As further noted by PROKOSCH (1939), CAMPBELL
(1959), and LASS (1994), the past time reference in the perfect forms is
dropped in favor of present meaning. As a result, the Germanic branch comes
to have a class of verbs of present meaning which have a past of erstwhile
perfects. The shift in the time reference takes substantial credit for the label
“preterite-presents” attached to these verbs. The subsequent morphological
consequences of the shift are explicated by LASS (1994: 169f.): “[...] since the
past sense was lost in these historical perfects, new pasts had to be constructed;
and since the weak conjugation even in early times was the only productive
one, this is the natural source. [...] the fact that the present is »really«
(historically) a strong preterite accounts for one major structural anomaly: the
lack of 3 sg inflection [...].” The conjugation of a preterite-present in Old
English is exemplified by mo–t and sceal in Table 3:
2.7. The verb in Old English 43
Present Indicative Subjunctive Indicative Subjunctive
Singular 1. mo–t mo–te sceal scyle, scule
2. mo–st mo–te scealt scyle, scule
3. mo–t mo–te sceal scyle, scule
Plural 1—3. mo–ton mo–ten sculon scylen, sculen
Preterite
Singular 1. mo–ste mo–ste sceolde sceolde
2. mo–stest mo–ste scoldest sceolde
3. mo–ste mo–ste sceolde sceolde
Plural 1—3. mo–sten mo–sten scoldon sceolden
Table 3. The conjugation of mot and sceal in the West Saxon dialect of Old English
In a nutshell, WARNER (1993: 140) points out that the conjugation of
a preterite-present in the present indicative resembles that of a preterite of
a strong verb (compare Table 2). The past forms are composed of a preterite
stem and a dental suffix, which is indicative of the operation of the weak
conjugation formulas. Also, the indicative forms in the present “often displayed
remnants of Indo-European vowel gradation (specifically, zero-grade) persisting
in strong verb preterites” (NAGLE 1989: 57), which can be observed in singular
sceal vs. plural sculon.
The class of the preterite-presents per se fails to survive till Present-Day
English. All the preterite-presents, besides those which yield modal auxiliaries in
Early Modern English, i.e. agan>ought, cunnan>can, dearr>dare, sceal>shall,
mot>must, mæg>may, become obsolete in standard English by late Middle
English or Early Modern English (cf. 3.2 on the demise of þearf). PLANK (1984:
312) maintains that the class “gradually shrank” as a result of its members either
switching to the other classes, e.g. deag and witan end up as weak verbs, or
simply falling into disuse. As NAGLE (1989) sees it, eventual obsolescence affects
those preterite-presents which fail to be abductively categorized as auxiliaries.
Deduction causes speakers to perceive them as not fitting in with the other
preterite-presents which have been covered by the auxiliary-bound change.
Consequently, speakers eliminate the verbs which seem out of place.
With the morphological characteristics of the pre-modals established, in
what follows I focus on the syntax of the verbs. In particular, I seek to handle
the use of the pre-modals in impersonal constructions first and then review the
complementation options relevant for the verbs.
As regards impersonal constructions, it needs emphasizing that the OE
pre-modals refuse to be categorized as impersonal verbs themselves, yet they
are attested with impersonal characteristics when the following infinitive,
a potentially impersonal verb, is used in this way. What is meant by the
impersonal characteristics is absence of any nominative subject, the arguments
being expressed by means of oblique NPs, as in (2.9):
(2.9) hine sceal on domes dæg gesceamian beforan
him [lit.: him (acc)] shall at Doomsday be-ashamed before
Gode
God
‘He will be ashamed before God at Doomsday’
Wulfstan 238.12 (example and translation taken
from WARNER 1993: 123)
Notice that in (2.9) the only argument of the verb gesceamian, i.e. hine takes
an accusative form, which leaves the sentence subjectless. Having made a foray
into such impersonal uses of the pre-modals, WARNER (1993) offers some
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insightful comments. Importantly, within the group, it is mæg, mot, sceal,
þearf, and wile that are conducive to impersonal occurrences, there being no
corresponding attestations of dearr, cunnan, or agan. As the nature of the
impersonal use of a pre-modal consists in it giving up its syntactic identity in
order to assume the syntactic profile of the subordinate impersonal verb,
WARNER (1993: 128) is led to treat the pre-modals thus used, which he terms
“intervening verbs,” on a par with raising verbs, e.g. þyncan. In other words,
with both intervening and raising verbs, the syntactic and semantic structure of
the sentence is determined by the impersonal character of the following
infinitive. At the same time, since impersonal syntax itself is not a central issue
for the OE pre-modals, I do not consider it necessary to invoke the burgeoning
literature on impersonal constructions in English here (for a detailed diachronic
examination of impersonals in English, see DENISON 1993, for a thorough
survey of linguistic approaches to impersonals in the history of English, see
DENISON 1993 and LOUREIRO-PORTO 2005).
When it comes to the complementation type, the pre-modals have four
options available, that is to say, a pre-modal may be either used intransitively
or make use of one of the following complements: an infinitive, which with the
notable exception of agan is a bare infinitive without to, an NP or a þæt-clause.
Availing myself of examples given in TRAUGOTT (1992: 194) and DENISON
(1993: 305, 308), I will illustrate all the patterns respectively:
(2.10) þeos seolf mæg wið ælces cynnes untrumnysse ðe
this salve may against each kind (GEN) illness(es) which
eagan eigliað
eyes afflict
‘This salve is good for all manner of infirmities that affect
eyes’
(Med3 37 114. 20)
(2.11) 7 he næfre hine ofersuiðan meahte
and he never him overcome might
‘and he was never able to overcome him’
(Mart 3 178.41)
(2.12) ...þæt he geornor wolde sibbe wið hiene þonne gewinn
...that they rather wanted peace with him than conflict
‘...that they wanted peace with him rather than conflict’
(Or 3 1 96.17)
(2.13) Ac þæt hie magon þæt hie þas tida leahtrien
but that they have-power that they those times blame (SUBJ)
‘but all they can do is blame the times’
(Or 74.25)
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Furthermore, as regards the distribution of the complementation types, the
members of the pre-modal group differ markedly from one another in the
frequency of acceptance of the individual patterns, or may even disallow
certain patterns altogether. For instance, TRAUGOTT (1992: 194) and DENISON
(1993: 308) note that the þæt-clause complement is compatible only with mæg
and wile. GOOSSENS (1987a), having investigated the language of Ælfric and
Wulfstan, demonstrates that cann shows a much stronger preference for NP
objects than sceal. Another important observation concerns the infinitival
complements of the pre-modals. If we juxtapose two facts: high frequency of
infinitives as the complements of the pre-modals and attestations of the
pre-modals themselves in the infinitive form, there should be no obstacle to
a pre-modal being followed by an infinitive of another pre-modal. Indeed, this
proves to be the case. From his quest for the so called double modals in the
Toronto Microfische Concordance to Old English, NAGLE (1993; 1994) comes
out assured that such combinations of the pre-modal do exist in that period, the
most common being sceal agan, sceal cunnan and mot agan. What is
remarkable is that while the syntactically first pre-modal in the sequence is
finite, the second pre-modal, each time occurring as a bare infinitive, invariably
chooses an NP object. This amounts to one of the reasons why NAGLE (1993)
dismisses the OE double modals as the possible predecessors of the double
modals in present-day Scottish English (cf. BROWN 1990) and of the multiple
modal constructions utilized in the speech of the southern US (cf. DI PAOLO
1989; BATTISTELLA 1991; MONTGOMERY and NAGLE 1993; MISHOE and
MONTGOMERY 1994; NAGLE 1994; 2003; NAGLE and HOLMES 2000). Consider
example (2.14) as an illustration of the OE double modal construction, where,
it is noteworthy, the infinitive can be seen to be used with the meaning of
possession rather than any modal semantics:
(2.14) þat hie healfre geweald wið Eotena bearn agan moston
that they half share (ACC) with Geats’ sons own might
‘that they might own an equal share with the sons of the Geats’
(Beowulf 1085)
(example and translation from NAGLE 1993: 366)
Once the typical sentence patterns with the pre-modals have been looked
into, I will now proceed to lay out the views of linguists on the syntactic status
of the pre-modals in Old English. In many cases, e.g. LIGHTFOOT (1979), the
syntactic whereabouts of the pre-modals are looked into as a prelude to the
discussion of syntactic change. Considering that failing to include some of the
central issues in the post-OE evolution of the pre-modals would distort the
overall picture, I incorporate these ideas into the content of the following
paragraphs. It should be borne in mind, however, that syntactic change as such
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does not constitute a focal point of attention in this monograph and will not be
thoroughly examined until it has a bearing upon a given researcher’s
perception of the pre-modals in Old English.
Generative linguists in the 1970s usually consider the pre-modals main
verbs. ALLEN 1975 [1978], before embarking on an analysis of OE word order,
starts with the tenet that the pre-modals (she uses the term “modals”) have to
be treated as main verbs until it is possible to prove otherwise. She says that
“the burden of the proof seems to be on those who would add a new category
to the grammar. There is no justification for including the category »modal« in
the grammar of Old English unless it can be demonstrated that modal verbs
behave differently from other verbs” (ALLEN [1978]: 92). Subsequently,
ALLEN’S ([1978]) critique is leveled at TRAUGOTT (1972) who, having defined
the syntactic criteria that PDE auxiliaries meet, refrains from showing that they
also apply to the OE pre-modals, which does not, however, stop her from
regarding the pre-modals as auxiliaries. All in all, in ALLEN’S ([1978]) view,
a pre-modal is generated under the V node in the VP, the infinitival
complements being treated as non-finite clausal complements dominated by S.
In his highly influential work, Principles of Diachronic Syntax, which pivots
on the rules of The Extended Standard Theory, LIGHTFOOT (1979) is set within
the same line of thought as ALLEN ([1978]) in his approach to the OE
pre-modals. Despite the areas in which the pre-modals diverge syntactically from
main verbs, e.g. their strong leaning toward bare infinitives as complements
rather than inflected infinitives, the pre-modals fall into the category of main
verbs. Thus, a tree-diagrammed representation of (2.11) would be:
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S
NP VP
hine
PRN AdvP NP V
He næfre S meahte
COMP S
NP VP
PRO NP V
PRN ofersuiðan
Figure 7. A tree diagram of sentence (2.11)
It will be clear from Figure 7 that the pre-modal meahte is still the head of the
VP which is complemented by the clausal constituent. In the underlying
structure the clausal complement is assigned the NP specification.
The appeal of the classification of the pre-modals as main verbs echoes in
later studies such as KOSSUTH (1982) or ROBERTS (1985). It must be said,
however, that this trend perseveres to some extent as a side effect of the
Lightfootian stance on syntactic change and the notorious Transparency
Principle. LIGHTFOOT (1979) is of the opinion that within the next centuries, up
till about the year 1500, the pre-modals are visited by a host of mutually
unrelated changes that he calls the Predisposing Changes. They are the
following:
a) the pre-modals are the only surviving members of the morphological
class of the preterite-presents,
b) the pre-modals show consistency in taking a bare infinitive,
c) the past forms of the pre-modals acquire uses not connected with
the expression of past time,
d) the pre-modals cease to combine with NP complements.
The operation of these changes leaves the pre-modals in a position where they
are syntactically marked off the rest of verbs. What happens next is a sudden
reanalysis of the pre-modals into modal auxiliaries due to the Transparency
Principle, an independent formula which enters once complexity and
exceptionality accumulate beyond tolerable limits in a grammar and a category
refinement seems to be in order. As FISCHER and van der LEEK (1981: 310) put
it “the conclusion to be drawn, [LIGHTFOOT (1979) — J.N.] argues, is that the
number of exception features due to the earlier changes had exceeded the limits
of derivational complexity set by the Transparency Principle. Forced to reduce
the intolerable opacity, the new generation [of speakers — J.N.] abducted the
separate category »modal«.” The emergence of the modal auxiliaries comes
about side by side with another round of changes affecting them, that is to say,
the modals lose non-finite forms (infinitives, gerunds, participles) and they no
longer enter perfective or double modal constructions, at least in standard
British English.
Obviously, the reanalysis changes a tree diagram representation of any
sentence containing a modal. A modal verb is no longer part of the VP, it is
inserted under the Aux node dominated directly by S, instead. MCMAHON
(1994: 118) sums up the consequences of the reanalysis visible in the Phrase
Structure Rules in the following way:
a) before the reanalysis: S → NP VP
(modal = V, part of VP)
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b) after the reanalysis: S → NP Aux VP
Aux → Tense (Modal)
(modal = separate category, not part of VP)
As is well known, LIGHTFOOT’S (1979) theory of change has been an object
of harsh criticism, e.g. FISCHER and van der LEEK (1981), ROMAINE (1981),
PLANK (1984), NAGLE (1989), which LIGHTFOOT (1991; 1999) ultimately only
partly accepts.6 Intent on pinpointing numerous drawbacks in LIGHTFOOT’S
(1979) data, PLANK (1984) tries to show that a radical reanalysis never really
takes place. Rather, most of the developments that LIGHTFOOT (1979) classifies
as the Predisposing Changes and the post-reanalysis changes, are shown by
PLANK (1984) to be gradual processes, some of them originating in Old
English. The very sixteenth century, the alleged seat of the reanalysis, is not
treated as a period of any crucial significance. The processes that lead the
pre-modals to auxiliarihood, although admittedly somewhat intensified in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, continue before and after this time. PLANK
(1984), in fact, does not take any firm stand on the issue of the syntactic status
of the OE pre-modals, his main contribution being the notion of graduality that
underlies the overall syntactic evolution of the English modals. The same
notion of graduality bears on NAGLE’S (1989) account of the (pre)-modals in
which he strongly opposes the independence of what LIGHTFOOT (1979) terms
the Predisposing Changes. The key to understanding these changes lies in the
fact that in late Old English the pre-modals slowly take over the function of
periphrastic subjunctive markers in dependent clauses. The adaptation of the
pre-modals to the subjunctive purposes follows from the meanings of the
pre-modals and the subjunctive closely overlapping. Increasingly frequent use
of the pre-modals in periphrastic structures, it is argued, leads speakers to
perceive the pre-modals as auxiliary-like. “I wish here to propose that as
a result speakers abduced special subcategorization of both the modals and the
whole preterit-present paradigm beginning in early ME as [+V, +Aux, +Mod],
a development which spread as the conditions favoring it heightened, namely,
the expansion of the use of the modals as auxiliaries” (NAGLE 1989: 71). The
developments assembled under the Predisposing Changes occur as a gradual
surface corollary of the special marking of the pre-modals. Interestingly
enough, NAGLE (1989) does not turn down the concept of a reanalysis of the
pre-modals in Early Modern English. For him it is a second quicker stage in
the evolution of the pre-modals.
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6 Without really abandoning the idea that the OE pre-modals are main verbs and that the
reanalysis takes place, LIGHTFOOT (1991; 1999) comes to admit a degree of relatedness between
the Predisposing Changes and the changes after the reanalysis as well as a gradual, rather than
simultaneous, character of the changes (cf. also the discussion in FISCHER 2007: 175—177).
Another study which marries both opposition to LIGHTFOOT (1979) and the
reanalysis of the pre-modals is HARRIS and CAMPBELL (1995). Their contention
is that the reanalysis takes place by early Middle English in the course of the
morphological subjunctive being ousted by the periphrastic subjunctive
containing the pre-modals. In this view, the pre-modals experience parallel
homophonous development as lexical verbs on the one hand and auxiliaries on
the other hand. The Predisposing Changes described by LIGHTFOOT (1979) as
leading to the reanalysis are to be seen as the gradual actualization of the
reanalysis. As the auxiliaries gradually account for most of the occurrences of
the pre-modals, the corresponding lexical verbs die out in Early Modern
English (cf. also FISCHER 2003 for support of these views).
It is, however, WARNER (1982; 1993) who answers ALLEN’S (1975) call and
ultimately provides evidence that the OE pre-modals and the other verbs are not
syntactically on equal footing. As noted by DENISON (1993), the novelty of this
account rests on the essentially cognitive theoretical approach to auxiliaries
rather than on the data presented. Inspired by ROSCH’S (1978; 1988) theory of
human categorization, WARNER (1993) reasons that the membership of a word
category, say, the category of verbs, does not imply that all the members of this
category conform in the same degree to all the properties that define this
membership. In other words, we can talk about “better” and “worse” members of
a word category, its more central and more peripheral elements. A consequence
of such a construal of a word category is that categories are not discrete but there
is an amount of overlapping between them. At the same time, the categories are
arranged on different planes as basic, superordinate and subordinate. “Because it
has most distinctive properties and is most internally coherent” (DENISON 1993:
335), a basic category is the most easily accessible to a language user. A working
hypothesis that WARNER (1993) assumes is that auxiliaries in early English start
off as a not well-defined category subordinate to the basic category ‘verb.’ With
his mind set on verifying this hypothesis, WARNER (1993) sets out to check
whether there is a set of correlated properties that might define the class of
auxiliaries in, inter alia, Old English and whether it is possible to point to a set
of verbs that merit inclusion in this category. Obviously, a central question is
whether the pre-modals belong to the class of auxiliaries.
Accordingly, WARNER (1993) probes into the behavior of potential OE auxiliaries,
including the pre-modals, in relation to the following syntactic properties:
a) occurrence before contexts of ellipsis,
a’) occurrence in pseudogapping contexts,
b) transparency to impersonal constructions, [which is indicative of
lack of subject selection and the status of a verb as a sentence
modifier].
(WARNER 1993: 152)
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The subsequent research, in which other morphological and semantic features
are also taken into account, allows for the following generalizations: the
pre-modals together with beon, habban and a few other verbs square with the
above properties beyond the point of randomness. By means of these properties
it is possible to delineate a class of the OE auxiliaries with some precision. In
this group, mæg, sceal, wile, mot and þearf qualify as more central auxiliaries
whereas can, dear and ah are more peripheral members of the class, with
a proviso, of course, that we focus only on the pre-modals.
It seems that WARNER’S (1982; 1990; 1993) research provides scholars with
an incentive not to treat the OE pre-modals as a homogenous group. They are
verbs that behave auxiliary-like in some uses and main-verb-like in other uses
and the amount of the auxiliary-like conduct varies from one pre-modal to
another. This line of reasoning resonates in the work of later generativists. One
can see it in MOLENCKI (1991), who is mainly set within the Extended Standard
Theory, where the pre-modals are shown as either main verbs (when followed
by NP complements) or auxiliaries (when followed by infinitives). In the latter
case a pre-modal is still generated within VP but under the AUX node, the
infinitive being inserted under V. MOLENCKI (1991: 139) supports such
treatment of the pre-modals even though it produces ripples in the lexicon:
“[...] the analysis will complicate the lexical component, because we have to
introduce two lexical entries [e.g.] cunnan into it. One would be cunnan1
followed by pure NPs and the other cunnan2 taking infinitival complements.”
Although van KEMENADE (1992a; 1992b) continues largely in the same
non-unitary spirit, she delves deeper into the syntactic analysis of the
pre-modals. One thing that changes is the theoretical framework, which in this
case is the Government-Binding theory. Van KEMENADE (1992a; 1992b) offers
a tripartite division of the pre-modals. In accordance with the division,
a pre-modal can be:
a) a main verb when it selects its own subject, is followed by an NP
or clausal complement, has non-modal or deontic semantics. An
example of such an occurrence of mæg is sentence (2.15) and its
tree-diagrammed representation ensues in Figure 8 (both the
example and tree diagram are taken from van KEMENADE 1992a:
151):
(2.15) butan tweo, gif hie þa blotan mehten (subj)
except two, if they them sacrifice might
‘except two, if they could (be able to) sacrifice them’
(Oros, 115, 14)
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As a main verb, the pre-modal is generated under V in V″ (former VP). V″
itself is dominated by I′ (former INFL or AUX), “a universal category which
in highly inflected languages contains tense and agreement morphology and in
[Present-Day] English [...] at least the modal auxiliaries” (NAGLE 1992: 272).
Mehten has the subject hie under specI′ which is understood as repeated under
specV′. Notice that in the diagram above, the I node is empty in absence of
any auxiliary.
b) a main verb when it is followed by an infinitival complement yet it
does not select its own subject. Pre-modals used with epistemic
semantics or in impersonal constructions usually fall into this
category, e.g.:
(2.16) ealle hie þæt anmodlice wilnodan þæt hie his word
all they that unanimously desired that they his words
gehyran moston
hear must
‘they all unanimously desired that they might hear his words’
(Bl. Hom., 219. 34)
(example and translation from van KEMENADE 1992a: 152)
The deep structure of (2.16) differs from that of (2.15) in that the surface
subject of (2.16) is generated in the lowest VP as the subject of his word
gehyran. Later it is raised to specI′ immediately dominated by I″. The status of
the pre-modal as a main verb under V stays intact.
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C″
SpecC′ C′
C
gif
I″
specI
hie
′ I′
V″ I
V′ V
mehten
specV
PRO
′ V′
NP
þa
V
blotan
Figure 8. A tree diagram of sentence (2.15)
c) an auxiliary when it takes an infinitival complement. This category
embraces the application of wile and sceal as markers of futurity,
e.g.:
(2.17) wenen and wilnian ðæt ge lange libban scylan her on
think and want that you long live shall here on
worulde
world
‘think and wish that you will live long in this world’
(Boethius, 46, 31)
According to van KEMENADE (1992a; 1992b), only in such cases is there
enough justification for regarding the pre-modal as on auxiliary. Witness that
scylan in Figure 9 is generated under I in I′.
In a recent study, however, ROMÉRO (2005) once again denies the
pre-modals the auxiliary specification. She also brings back the focus to the
NP/infinitive complement dichotomy. It is argued that the pre-modals can
function as either lexical verbs, which happens when they take an NP or PP
complement, or as semi-lexical verbs when they choose an infinitival
complement. Accordingly, two different syntactic positions are available to the
pre-modals: V in VP to a pre-modal which is a lexical verb and vModal in
vModalP to a semi-lexical pre-modal. If the former position is hardly
remarkable as it is a continuation of the previous studies, the latter means that
another phrase termed vModalP is introduced to the tree diagram. The phrase
is reserved for the pre-modal+infinitive construction. A representation of
sentence (2.18) is presented in Figure 10 (the sentence and tree diagram are
taken from ROMÉRO 2005: 116, the PDE translation mine):
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C″
specC′ C′
C I″
specI′ I′
V″ I
modal Aux
specV′ V′
... V
Figure 9. A tree diagram of sentence (2.17) (the example and tree diagram taken from van
KEMENADE 1992a: 156—157)
(2.18) þu scealt oncnawan þone gesettan dom
thou shalt understand the made judgment
‘you must understand the judgment made’
(ApT: 5.5. 71; 1050)
In Figure 10, which is a reflection of CHOMSKY’S (1995) minimalist program,
the new phrase, vModalP, can be seen to contain the head vModal which
governs VP. The T position is originally empty as the clause is devoid of any
auxiliary. Only later is it filled by the pre-modal, a consequence of the V-2
movement after the subject moved from Spec in VP to Spec in TP.
In parallel with the above mentioned endeavors, GOOSSENS (1987a) proposes
an alternative Functional-Grammar-inspired scheme that encompasses
a syntactic treatment of the pre-modals. In his earlier publications GOOSSENS
(1985a; 1985b) develops the scheme for the PDE modals and applies it to the
OE pre-modals partly as a reaction to LIGHTFOOT’S (1979) notion of the sudden
reanalysis of the pre-modals into auxiliaries. As such, GOOSSENS’S (1987a)
proposal diverges from LIGHTFOOT’S (1979) in two respects: 1) it is out of place
to consider the pre-modals in terms of syntax only, especially from
a diachronic point of view; the syntactic status of the pre-modals, as well as
later modals, is at every point of their development intertwined with their
semantics; 2) his view of the pre-modals is necessarily gradualist and
inseparable from the idea of grammaticalization. GOOSSENS (1987a: 118) draws
a grammaticalization scale for the (pre)-modals, a slightly modified version of
which, taken from GOOSSENS (1996: 45), is presented in Figure 11:
full predicate  complex predicate formation  operator
Figure 11. A grammaticalization scale of the (pre)-modals
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Spec T
Tþu vModalP
scealt vModal VP
scealti Spec V
þuj NP V
oncnawanþone gesettan dom
Figure 10. A tree diagram of sentence (2.18)
Without going into the details of the Functional Grammar theorizing, one can
say that the labels on the scale stand for the particular stages of the syntactic
and semantic evolution of the pre-modals:
a) a full predicate is a pre-modal used as a lexical verb with
a non-modal (facultative) meaning; a full predicate typically selects
its arguments (the subject, the direct object NP);
b) complex predicate formation involves the use of a pre-modal with
a deontic or epistemic meaning followed by a predicate which
“imposes its argument structure upon the whole combination”
(GOOSSENS 1996: 46);
c) an operator describes a pre-modal in the most grammaticalized use
when it serves to convey futurity or appears in conditional or
subjunctive clauses without any discernible modal meaning.
As the grammaticalization proceeds, a full predicate shows a propensity to
develop an application in complex predicate formation which in turn may
evolve into a use as an operator. Inevitably then, the presented model is
dynamic in that the pre-modals are all the time in the process of change. As
a consequence, a given occurrence of a pre-modal may represent an area of
overlap between two stages. At a given point in time, an investigation into the
pre-modals should evidence which stage on the scale a particular member of
the class has reached. An attempt at such an analysis is made in GOOSSENS
(1987a), where two extremes of the grammaticalization scale are found, that is
cann and sceal. The former, still primarily a full predicate, only flirts with
complex predicate formation uses in Ælfric’s homilies while the latter,
a fully-fledged part of complex predicate formation, is also attested to function
as an operator. It is also noteworthy that WARNER’S (1993) assessment of sceal
and cann as, respectively, central and peripheral members of the category of
the OE auxiliaries is in tune with GOOSSENS’S (1987a) findings concerning the
extremes of the grammaticalization scale.
With this being said, I now turn to investigating select OE verbs in the
following two chapters. The semantics and syntax of a given pre-modal are
considered in the context of grammaticalization theory with meanings and
structures attested being stages on the path of development that the verb has
traveled. While performing the main task of analyzing the non-epistemic
necessity of relevant pre-modals and lexical verbs, I check corpus examples
against the possibilities offered by COATES’S (1983) gradience model of modal
meanings and TALMY’S (2000) and SWEETSER’S (1990) force dynamic
underpinning of modality. Deontic necessity of each verb receives the most
thorough treatment and finally provides the input for a continuum of deontic
necessity. I conclude this study by, following DE HAAN (1997), integrating the
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OE pre-modals and lexical verbs into two separate continua of deontic
necessity. It remains to be seen to what extent the continuum model is helpful
in clarifying the semantics of non-epistemic necessity in Old English. Before
this insight can be obtained, however, I begin with a background check on the
corpus intricacies of the necessity of the pre-modals in the next chapter.
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The pre-modal verbs
The chapter offers a detailed investigation of non-epistemic necessity
expressible by means of the OE pre-modals. Quite matter-of-factly, it is also,
by itself, an investigation of those pre-modals whose semantics falls within the
range of non-epistemic necessity. If pre-modals irrelevant for the notion of
necessity are sifted out, one is left to direct their attention to the following five
verbs: agan (to) infinitive, þearf, sceal, mot, and mæg. In order to amplify the
case for the idiosyncrasy of the necessity conveyed by each pre-modal,
I analyze the verbs in separate sections. The order of the sections is a reflection
of the order in which the pre-modals are arranged above. So is it a reflection of
the assumption that it is essential to start with those pre-modals that center on
the notion of necessity, i.e. agan (to) infinitive, þearf, and sceal, and arrive at
a complete picture by highlighting permission-related pre-modals, i.e. mot and
mæg.
A convenient starting point will, however, be made by placing the five
pre-modals in a broader context of their text frequency. Table 4 compares the
normalized frequencies of the five verbs per 100,000 words in the DOE and
Helsinki Corpora. It is of no secondary importance to realize that within the
group we have to do with enormously popular tokens such as sceal and mæg
on the one hand, and hardly noticeable verbs such as agan (to) infinitive on the
other hand. With respect to the frequency of the particular verbs, the
methodology of compiling samples of examples to be looked into varies from
verb to verb. With low frequency pre-modals agan (to) infinitive and þearf,
I have collected all the occurrences of the verbs in the 5,291,236 word DOE
Corpus while in the case of sceal, mot and mæg I have obtained a number of
examples from texts selected from the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus. The
exact details of sample size and text selection for each of the latter three
pre-modals are given in sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Consequently, depending on
whether an example comes from the DOE or the Helsinki Corpus, the
codification differs. If an example comes from the DOE Corpus, the
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codification indicates the short title of the text, as specified by MITCHELL, BALL
and CAMERON (1975; 1979), and the corresponding Cameron number
(cf. CAMERON 1973). In the case of an example retrieved from the Helsinki
Corpus, I include the code of the text, e.g. COBENRUL for the Benedictine
Rule (cf. KYTÖ 1993), followed by the number of the line which indicates the
location of the example in the text in the corpus. Each example is followed by
a gloss in which I adhere to the convention of the literal translation of a given
pre-modal. Thus, mot, for instance, is each time glossed as must irrespective of
whether is it is used with the meaning of permission or PE necessity. All
glosses and translation are mine unless otherwise indicated.
3.1. Agan
Far from coming across as a major conveyer of obligative modality in Old
English, agan does take its modal roots in that period. Remarkably, some
accounts of the semantics of the OE pre-modals choose to overlook this late OE
aspect of the meaning of agan. Thus, for instance, B&T focuses only on the
widespread application of agan as a verb of possession, TELLIER (1962) notes
the advent of the sense of necessity with agan in the twelfth century, yet does
not fully acknowledge it until the thirteenth century. Nor can one find agan
among the OE pre-modals of necessity in WARNER (1993). A totally different
perspective is adopted by OED which, rather than dismiss the OE obligative
uses of agan, accommodates them by showing that they gradually lead to the
PDE status of ought as a marker of deontic necessity (cf. HARRIS 1986; MYHILL
1997 for issues connected with the dwindling frequency of ought in Present-Day
English). An in-depth treatment of the semantic and syntactic development of
OE agan and its subsequent incarnation ought is provided by NORDLINGER and
TRAUGOTT (1997) and fine-tuned by TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005). They
convincingly outline the possible channels through which the original possessive
semantics of agan may have been pushed toward deontic necessity.
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Verb N.F.
sceal 340.3
mæg 221.5
mot 74.4
þearf 5.0
agan (to) infinitive 1.2
Table 4. Normalized frequencies of the necessity-related
pre-modals
As observed by B&T and PROKOSCH (1939), agan has cognates in other
Germanic languages, namely Gothic àigan, Old Norse eiga, Old Saxon egan
and Old High German eigan, the semantics of which revolves around the
notion of possession. WATKINS, ed., (2000: 1—2) adduces *aik- ‘to be master
of, possess’ as the PIE root of all these Germanic forms with an intermediate
proto-Germanic form being *aigan. It can be added that the same root spawns
two other semantically related verbs in English: own, which is derived from the
past participle of agan, namely agen, and owe. This twofold development of
agan in English is brought up by HARRIS and CAMPBELL (1995: 178) who
consider own and owe the lexical reflexes of agan which remain true to the
verbal origin of the form after agan in some contexts is swept up by the
processes of grammaticalization. Without invalidating HARRIS and CAMPBELL’S
(1995) hypothesis, the same development can be seen as an actualization of
HOPPER’S (1991) principle of divergence (cf. 2.6). A story of a frequently used
verb of possession gradually becoming a verb of deontic necessity is, quite
understandably, nothing uncommon. DENNING (1987) and BYBEE, PERKINS and
PAGLIUCA (1994) give a cross-linguistic overview of the possible sources of
deontic necessity expressions, erstwhile verbs of possession being commonly
attested. Notable examples could include Latin habe–re or Polish mieć. In
English a similar distance, yet at a different pace, is traveled by the verb have
whose grammaticalization and PDE status as a quasi-modal of deontic
necessity have been scrutinized by, among others, BYBEE and PAGLIUCA (1985),
FISCHER (1994), and ŁĘCKI (2010). As van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998:
95) see it, verbs meaning ‘have’ are inclined to make a direct leap to PE
necessity, with the PI necessity stage being omitted.
3.1.1. Agan with the sense of possession
Invariably, the possessive semantics of agan is to be linked with the syntactic
pattern of agan+NP. The corpus pinpoints a variety of contexts in which such
a construction occurs with a plethora of different shades of meanings referring
to having, owing and belonging. The cline of possession meanings extends
from those which embrace most concrete objects, e.g. domestic animals:
(3.1.1) se hyra se þe nis hyrde 7 se þe nah
the hired-servant this that not-is shepherd and this that not-own
þa sceap,
the sheep
‘The hired servant who is not a shepherd and who does not
own the sheep’
(Jn (WSCp) 10.12)
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through those which take more abstract objects hardly imaginable in terms of
literal possession, e.g. agan geleafe ‘to have faith’:
(3.1.2) þe heo ahte trumne geleafan a to ðam ælmightigan
for she had strong faith always in the almighty
‘for she always had strong faith in the Almighty.’
(Jud 5)
FISCHER (1994: 151) avails herself of the concept of semantic bleaching, first
noted by HEINE and REH (1982) and LEHMANN (1982), while accounting for
similar extensions in the meaning of have, another verb of possession. This verb
“from the very beginning (at least from historic Old English onwards) had
a range of meanings centered around the notion of possession. At one end of the
scale have could express pure possession interchangeable with verbs meaning ‘to
own’ etc.; at the other end, it would, much more vaguely, imply a relation
between its subject and object, wherein it comes very close to the existential verb
be” (FISCHER 1994: 151—152). The corpus data, through pointing to the
aforementioned cline, indicate that agan develops a web of meanings in
accordance with a parallel formula. Semantic bleaching may constitute the first
step to the grammaticalization of a verb of possession into an auxiliary, as
FISCHER (1994: 152) further notes. Even more significantly, BYBEE and PAGLIUCA
(1985), after surveying their fifty language sample, observe recurrent
cross-linguistic co-existence of the generalization of a meaning of a lexical item
and the process of its grammaticalization. In the case of agan, the bleaching does
induce grammaticalization which goes hand in hand with the verb slowly
encroaching upon the semantic area of deontic necessity.
3.1.2. Agan (to) infinitive
As noted above, the weakening of the sense of possession triggers the
development of lexical agan into a modal auxiliary, hence the late OE spate of
the agan (to) infinitive construction, which eventually comes to be a firmly
established marker of deontic necessity in later English. The DOE Corpus
uncovers 63 cases of agan followed by an infinitival complement and agan is
the only pre-modal which shows consistent attachment to the inflected
infinitive. I find only one example to the contrary. It is shown in (3.1.3) and
has agan complemented by the bare infinitive þolian:
(3.1.3) gif hit ani deð, hu ah þarfore þolian þa regullice
if   it    any does, he ought therefore undergo the canonical
wrecæ.
punishment
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‘if anyone does that, he should undergo the canonical
punishment.’
(BenR 3.21.28)
On account of this one-off deviation from the routine practice of agan to take
the inflected infinitive, I follow the convention of putting to in agan (to)
infinitive in brackets.
3.1.3. Agan to geldanne
The frequency of different nonfinite complements of agan is presented in
Table 5. Visibly, there is a remarkable preponderance of the occurrences of to
geldanne as a complement of agan, which is of interest in view of NORDLINGER
and TRAUGOTT’S (1997) comment on this collocation. They emphasize the use
of agan to geldanne as a gloss for Latin debere (meaning ‘to owe’), which
finds confirmation in five out of the eleven occurrences. It proves futile to seek
any necessity meaning in those eleven instances of the construction, though.
Even more so, if we acknowledge MITCHELL’S (1988) slamming the door on
admitting anything beyond the sense of possession before the end of the
eleventh century in the sentences of the following type:
(3.1.4) egressus autem seruus ille inuenit unum de conseruis suis qui
debebat ei centum denarios et tenens suffocabat eum dicens
redde quod debes
gefoerde soðlice ðegn ðe gefand vel gemitte enne of
went indeed servant who found vel met one of
efneðegnum his seðe ahte to geldenna hundrað scillinga
co-servants his this-that had to pay hundred shillings
7 geheald hine cuoeðende geld þæt ðu aht to geldanne
and held him saying pay that thou have to pay
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Infinitival
complement
Pre-modal
to
geldanne
to
syllanne
to
habenne
to
donne
Other Total
agan 11 6 6 5 35 63
Table 5. Co-occurrence of agan with infinitives
‘The servant was walking when he met one of his co-servants
who owed him a hundred shillings, he grabbed him saying,
‘Give me back what you owe me.’’
(MtGl (Li) 18.28)
(3.1.5) Ælc mon eornestlice ah to geldene sum þing, and hæfð
each man therefore ought to pay some thing, and has
oðerne mon þe him sceal
another man that him shall
sum ðing; forþon ðe nan mon nis ðe næbbe sume synne,
some thing; because no man not-is who not-has some sin,
‘Indeed, each man owes someone something and there is
someone who owes him something. It is because no man is
without guilt,’
(ÆHomM 7 79)
As a matter of fact, one cannot but side with MITCHELL (1988) when he argues
that the agan to geldanne constructions such as in (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) do not
lend “any support to the notion that agan alone means ‘to be obliged to’; the
sense of the Old English is ‘You have something to pay. Pay it.’ In other words,
agan means ‘to possess’ and the inflected infinitive qualifies the object. The
comparison is with MnE ‘I have my house to let’, not with ‘I have to let my
house’” (MITCHELL 1988: 77). Indisputable as the point made by MITCHELL
(1988) is, a comparison of agan in (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) reveals quite remarkable
differences. In the former, agan to geldanne appears twice, each time as a gloss
for Latin debere and each time with reference to the most prototypical type of
a debt, namely a financial one. By no means, on the other hand, does the debt
in (3.1.5) concern financial matters, it has some moral overtones instead. What
is owed and/or paid for is a guilt or sin committed. Considering that (3.1.5) is
not a line translated from Latin, it testifies to the fact that semantic bleaching
of the possession meaning in the case of agan continues.
Also, I believe the significance of agan to geldanne lies elsewhere. This
juxtaposition, quite likely merely a convenient way of translating debere at
first, may be the first incentive to follow agan with an infinitive. If the textual
popularity of this practice is any indication of its frequency in the spoken
language, then the expression can be said to have acquired an aspect of
idiomaticity. A mechanism that yet more enhances the fostering of agan to
geldanne in Old English is that connected with a speaker’s mental lexicon
being affected by the traces left by frequently used words. Theorized by BYBEE
(1985), the mechanism is credited by KRUG (1988; 2000) with much
explanatory force behind the establishment of word sequences and grammatical
structures. The pivotal assumption which this theory revolves around is that
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a lexical item which is repeatedly swept into the consciousness of the speaker
is very likely to leave a mark and, thereby, to stay there. Subsequently, a point
is reached when a speaker’s familiarity with the item boosts its frequency,
which in turn creates an environment favorable for grammaticalization.
Furthermore, an interesting observation that forces itself after an
investigation of the corpus is a relatively high rate of recurrence of agan with
different verbs of social transactions. Table 5 shows that to syllanne (‘to give’)
collocates with agan six times. A host of verbs such as to gifanne (‘to give’),
to dælanne (‘to give, distribute’), to bebycganne (‘to sell’), etc. also make
one-off appearances. My conjecture is that only after both a sufficient amount
of the semantic bleaching of agan to gyldanne and a number of traces left on
speakers’ lexicon by this construction is the extension to the verbs of social
transactions possible. Undoubtedly, a facilitating factor in the genesis of this
extension is significant semantic affinity between the verb to geldanne and the
likes of to syllanne. Once the novelty of agan (to) infinitive wears off, speakers
are ready to experiment with applying the structure to new albeit related
contexts and substituting semantically related infinitives for the one firmly
established. The meaning of agan followed by a verb of social transactions, is
still mostly possessive:
(3.1.6) 7 heo cwæð to Osulfe ðæt heo hit ahte him wel to
and she said to Osulfe that she it ought him well to
syllanne forðon hit wæs hire morgengifu
give because it was her morning-gift
‘She told Osulf that she had it to offer him/was supposed to
give it to him as it was her morning gift’
(Ch 1445 (HarmD 18) 13)
(3.1.7) And landcop 7 hlafordes gifu, þe he
and tax-for-purchase-of-land and lord’s gift that he
on riht age to gifanne,
properly ought to give
‘The tax at the purchase of land and the lord’s gift that he
legally has to give’
(LawIIIAtr 3)
At the same time, however, NORDLINGER and TRAUGOTT (1997) and TRAUGOTT
and DASHER (2005) in their in-depth discussion of the OE development of agan
emphasize the advent of an invited inference of a deontic necessity to pay once
the object possessed is no longer referential. The focal point of their argument
is, in fact, the context wherein agan to geldanne occurs, as illustrated in (3.1.4)
above.
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In [such — J.N.] cases [...] the debt is referential, but the pennies to
pay it off are not (yet). Where the object may not yet exist (like the
pennies) and especially where it does not yet exist [...] the semantics
of possession is bleached, and the pragmatic inference of obligation
strengthened. Semanticization of the obligation has clearly occurred
when the object is no longer physical, only cognitive or experiential
[...]. (TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005: 139)
Indeed, there seems to be no good reason why this line of reasoning should not
also cover the cases like (3.1.6) and (3.1.7) where agan is coupled with a verb
of social transactions. The referential function of the debt in (3.1.4) or (3.1.5)
is now taken over by the deal imposed or agreed upon. What is not referential,
however, is the thing to be given which is yet to be materialized. Particular
contexts may vary to a lesser or greater degree but what is of crucial
importance is that an inference of a deontic necessity to give, sell, buy, etc.,
sneaks into many of those contexts, an inference which is bound to stay.
Obviously, because of the way in which inference-based semantic change
proceeds, it is impossible to point a finger to a precise moment when the
consummation of the sense of deontic necessity in agan (to) infinitive takes
place. As noted by FALTZ (1989) and BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) it
takes a transition period before a meaning brought along by an inference can
be taken to be prevalent in a given item. Beforehand, sentences are encountered
where both senses, the initial one and the inferential one, strive for dominance,
undoubtedly, this stage being preceded by the unquestioned presence of the
initial meaning and a slight implication of the second. In TRAUGOTT and
DASHER’S (2005) view it is the time needed for an invited inference to evolve
into a generalized invited inference. That being so, linguists venture converse
hypotheses as to when the obligative sense of agan really appears. TELLIER
(1962), while providing the first instance of ahte to habanne from 1085, opts
for the end of the twelfth century as a relevant date whereas aforementioned
MITCHELL (1988) moves this date back by a century.
3.1.4. Possession vs. deontic necessity in agan (to) infinitive
A semantic analysis of the tokens of agan (to) infinitive in the corpus, which is
shown in Table 6, reveals that despite the overall small number of the
occurrences of the construction, it seems to be in broad strokes reserved for the
obligative meaning. The figures presented in Table 6 testify to the sense of
possession being recessive when agan takes an infinitival complement (10 out
of the 63 occurrences exhibit a dominating meaning of possession rather than
deontic necessity). A likely explanation is that possession clings to the older
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construction agan+NP, an inference of deontic necessity constituting an
inherent part of almost every use of the novel structure agan (to) infinitive. The
possession meanings are illustrated in (3.1.8) and (3.1.9):
(3.1.8) 7 se cyning cwæð þa þet he nahte nan land ut to
and that king said then that he not-ought no land out to
syllanne,
give
‘And the king then said that he had no land out there to
give.’
(Ch 1242 (Harm 108) 6)
(3.1.9) þæt se deofol eow nage naht on to bestelenne on
that that devil you not-ought nothing upon to steal on
þam ytemestan dæge eowres lifes ungeandettes
the last day of-your life unconfessed
‘So that the devil would have nothing of yours to steal upon on
the last day of your unconfessed life’
(HomU 26 41)
3.1.5. Agan (to) infinitive
with the meaning of deontic necessity
On the opposite pole there are 34 cases of agan (to) infinitive which
unequivocally take deontic necessity as a dominant semantic area. The earliest
example that I have identified comes from the second half of the ninth century
(see (3.1.10)), which should not, however, obscure the fact that the bulk of
such occurrences spread over the subsequent centuries.
(3.1.10) Ðeah hwa gebycgge his dohtor on þeowenne, ... nage
though who sell his daughters into slavery, not-ought
he hie ut on elðeodig folc to bebycgganne.
he them out on alien people to sell.
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5 — Expressing...
Meaning
Pre-modal
Possesssion
agan to
geldanne
Possession/
deontic
necessity
Deontic
necessity
Total
agan (to)
infinitive
10
(15.9%)
11
(17.4%)
8
(12.7%)
34
(54%)
63
(100%)
Table 6. Distribution of meanings of agan (to) infinitive
‘nevertheless, who would like to sell his daughters into
slavery, he ought not to sell them to alien people’
(LawAfEl 12)
Both TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005) and DOE make sure to clearly
distinguish between the instances where agan makes use of an infinitive of
habban as a complement, as in:
(3.1.11) oððe hwilce gerihtæ he ahte to habbanne to xii monþum of
or what dues he ought to have to XII months of
ðære scire.
that scire
‘or what dues he ought to have by the year from that shire’
(ChronE 1085a.25)
and those with all the other infinitival complements. The rationale behind this
division rests on an argument that “in [such a — J.N.] construction the subject
is defined in the DOE as ‘the person to whom the obligation is due.’ i.e. the
subject is in the semantic recipient role” (TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005:
139—140). Indeed, the peculiarity of (3.1.11) consists in the lack of any
explicit agent, habban being a non-agentive verb. At the same time, as
TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 140) further argue, the subject can assume the
role of a beneficiary only as a result of an action. The identity of the agent and
the time of the action are left unsaid, which is of no consequence as the action
is clearly implied to take place anyway, the subject being entitled or “obliged”
to benefit from it. TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 140) paraphrase agan to
habenne as ‘to have/get the right to’ and believe the construction to enjoy the
status of an idiom, the six occurrences of this construction in the DOE Corpus
providing a corroborative, if not conclusive, piece of evidence that their
assessment is correct. The right of the subject of agan to habenne to receive
profits is derived from various external, usually legal, norms, e.g. the position
of a king in (3.1.11). Needless to say, the subject is each time a person whose
high social status provokes certain expectations in the speaker.
All in all, agan to habenne emerges as an exponent of deontic necessity
which is shown implicitly. NORDLINGER and TRAUGOTT (1997: 9) are very
cautious about advancing a far-reaching obligative sense of the idiom in favor
of possessive meaning still holding its own. In this scenario the meaning of
agan is said to read ‘get, come to have.’ I am of the opinion that the possession
of agan as employed in agan to habenne is significantly bleached, otherwise
a juxtaposition of two possession verbs would be out of place. Agan, as
evidenced by the corpus data, more often than not carries deontic necessity
when followed by an infinitive.
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The most numerous group of the obligative uses of agan (to) infinitive is
made up by those instances where the subject is an Agonist confronted with
deontic necessity. All the 28 cases manage to conform to this formula, as in
(3.1.10) for instance. For our analysis to be coherent, it should, however, be
still borne in mind that probably none of the 28 examples is totally devoid of at
least a taint of bleached possession meaning. Using COATES’S (1983)
terminology of fuzzy sets it could be said that the merger area between deontic
necessity and possession is remarkably significant. It appears that, for the
reasons of the specificity of the access we have to Old English, or to any dead
language, linguists, including the author of this monograph, tend to see the
meanings they need to see in some sentences in order to prove their theses.
A plausible illustration could be VAN DER GAAF (1931), VISSER (1963—1973),
MITCHELL (1985) and others who aim to prove that have comes to express
necessity as early as in Old English, an argument resting on a semantic
analysis only, and FISCHER’S (1994) diatribe against advancing any deontic
modality and full grammaticalization in the case of have before the respective
word order change in late Middle English/Early Modern English. In other
words, only after have ceases to admit NP objects before the following
infinitive does it become an eligible marker of deontic necessity and
a fully-fledged auxiliary. A similar battle could rage over agan, consider
sentence (3.1.12):
(3.1.12) And þu ahst to fyllene þine seofen tidsangas under dæg
and thou ought to fill your seven services under day
and niht,
and night
‘and you ought to/have to fulfill your seven services every
day and night’
(HomU 45 29)
On the one hand, considering the homiletic context, the authority of the
speaker, the second person singular subject and an activity main verb, a sense
of deontic necessity rarely gets any further in Old English. Nor does it in
Present-Day English. Even the word order with the object following to fyllene
subscribes to the claim of the auxiliarization of agan. A PDE translation along
the lines of ‘You ought to fulfill your seven services...’ might be felt too weak,
a stronger verb for example have to serving the purpose more effectively. On
the other hand, proponents of the possession reading of agan in Old English
could easily justify their assessment through interpreting (3.1.12) as ‘You have
your seven services to fulfill...’ The argument of the word order could also be
invalidated on the frequency grounds since the object-main verb pattern
prevails in 24 out of the 34 instances.
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In my survey I follow the likes of VAN DER GAAF (1931), VISSER
(1963—1973) and Mitchell (1985) and adopt the semantic approach. Basing on
evidence from other pre-modals it seems that modal semantics does not
necessarily go together with the appearance of the constraint on object NPs to
follow main verbs. Consider mot, for example, to which the meanings of
permission and deontic necessity are ascribed regardless of whether the object
NP precedes or follows the main verb complement (cf. examples (3.4.12) and
(3.4.13) below).
With this proviso in mind, I set out to analyze the focal group of the agan
(to) infinitive occurrences, namely the 28 instances with the dominant sense of
deontic necessity. My inspection of the obligative agan (to) infinitive
occurrences in the DOE Corpus has led me to enumerate the most frequent
parameters those occurrences observe:
(a) animate third person subject
(b) generic reference of subject
(c) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’
(adapted from COATES 1983: 36)
In the group of the 28 examples, as many as 17 converge to embrace all those
features, a number significant enough to warrant a prototypical use or in
COATES’S (1983: 33) words, ‘the native speaker’s psychological stereotype.’
Remarkably, negative contexts outnumber positive ones by 9 to 8, an index of
negated agan being considered more natural with a sense of deontic necessity.
While I shall return to the question of negation with agan in 3.1.6, two
sentences illustrate the prototypical use, namely (3.1.10) above and (3.1.13):
(3.1.13) Ðæt is, þæt man ah to forganne ealle fulnyssa, þe
that is, that man ought to refrain-from all foulness, that
gode laðe syndon,
to-God loath is
‘That is, man should refrain from any foulness that is loath to
God.’
(HomU 46 87)
For a sentence to aim for prototypicality, it should be elicited from an
instructive piece of writing. The majority come from homilies and codes of
law.
The obligative occurrences of agan (to) infinitive display a feature of
gradiance. What gradience implies is that different degrees of necessity and
subjectivity can be expected in the particular uses of the construction. With
a view to illustrating the gradience of deontic necessity, I consider it plausible
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to perceive the instances of agan (to) infinitive as arranged along a cline, much
in the vein of COATES’S (1983) scrutiny of the meanings of modals in British
English and COLLINS’S (1991) discussion of the semantics of modals in
Australian English. Such an approach in the case of a modal of deontic
necessity has the advantage of revealing “the semantic continuum from strong,
subjective, almost performative uses (it is imperative/compulsory) to weak
requirement (it is important/necessary’)” (COLLINS 1991: 154). COATES (1983:
34) predates COLLINS (1991) with a remark that “the value of the concept lies
in the fact that it allows the linguist to describe a continuum of meaning, with
a core and a periphery which can be identified [...]. Between those two
extremes, there is considerable fuzziness.” The cline of the deontic necessity of
agan (to) infinitive in Old English has its illustration in examples (3.1.10),
(3.1.12), (3.1.13), as well as in the following ones:
(3.1.14) We habbað gesett þæt preostas nagon to wunigenne ne
we have decreed that priests not-ought to dwell nor
to mæssigenne ne to fulligenne an nanre cyrcan þe to oðre
to say-mass nor to baptize on no church that to other
burge gebyrige
city belongs
‘we have decreed that priests are not to dwell or say mass or
baptize in any church that is subject to another town’
(ChrodR 1 78.1)
(3.1.15) Nah naðer to farenne ne Wilisc man on Ænglisc land
not-ought neither to go no Welsh man on English land
ne Ænglisc on Wylisc ðe ma,
no English on Welsh the more
‘Neither a Welshman may trespass on the English land nor
may an Englishman trespass on the Welsh land any more’
(LawDuns 6)
(3.1.16) Ðonne agan weofodðenas to smeagenne symble, þæt hi
then ought altar-servants to consider always, that they
huruðinga heora lif fadian, swa swa to cyrcan
at-any-rate their lives arrange as as to church
gebyrige mid rihte.
be-of-concern with right
‘Altar servants should always take care to arrange their lives
so as to make the church be rightly of concern to them’
(WPol 2.1.1 209)
3.1. Agan 69
(3.1.17) þa forsoc he. 7 sæde þæt he hit nahte to donne.
then refused he and said that he it ought-not to do
‘Then he refused; and said, that he ought not to do it’
(ChronA 1070.9)
Sentence (3.1.12), while coming closest to the upper extreme of the cline,
stands out like a beacon of attention. It is the only instance of agan with
a non-third-person subject and one of the two instances, the other being
(3.1.17), whose subject has a specific reference. Due to the second person
singular pronoun in the subject position, (3.1.12) is marked off from the rest of
the examples as the single strongest exponent of deontic necessity. In PALMER’S
(1979: 62) view, deontic necessity is at its strongest when the subject of
a modal is you and when “the speaker is in a position to lay the obligation, and
is thus in a position of some authority.” The context of (3.1.12) stands as
a clear indication that the speaker’s position is that of superiority as he is
a master who addresses a youth. What debilitates the strength of the modal
expression is, however, the source of the necessity. The speaker merely allows
himself to be a conveyer of religious norms. As I have noted above, the
necessity imposed strikes one as quite vehement in that it might take a verb
have to to do justice to its strength in a PDE translation. To use SWEETSER’S
(1990) nomenclature, the strength of the necessity encoded in the situation
would call for a considerable amount of resistance on the part of the Agonist
were he or she to oppose it.
In example (3.1.14) the speakers explicitly mark their involvement, which
renders this instance the most subjective of all in the corpus, the remaining 27
occurrences subscribing to the pattern of weak subjectivity as elaborated on by
LYONS (1982) and TRAUGOTT (1989). Furthermore, (3.1.14) is exceptional
insofar as the speakers present themselves as the source of the necessity. At the
same time, however, the subject is third person plural with a generic reference,
which has a weakening effect. The authority of the speakers as law-givers
cannot be questioned, nor can the resultant pervasive nature of the necessity.
Example (3.1.15) falls within the prototype I have sketched above as emerging
from my corpus. It is representative of an external source of deontic necessity
in the shape of legal regulations. The subject is third person singular yet still
generic. As with other codes of law, the sense of necessity can be strongly felt
due to the imminent prospect of the penalty enforcement rather than the actual
authority of the speaker.
Not infrequently, as in example (3.1.16), the necessity expressed by agan
merges into a weaker force, evoking the cumulative effect of a piece of advice.
Sentences of this type are traceable to handbooks and manuals where the moral
good or the well-being of the subject receives priority. The instructions are
rather universal than specific, hence the generic reference of the subject. As
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with most examples, it is hard to identify the speaker as the source of the
necessity. Add to that the fact that the verb following agan is that of a mental
state rather than an activity verb and it takes only a moment’s thought to
realize that (3.1.16) goes lower down the cline. Due to its non-generic subject
and a past time reference, example (3.1.17) is a solitary representative of this
type in the whole corpus. The example, a true deontic statement, is hardly
subjective whatsoever as the speaker merely reports rather weak deontic
necessity in the past.
In an attempt to provide a gauge of the strength of deontic necessity
pertaining to a particular example containing a PDE modal verb must, COATES
(1983: 36) assembles a matrix in which a set of the occurrences of must are
cast against 8 features. The features are presented below:
(a) second person subject,
(b) speaker involvement,
(c) speaker has authority over subject,
(d) verb is agentive,
(e) paraphrasable by ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that’,
(f) animate subject
(g) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’,
(h) inanimate subject.
(adapted from COATES 1989: 36)
An advantage that such a matrix has is that it fits the corpus examples of
must into a coherent pattern. On no account is the order of those features
random. Rather, it is understood to reflect the cline of deontic necessity and
subjectivity, the upper features being indicative of stronger necessity and
subjectivity and the lower features gradually pointing to weak necessity, weak
subjectivity or lack thereof. Thus, for example, an occurrence interpreted as (a),
(b), (c) and (d) positive will be more modal than one which exhibits features
(f) and (g). As a result, COATES (1983) manages to arrive at a detailed
illustration of the gradience of the deontic necessity of must in Present-Day
English. Agan being a verb of deontic necessity in Old English, I believe it is
worth an effort to confront the examples given above with COATES’S (1983)
parameters with a view to obtaining a picture showing the gradience of the
necessity of agan as well as comparing the strength of the necessity encoded in
PDE must and OE agan.
Drawing upon Figure 12, one can notice the gravitation of the occurrences
of agan toward the skirt and periphery of the cline with the strong extreme to
a large extent left unoccupied. Considering that (3.1.12) is a sole representative
of the core, it is a safe bet to state that agan steers clear of strong necessity and
strongly subjective contexts. Otherwise, the examples split up into three groups.
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Examples (3.1.14) and (3.1.15) display warranted inclinations toward stronger
necessity, (3.1.13) and (3.1.10) hesitate between the center of the cline and
a visible periphery-bound orientation whereas examples (3.1.16) and (3.1.17)
are typical of very weak necessity and weakly subjective contexts. If we recall
that 17 out of the 28 examples available are compatible with a weaker force of
necessity, i.e. feature (g), then the answer to the question of which area of the
cline is most heavily exploited must be that it is the center and periphery. This
finding is consonant with what COATES (1983: 13) elicits from her research into
the clines of root modality, namely the conclusion that “[t]he majority of
examples are found in the skirt and at the periphery.” A difference worthy of
note between the cline of the meaning of a well established modal must and
that of the meaning of a developing modal agan is that in the former it proves
relatively easy to pin down a number of strongly subjective examples carrying
a high degree of deontic necessity (cf. COATES 1983). Virtually empty is the
core of the agan cline, a concomitant of the verb’s budding modality.
The total absence of feature (h) needs some accounting for at this point. All
of the agan (to) infinitive instances in Old English take animate subjects as this
construction does not occur with inanimate subjects until well into Middle
English. NORDLINGER and TRAUGOTT (1997) note the first such examples at the
beginning of the fourteenth century. Two points require accentuation in
connection with this development. TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 108—109)
shed some light on the first of them through stressing that in a prototypical
deontically modalized English sentence an agent is construed as the subject. Any
other variants with non-agentive verbs or agents foreshadowed in favor of
inanimate subjects are possible, yet they enjoy a peripheral status. Hence, their
delayed appearance is justified. The second point centers on the notion of scope
which is traditionally taken to split into two types: narrow and wide, the former
found in non-epistemic modality and the latter traceable to epistemic modality
(cf. LYONS 1977; BYBEE 1988). NORDLINGER and TRAUGOTT (1997) clarify the
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a b c d e f g h
(3.1.12) + ? + + + + – –
(3.1.14) – + + + + + – –
(3.1.15) – – + + + + – –
(3.1.13) – – + + – + + –
(3.1.10) – – ? + – + + –
(3.1.16) – – ? – – + + –
(3.1.17) – – – + – + + –
strong necessity/subjectivity weak necessity/subjectivity
(core) (periphery)
Figure 12. Matrix to show gradience of deontic necessity of agan
issue of scope and emphasize the need to distinguish between narrow and wide
scope with reference to deontic modality as well. In their article it is
convincingly argued that when an agent appears as a subject of a sentence, as in
(3.1.18):
(3.1.18) mycel is and mære, þæt sacerd ah to donne folce
great is and splendid, that priest ought to do people
to þearfe, gif he his drihtne gecwemð mid rihte.
according-to need if he his lord pleases with right
‘it is great and splendid that a priest ought to deal with
people according to their needs, if he is to please the Lord
rightfully’
(WPol 2.1.1 130)
then the deontic modal, in this case a verb of deontic necessity, links the
subject to the proposition by means of the necessity. Such a situation
epitomizes narrow scope, also referred to as propositional scope, of a modal
verb. Wide scope with deontics is attested diachronically later and less
frequently than narrow scope. Wide scope requires a scenario where the agent
is relegated to the background, or, in TALMY’S (2000) force dynamic
framework, the Agonist is demoted, and the function of the subject is taken
over by an inanimate NP which belongs to the proposition. As can be easily
deduced, the earliest example of wide scope of deontic agan coincides with
pinning down the first instance of an inanimate subject of this verb:
(3.1.19) before þe noun Whan goddys seruyse owyþ to be doun.
before the noon-time when God’s service ought to be done
‘before noon, when God’s work should be done’
(1303 Rob. of Brunne, Handl. Synne 1024 [VISSER 1969:
1815]) (example and translation from NORDLINGER and
TRAUGOTT 1997: 11)
Thus, for scope of a deontic to be wide, a non-agentive inanimate subject of
this deontic is required, a condition not met by any of the 28 obligative
occurrences of agan in the corpus. The two theses, the one dealing with the
prototypicality of agents as the subjects of deontic modals and the other
pertaining to narrow/wide scope are complementary. They result in the
construal of narrow scope with deontic modals as a prototype which develops
diachronically earlier than peripheral wide scope. This ties in with the
observations made by GOOSSENS (1987a) who, while trying to show different
degrees of the semantic and syntactic evolution of the pre-modals in Old
English, attests no inanimate subjects with cunnan and a handful of inanimate
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subjects with sculan. The choice of these two verbs is, of course, not
accidental, cunnan being a notorious “hesitant companion to the other modals”
(NAGLE 1989: 74) and sculan being one of the most advanced on the way to
grammaticalization and absorption of modal meanings (cf. PLANK 1984; NAGLE
1989).
3.1.6. Agan (to) infinitive with negation
When HERMERÉN (1979: 161) acknowledges that “modals in relation to negation
are an important aspect of modal meaning,” it comes as no surprise that the
question of the co-occurrence of negation with modality has been looked into
from various angles. LYONS (1977: 768—769) advances the need to distinguish
between the negation of modality and the negation of the proposition, which
follows a modal marker.7 This topic has become a recurrent one as picked up,
for example, by JACOBSSON (1979) who, while analyzing the contemporary
trends in the usage of the necessity modals, discusses modal negation and main
verb negation. Also PALMER (1979: 26) speaks correspondingly of “the negation
of the modality and the negation of the event” as in:
(3.1.20) You mustn’t take him too seriously.
(3.1.21) You needn’t take him too seriously.
(sentences from PALMER 1979: 26)
Even though both (3.1.20) and (3.1.21) contain modal and negation markers, in
(3.1.20) it is the event that is under negation whereas in (3.1.21) it is the
modality of necessity that falls within the scope of negation. Thus, the
appropriate paraphrases of (3.1.20) and (3.1.21) respectively are the following:
(3.1.22) It is necessary for you not to take him seriously.
(3.1.23) It is not necessary for you to take him seriously.
(For more considerations of the irregularities and gaps in the system of modal
markers in relation to negation cross-linguistically, see PALMER 1995, 1997; DE
HAAN 1997 and VAN DER AUWERA 2001).
As regards the negative examples of agan (to) infinitive, I have assembled the
corpus data in Table 7. The negative forms, while in the minority when it comes
to the total number of the occurrences of the construction, i.e. 34,9 per cent,
appear in half of the examples of agan (to) infinitive when the meaning at issue
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7 JOOS (1964), JAKOBSON (1971), BOUMA (1975), and PALMER (1979) use the term “event”
instead of “proposition”.
is deontic necessity. Note that negation does not find its way to agan to
geldanne. Nor does it to the agan to habenne instances which are included
among the deontic necessity examples in Table 7. Among the 6 instances of
agan to habenne, 5 are engendered in affirmative clauses, one occurs in an
interrogative clause. Once we set aside agan to habenne, as TRAUGOTT and
DASHER (2005) suggest that it be done, we are left with the 28 deontic necessity
examples out of which 17 are negative. It follows then that agan with the
meaning of deontic necessity sees a significant increase in the number of
negative clauses. I have checked whether there is any correlation between the
affirmative/negative type of a clause and the force of the necessity of agan. In
Table 8 the cases of strong and weak deontic necessity have been cast against the
clause types. It turns out that in the case of both affirmative and negative clauses,
the strong necessity instances constitute slightly less than half of all the
examples. There is no justification for the statement that stronger necessity of
agan (to) infinitive is to be linked with the increase in the number of negative
sentences. Possibly, no such correlation can be established due to insufficient
data in Old English. Further investigation into agan in Middle English could
shed some more light on the issue. That an overall inclination of the negative
contexts to exhibit stronger modality can be expected finds support in NAGLE’S
(1989: 96) interesting cross-linguistic observation which posits that
we might speculate that the meanings of the marginal modals [namely
dare and need in Present-Day English] in negatives and questions are
somehow ‘more’ modal than in affirmatives [...]. Evidence for the [...]
notion, at least as regards negatives, is found in many Indo-European
languages that have morphological subjunctive verb tenses. In both
modern French and Old English, for example, the morphological
subjunctive appears in complement clauses whose higher sentence
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Clause type
Meaning
Affirmative Negative Interrogative Total
Possession 6
(9.5%)
4
(6.3%)
0 10
(15.9%)
agan to geldanne 9
(14.3%)
0 2
(3.1%)
11
(17.4%)
Possession/ deontic
necessity
7
(11.1%)
1
(1.6%)
0 8
(12.7%)
Deontic necessity 16
(25.4%)
17
(27%)
1
(1.6%)
34
(54%)
Total 38
(60.4%)
22
(34.9%)
3
(4.7%)
63
(100%)
Table 7. Distribution of clause types with agan (to) infinitive
contains a semantically negative verb such as doubt or negated verbs
of thinking, believing, etc., or where the meaning contained in the
complement clause is negative as in OE sentences [...] from TRAUGOTT
1972: 101:
(3.1.24) ic wene ðætte noht monige begiodan Humber næren
‘I think that not many beyond the Humber not were’.
(subj.).
CP. 3. 16 (complement negative)
(3.1.25) ðeh ne geortriewe ic na Gode ðæt he us ne mæge (subj.)
gescildan.
‘although I shall not distrust God (so much as to think) he
can not shield us’. (higher sentence negative) (NAGLE 1989:
96—97)
I have included some of those negative instances while illustrating the cline
of the deontic necessity of agan as a holistic attitude seems the most feasible
in this case. It is a fair generalization which makes it clear that both affirmative
and negative constructions serve to express different degrees of deontic
necessity and subjectivity. Nevertheless, the fact that the negative examples
vary in the degree of necessity makes it no mean task to analyze these
examples in terms of the scope of negation. Consider (3.1.14) and (3.1.15)
again, where the intensity of the necessity makes the meanings of those
examples approximate to the sense of lack of permission, (for the meanings of
strong necessity-not-to and prohibition being closely intertwined in the case of
PDE mustn’t, see COATES 1983: 39). These cases, it seems to me, are best
treated as ones where it is the proposition that is negated. Thus in (3.1.14) it is
a deontic necessity not to stay or say mass, etc. that is imposed on the priests
and, analogically, in (3.1.15) we find out about a necessity for a Welshman not
to go England. Logically, strong necessity-not-to is equal to prohibition, which
accounts for the availability of a prohibition reading in the case of both
(3.1.14) and (3.1.15) (see also 3.4.3 for the equivalence of the notions of
necessary-not and not-possible in the sense of LYONS (1977) and 3.4.4 for the
inference of necessity-not-to from prohibition in the case of mot). Conversely,
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Necessity type
Clause type
Strong necessity Weak necessity Total
Negative clauses 7 10 17
Affirmative clauses 3 8 11
Total 10 18 28
Table 8. Distribution of strong/weak necessity with agan (to) infinitive
the negative instances of weaker necessity such as (3.1.17) require a different
interpretation. The force of necessity of agan in (3.1.17) brings the meaning of
the verb close to that of PDE should or ought to. The peculiarity of these two
PDE modals, when they are used with non-epistemic meanings, is that they
accept both kinds of negation, which leaves the meaning, broadly speaking,
intact. In COATES’S (1983: 239) assessment, the special compatibility of should
and ought with negation of both modality and proposition, has to do with the
merger-like character of the non-epistemic and epistemic meanings of the
respective verbs. Opinions of other linguists, with the notable exception of
HALLIDAY (1970), who acknowledges only proposition negation with should,
converge in this respect in that the following sentence:
(3.1.26) They [beggars — J.N.] shouldn’t be allowed to go about like
that. (sentence from COATES 1983: 63)
can be paraphrased as either (3.1.27) or (3.1.28) (cf. EHRMAN 1966; HERMERÉN
1979):
(3.1.27) It is not advisable/appropriate that they be allowed...
(3.1.28) It is advisable/appropriate that they not be allowed...
In an attempt to account for this phenomenon, HORN (1989: 342) constructs
a metascale of deontic necessity which indicates the increasing force of
necessity.8 The bottom of the scale is occupied by a weak force of permission,
say, that of PDE can or may, the center of the scale is associated with the
necessity of should and ought and the strong necessity of must, have to and
need belongs in the top of the scale. If negation of modality is applied to these
modals, a reverse scale is arrived at. Negation of permission yields a strong
force of prohibition, strong necessity, when negated, results in a weak force of
no-necessity-to, while negation of the necessity of should/ought leaves the
necessity unaffected so it remains the intermediate point on the negative
metascale as well. The force of weaker necessity, that of should and ought,
stays constant regardless of whether the necessity is negated or not, and, what
is more, it also remains the same if the proposition following the necessity is
under negation rather than the necessity itself. It then seems plausible to argue
that the necessity of agan in (3.1.17) approaches the middle point on the
metascale thereby making agan responsive to either modality negation or
proposition negation without impinging on the meaning of the verb. It might
also be added that the position of the negative particle is no clue that might
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8 DE HAAN’S (1997) continuum of deontic modality, which is presented in 2.3, is a recasting
of HORN’S (1989) notion of the metascale.
hint at the type of negation which agan takes in a particular example.
Invariably, the negative particle ne is attached to agan, cumulatively yielding
forms like nah, naht, nage, etc. (cf. WARNER 1993: 150—151). The same trend
perseveres in Present-Day English in that not is contracted with or follows the
modals irrespective of what type of negation is at issue (cf., for instance,
PALMER 2003).
3.1.7. Indeterminacy of possession and deontic necessity
As shown in Table 6, alongside the possessive and obligative instances of agan
(to) infinitive, there is a group of 8 examples which reconcile both of these
semantic areas. It should be reemphasized that these examples are to be seen as
a forming part of the verb’s semantic evolution from possession to deontic
necessity. On the time axis, they emerge once the inference of deontic
necessity acquires such frequency and strength that it is acknowledged as
a component of the meaning of agan on a par with the sense of possession.
The compatibility of the meanings of possession and weak necessity is,
however, so high that an application of either interpretation does not induce
any tension or misunderstanding. In other words, these eight sentences are
a realization of a merger which is illustrated in the following:
(3.1.29) Iosep hæfde mycele gyuu to his hlaforde 7 þenode
Joseph had great gifts to his  Lord and stretched-out
him 7 betæhte him eall þæt he ahte to bewitanne.
him and handed-over him all that he ought to entrust
(possession) ‘Joseph had great gifts for his Lord and handed
over to him all that he had to give’
(deontic necessity) ‘Joseph had great gifts for his Lord and
handed over to him all he was supposed to give’
(Gen (Ker) 39.4)
(3.2.29) is followed by two different translation lines, the first stemming from
the possessive meaning of agan (to) infinitive and the other stemming from the
obligative meaning of the construction. The obligative reading of (3.1.29)
brings it close to (3.1.17) in that a case of deontic necessity in the past is
objectively reported. Equally possible, however, is an implementation of the
possession reading in this example.
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3.1.8. Summary of agan
It will be readily realized that agan comes a long way in Old English to spark
a modal extension in its semantics, which goes hand in hand with the
beginning of the verb’s grammaticalization into an auxiliary. I have tried to
illustrate the particular steps of this semantic travel, its motivations and the
ultimate OE destination. That agan comes to be associated with weak necessity
and weakly subjective contexts in Old English testifies to an early stage of its
evolution. A determining factor in the whole life-span of modal agan and later
ought to is the origin of the obligative meaning of the verb in the collocation
with to geldanne, a sequence often translated as ‘to owe.’ This situation brings
agan close to verbs of owing, duty, belonging and being good/proper which on
van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S (1998) semantic map, are shown to aim at
deontic necessity as a subsequent phase of their evolution. Importantly, the link
which facilitates the transition from owing to deontic necessity is that in the
former the focus is shifted to the person to whom something is owed. The
creditor could be visualized as a source of the obligation to pay the debt,
a source which is external to the subject. In Old English this information is
crucial; as agan gradually increases its frequency in obligative environments
due to the strengthening of inferences, the necessity rigidly comes from the
outside. It comes to be associated with legal, religious and social rules. Without
ever filtering through to really subjective settings in Old English, the deontic
necessity of agan flourishes mostly in negative sentences.
3.2. Þearf
Among the OE preterite-present verbs of necessity discussed in this study,
þearf figures prominently as the only one which has not been passed over to
Present-Day English in any capacity whatsoever. According to PROKOSCH
(1939: 191) and MOLENCKI (2002: 3), þearf goes back to the Indo-European
form *terp-. MOLENCKI (2002: 3) invokes the data provided by “REJZEK (2001:
679) and SNOJ (1997: 880) [who — J.N.] believe that the Indo-European root
*terp- ‘to satisfy need’ had the variant *terb(h)- ‘to need,’ whose descendant
forms developed in Slavonic and Germanic.” The Germanic cognates of þearf
are Gothic þarf, Old Norse þarf, Old Saxon tharf and Old High German darf.
It should be also pointed out here that in Old English, side by side with þearf,
there is another pre-modal verb of necessity derived from it, namely beþurfan.
Since the verb is a morphologically complex form and is not a pre-modal,
I have chosen to handle beþurfan alongside the weak and strong verbs of
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necessity in sections 4.1 and 4.1.3. VISSER (1963—1973: 1423) pays attention
to the amalgamation of þearf with another preterite-present verb dearr in
Middle English brought about by a frequent omission of final f in the forms of
the former. The resultant similarity of the stems is yet enhanced by common
misguided substitution of the alveolar plosive for the initial dental fricative in
þearf bringing it even closer to dearr. A thorough account of the confusion
caused by the two verbs and their eventual ME fusion is given by MOLENCKI
(2005), who, apart from the morphological and phonetic reasons for the fusion,
stresses the areas of semantic affinity shared by þearf and dearr. The affinity
results in þearf, or tharf as the action takes place in Middle English, falling
into disuse in favor of dare. OED (1989) and MOLENCKI (2002) caution that,
far from being an isolated phenomenon, confusion between the cognates of
þearf and dearr has similar consequences in other Germanic languages.
Before those turbulent events take their toll, the distinct presence of þearf
leaves its indelible mark on the DOE Corpus. Instances of þearf found in this
corpus are assembled in Table 9. If any comparison between agan and þearf
seems plausible at this stage, what strikes one forcibly is that, complement-wise,
the verbs are mirror images of each other. Whereas the modal use of agan stands
in the shadow of the non-modal use of the verb in terms of frequency, þearf
relies mainly on its modal potential since the instances of infinitival
complements of þearf outnumber those of NP complements by 227 to 34. In
what follows, section 3.2.1 will be devoted to the occurrences of the þearf+NP
structure and the remaining sections contain a close look at the use of þearf
coupled with the infinitive.
3.2.1. Þearf with NP complements
Undoubtedly, the 34 examples of þearf taking an NP complement in the DOE
Corpus are a trace of the non-modal past of the verb. That the NP complements
are older than the infinitival complements can be gathered from the fact that
most of them come from the eighth and ninth centuries (including 1 example
from Beowulf and 17 examples from the Alfredian prose). In the following
centuries they are still attested, yet a downward trend in frequency can be
observed. To be sure, the main verb morpho-syntax of tharf persists till the
very end of the verb’s presence in Middle English (cf. MOLENCKI 2005,
LOUREIRO-PORTO 2005). The situation of the co-existence of an older and
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Complement type
Pre-modal
+Infinitive +NP Total
þearf 227 34 261
Table 9. Complementation of þearf
younger structure garners support for HEINE’S (1993) Overlap Model in the
process of grammaticalization of main verbs into auxiliaries whereby source
items are used side by side with target items.
Typically, when followed by an NP, þearf means ‘to have a need,’ the
subject is human, singular, often with a generic reference. The need can denote
something down-to-earth and physical, e.g.
(3.2.1) ne ðearf he nanra domboca oþerra
not needs he none book-of-law other
‘He does not need any other code of law’
(LawAfEl 49.6)
yet, more often than not, the object of þearf stands for something more abstract
or very general or even unspecified, e.g.
(3.2.2) þonne ne ðorfte he no maran fultomes þonne his selfes.
then not needed he no more help than his self
‘then he needed no more help than his own’
(Bo 26.59.30)
(3.2.3) Ac ðæt nis nan man þætte sumes eacan ne ðyrfe, buton
but that not-is no man  that some addition not need, but
Gode anum; he hæfð on his agenum genog, ne ðearf he
God one, he has on his own enough, not need he
nanes þinges buton ðæs þe he on him selfum hæfð.
no thing but that which he on him self has.
‘There is not a man who needs something more besides God
alone; he has enough on his own, he does not need anything
besides what he has on his own’
(Bo 24.55.28)
There is one interesting case where the subject is inanimate. The mechanism
involved here is metonymy of the type part for the whole as the need of
a human is ascribed to the mouth:
(3.2.4) Muða gehwylc mete þearf, mæl sceolon tidum gongan.
mouth each food needs, meals should on-time go
‘Each mouth needs food, meals should be on time.’
(Max I 124)
Marginally, as noted by MOLENCKI (2002: 13), þearf expands its semantic
potential and “corresponds to sceal in the sense of modern ‘to owe’”:
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(3.2.5) On lifiendes Godes naman, ne ðearf ic N sceatt ne scylling,
on living God’s name, not need I sceatt nor schilling,
ne penig ne peniges weorð,
nor penny nor penny’s worth
‘In the name of the living God, I owe no sceat or shilling or
penny or a penny’s worth to anyone’
(LawSwer 11)
At the same time, (3.2.5) emerges as the only case of þearf with the meaning
of ‘to owe’ I find in the corpus. I reserve some more space for the comments
on the approximation of þearf and sceal in 3.2.4.3.
Very rarely — twice to be exact — does þearf+NP become involved in an
interrogative context, which is not to say that þearf+infinitive does significantly
more often, one of the two possible illustrations being (3.2.6) below:
(3.2.6) Hu þearf mannes sunu maran treowe?
how needs man’s son more assurance
‘What need does a man’s son have of a better assurance?’
(Ex 426)
Needless to say, an interrogative structure falls short of influencing the
meaning of the verb which retains the focus on the subject’s needs.
On the whole, the þearf+NP structure can be said to serve to express the
subject’s needs motivated by her or his everyday existence. Importantly, rather
than to convey a speaker’s needs, the verb finds itself at the service of the
expression of somebody else’s desires. In other words, in all but two cases, the
subject is other than first person. The shift from the contexts with the salient
focus on a speaker’s own needs to those in which someone else’s needs are
acknowledged, matters to the degree that “the key to the development of an
obligative [...] may involve the assertion of a desire on the part of the speaker
(cf. the use with the third person subject in She must have her way)” (DENNING
1987: 50).
Also, it is worth noting that, much like þearf+infinitive, þearf+NP tends to
be nestled in negative contexts. Although the discrepancy between the number
of negative and affirmative contexts does not reach any striking proportions,
namely 20 and 12 respectively, it is still remarkable. I refer the reader to
section 3.2.5 for a detailed discussion of the non-assertive occurrences of
þearf+infinitive.
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3.2.2. Þearf with the infinitive
Not so frequently attested cross-linguistically, the pathway of the development
of þearf from a main verb meaning ‘to need’ to a grammaticalized token of
deontic necessity has some parallels in other languages. BYBEE, PERKINS and
PAGLIUCA (1994) spot a similar evolutionary formula in Basque and DENNING
(1987: 48) points to the Chinese verb yùng, which, on the one hand, is an
auxiliary functioning as a conduit for medium necessity but, on the other hand,
retains main verb characteristics and the meaning ‘to need’ in other contexts.
The semantic readjustment of þearf propelling its grammaticalization seems
less complex than in the case of agan. DENNING (1987: 51) explains that
“sometimes the semantic change is relatively minor, being rooted in some
component of compulsion already inherent in the semantics of the source verb,
as is the case of those with such original senses as ‘need’ [...].” Further, van der
AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998: 95) put forth a claim that “need [as a source
item — J.N.] feeds into a participant-internal necessity,” a line of development
not at all at odds with what could be expected given the corollaries of the
meaning of þearf discussed in 3.2.1. Relevant here is the fact that in both the
expression of one’s needs and the expression of PI necessity, the common
denominator is the subject’s desire which is spotlighted. Also in keeping with
van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S (1998) map of modality, PI necessity is
coterminous with PE necessity, the latter being another semantic area visited by
þearf. Thus in the following sections my attention is commanded by the two
major obligative senses of þearf: PI necessity and PE/deontic necessity. Other,
quite marginal, semantic extensions of the meaning of þearf receive due
consideration in 3.2.6 as well.
3.2.3. Syntactic considerations
Before the semantic reflections take over, the type of the infinitival
complementation of þearf deserves to be dealt with. Unlike agan, þearf follows
other preterite-presents in that it is, to use WARNER’S (1993: 136) terms,
“subcategorized for the plain infinitive.” Rather than be complemented by the
inflected infinitive, the verb exhibits considerable consistency in taking the bare
infinitive. The only example that runs afoul of this formula is (3.2.7),
(3.2.7) Gif hit sie winter ne þearft þu þone wermod to don.
if it be winter, not need thou the absinthe to do
‘if it is winter, you need not use absinthe’
(LCh II (2) 2.3.4)
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of which MOLENCKI (2002: 7) says: “[...] in the Book of Leechdom there is an
interesting example of a complex (inflected) infinitive, whose ending appears to
have been reduced (to don for to donne).”
Among the 227 occurrences of þearf+infinitive there are 12 instances which
formally lack any overt infinitive following þearf. Two possible interpretations
of such a state of affairs come into play: we have to do either with an
intransitive (absolute) use of the verb or with ellipsis of the infinitive. B&T and
LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005: 157) choose to set absolute uses of þearf apart from
elliptical ones. WARNER (1993: 133) is less absolute in that he conjectures that
it is not, in fact, always possible to determine which of the two options is the
case. The solution he offers is to mark all such instances as potentially
elliptical without, however, jettisoning the possibility of them containing
intransitive þearf altogether. It seems reasonable to follow WARNER (1993) as
in my 12 examples the context preceding the occurrence of þearf each time
engenders the potential antecedent of the verb ellipted, as drince in (3.2.8):
(3.2.8) Wiþ þeore, ... do on wilisc ealu, bewyl oþ þriddan dæl
against ulcer, do on Welsh ale, boil-away to third part
7 drince þa hwile þa he þurfe.
and drink while he need
‘With ulcer, ... add to the Welsh ale, boil it away to the third
part and let him drink it while he needs’
(LCh II (1) 47.3.9)
WARNER (1993: 113) refers to such ellipsis, which is encountered with the
pre-modals and beon/wesan in Old English, as “postverbal ellipsis.” Postverbal
ellipsis in Old English works largely along the same lines as post-auxiliary
ellipsis in PDE (cf. HANKAMER and SAG 1976; SAG 1979), the different
nomenclature stemming from the problem of whether the OE pre-modals are
auxiliaries or not (cf. 2.7.1).
Another syntactic point worth making is the distribution of þearf+infinitive
with respect to clause types presented in Table 10. The table is to serve as
a crucial reference point that I intend to use while investigating the semantics
of þearf henceforth. At this stage I confine myself to stressing a striking
asymmetry between the number of negative and affirmative clauses containing
the verb, a mechanism we could observe work in the case of the occurrences of
agan (to) infinitive as well.
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3.2.4. Þearf with the meaning of necessity
As regards the signification of þearf, TELLIER (1962: 103) observes that “le
sens est généralement celui de »avoir besoin«,” [generally it has the meaning
‘to need’ — J.N.] and WARNER (1993 : 160) adds that “it is centrally dynamic,
but also expresses deontic modality.” While TELLIER’S (1962) assessment cannot
be denied a degree of accuracy, especially with respect to þearf+NP, it still
remains exactly what it aspires to be, namely a very general statement. It is
WARNER’S (1993) observation that is more difficult to be upheld. My
investigation of the data from the DOE Corpus has led me to conclude that
þearf in Old English is a token of predominately external obligation, that is to
say, deontic necessity if the terminology adopted in this monograph is to be
applied.
3.2.4.1. PI necessity of þearf
As hinted at in 3.2.2, the semantic leap from the expression of one’s need to PI
necessity, which þearf makes at one point of its evolution, fails to qualify as
any revolutionary change. In both of these semantic areas, the subject’s desire
is in the center of the speaker’s message. Initially, as shown in 3.2.1, when
þearf takes NP complements, the subject is one with the speaker, later more
and more contexts emerge where the unity of the speaker and subject is
severed, thereby causing þearf to become more subjective. After all, it is hardly
possible to expect objectivity from someone who is talking about someone
else’s needs. Once this stage is accomplished, it seems that the verb is ready to
accept infinitival complements. What may provide a spark for this advancement
is the fact that OE infinitives are by some linguists believed to be on a par with
nouns. Consider that “since infinitives were nouns, the relation between them
and the verbs shall, can, etc., to which they were joined, must originally have
been the same as that between a direct object and a full verb, so that there was
structurally no difference in this respect between ‘he can manigfealdan spræce’
(= »he knows many languages« — IGR) and ‘he can sprecan’ (= »he can
speak« — IGR)” (VISSER 1963—1973: 548, quoted in ROBERTS 1985: 22), (for
a similar stance on OE infinitives, see LIGHTFOOT 1979; also see FISCHER and
van der LEEK 1981 for criticism and van KEMENADE 1992a who argues that OE
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Clause type
Pre-modal
Negative Interrogative Affirmative Total
þearf+infinitive 186
81.9%
4
1.8%
37
16.3%
227
100%
Table 10. Distribution of clause types with þearf+infinitive
bare infinitives are, in fact, propositional VP complements). Notwithstanding
such formal disagreements, the idea that bare infinitives replace nominal
complements of þearf cannot be questioned. While coping with a similar
development, namely the emergence of the infinitival complements in the case
of to want, KRUG (2000: 144) maintains that
A feasible and rather elegant explanation is syntactic in nature, which
reveals that [...] it is impossible to isolate semantic from syntactic
development. It is an account in terms of extension and would simply
posit generalization of transitive WANT along the following lines: if
a noun phrase can denote a desired entity, so too can an infinitive.
This type of generalization is exemplified by the bracketing of the two
examples below:
I want [a car]
I want [to go]
(KRUG 2000: 144)
The moment þearf+infinitive comes into being, the need of þearf becomes PI
necessity, a corollary of a necessity of an action, state or some other verbal
concept to be achieved, being substituted for an object required. Note that
simultaneously the subjectivity of þearf is yet enhanced, necessity being
a modal concept, and the verb is pushed onto the road to grammaticalization
into an auxiliary (cf. BOLINGER 1980).
In spite of the fact that all the accounts of the semantics of the OE
pre-modals I have consulted ascribe PI necessity to þearf (cf. OED; MITCHELL
1985; WARNER 1993; MOLENCKI 2002 among others), it proves not an easy task
to identify a really uncontroversial example with this meaning. By an
uncontroversial example of PI necessity I mean a sentence in which the speaker
who is at the same time the subject comments on his or her needs or
optionally, the speaker talks about the subject’s need. In the set of 227
occurrences in the DOE Corpus, a minority meet those criteria, a few of the
best illustrations following:
(3.2.9) he is þurh his mihte æighwær andweard: and ne ðearf
he is through his might anywhere present: and not need
na faran fram stowe to stowe;
not go from place to place
‘He has the ability to be present anywhere: he need not walk
from place to place’
(ÆCHom I 10 261.91)
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(3.2.10) Ða ongæt se wæliga, þæt he ne þorfte na ofer
then realized the rich-man, that he not needed not over
þæt wenan him selfum þære ecan hæle hihtes.
that consider him self of-the eternal salvation hope
‘Then the rich man realized that there was no need for him to
think about the hope of eternal salvation’
(GDPref and 4 (C) 34.310.16)
(3.2.11) Drihten is min onlyhtend, and min Hælend; hwæt þearf
Lord is my light, and my Savior; what need
ic ondrædan?
I fear
‘the Lord is my light and my Savior; what need I fear?
(PPs (prose) 26.1)
Representative of the most typical use of PI necessity with þearf, (3.2.9)
through (3.2.11), as well as (3.2.8), all contain animate subjects and in each
“the subject is actor with respect to the modality as well as with respect to the
process” (Halliday 1970: 339). In other words, it is the subject’s volition or
need that is recognized as a focal point and the subject is assigned the function
of the agent (in (3.2.8) and (3.2.9)) or the experiencer (in (3.2.10) and (3.2.11))
of the action specified in the proposition. As for the former point, that of the
animacy of the subject, HERMERÉN (1979: 99) argues that “it is a common
characteristic of the surface subject of [...] [PI — J.N.] modalities.”9
A closer look at the nuances of the PI necessity of þearf seems appropriate.
Culled from a medical manual, (3.2.8) focuses on a bodily need of the subject.
The subjunctive form indicates a hypothetical situation that might take place. It
is uncommon that þearf is engendered in an affirmative clause (see Table 10).
Interestingly enough, but for Bald’s Leechbook, the number of the affirmative
clauses containing þearf would significantly dwindle away. The other three
examples conform to the predominant type of a clause, namely a negative. In
(3.2.9), the PI necessity, or rather lack thereof, to be exact, derives from the
subject’s property of omnipresence. The present-time reference has a general
sense, it can thereby be taken to include the future as well. Unlike (3.2.8) and
(3.2.9), examples (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) contain non-agentive main verbs, a verb
of mental activity (wenan) and a verb of feelings (ondrædan) respectively. In
(3.2.10) the speaker quite objectively reports the lack of necessity in the past
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9 HERMERÉN (1979) introduces an alternative division of modality into internal, external and
neutral which roughly correspond to the dynamic, deontic and epistemic types respectively. With
necessity subsumed under external modality, the point that seems to be missed in this scheme is
that necessity can also be internal. The quotation used above refers to internal modality as this is
what, I assume, PI necessity is part of.
on the part of the subject whereas (3.2.11) takes on an aspect of uniqueness in
that it is one of the four interrogative examples with þearf+infinitive in the
whole corpus (see Table 10). Witness, however, that despite the interrogative
form of the sentence, (3.2.11) is nowhere near a bonafide question. Rather, it
approaches a rhetorical question, the speaker apparently not expecting any
answer, and a paraphrase of (3.2.11) could be:
(3.2.12) I don’t need to/have to fear anything./I have got nothing to be
afraid of.
As a result, (3.2.11) is to be thought of as a logically negative sentence, which
only goes to prove that OE speakers have a strong association of þearf with
a context of lack of need/necessity.
Interestingly, it should be noted that the fact that the subject does not need
to be afraid in (3.2.11) is not wholly internally motivated. More than by the
psychological disposition of the subject, the lack of necessity is determined by
the presence of God, an external factor, which brings us to the question of the
indeterminacy of the meaning of þearf. (3.2.11) turns out to combine PI
necessity, PE/deontic necessity and is even compatible with yet another
reading, viz. that of ‘to have a reason.’ By no means is (3.2.11) a solitary
example of such a blend, on the contrary similar cases could be multiplied.
A practical difficulty that this state of affairs brings about is that the numbers
presented in Table 11, which reflect the results of my analysis of the semantics
of þearf+infinitive, should be understood as tentative only. As evidenced by
example (3.2.11), there are no clear dividing lines between PI and PE necessity
of þearf, an indication of PI necessity and PE necessity being susceptible to
merger. Under my very subjective interpretation of the relevant contexts there
are at least 33 cases of merger which I understand as occurrences of
þearf+infinitive where both PI necessity and PE/deontic necessity (optionally
some other meaning too) are involved but none clearly prevails. It, however,
bears reemphasizing that rather than sound absolute, I would like Table 11 to
give a rough idea about the frequency of usage of þearf with different
meanings in the DOE Corpus. Counter to WARNER’S (1993) appraisal,
PE/deontic-necessity-dominant contexts occur twice as often as PI-necessity-
dominant contexts, which suggests that it is PE/deontic necessity that occupies
the center of the semantics of þearf+infinitive.
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Neccessity type
Pre-modal
PE/deontic
necessity
PI necessity Indeterminate Other Total
þearf+infinitive 118
(52%)
66
(29.1%)
33
(14.5%)
10
(4.4%)
227
(100%)
Table 11. Distribution of meanings of þearf+infinitive
3.2.4.2. From PI necessity to PE/deontic necessity
Obvious as it is that þearf after flirtation with PI necessity becomes available
to PE necessity, the very shift needs to be accounted for. I conjecture that the
key to the understanding of this development lies in the verb’s adherence to
negative environments. In order to shed some light upon what is meant here
I must refer to Present-Day English. In Present-Day English there are two
verbs which are considered beneficiaries of the semantics of þearf: modal need
and main verb to need to (cf. TAEYMANS 2004 and NYKIEL 2005 for a history of
need and to need to). Both verbs are commonly associated with necessity
inherent to the subject, hence PI necessity, much like þearf in Old English
(cf. SWEETSER 1990 and SMITH 2003). On the other hand, deontic necessity is
tightly knit with the core of the meaning of to have to (see, among others,
COATES 1983; SWEETSER 1990; SMITH 2003). Thus there emerges a finely
drawn, albeit a little idealized perhaps, symmetry:
PI necessity deontic necessity
need/to need to to have to
The contrast between PI necessity and deontic necessity with respect to
these verbs is neutralized in negative contexts. In other words, forms needn’t,
don’t need to and don’t have to converge to denote no-necessity-to-do. PALMER
(1979: 104) holds that “NEED often seems to supply the forms for negating
necessity modality and for questioning it,” COATES (1983: 51), having surveyed
the Lancaster and Survey of English Usage corpora, garners evidence in
support of needn’t and don’t have to being lumped together and TAEYMANS
(2003: 105) comments on the possibility of replacing have to with needn’t or
don’t need to. It could be concluded then that when there is no necessity to
perform an act, the source of the modality is relegated to the far reaches of the
background. The neutralization of PI and deontic necessity in negative contexts
could also be viewed through the perspective of Talmy’s (2000) force
dynamics. In this scenario a given modal context, e.g.:
(3.2.13) I needn’t work today.
(3.2.14) I don’t have to work today.
involves two participants: the Agonist, who is associated with the subject, and
the Antagonist, one associated with the source of the necessity. Ideally, in
(3.2.13) the Antagonist would be a part of the subject’s self and in (3.2.14) the
Antagonist is to be identified as some external authority. In a prototypical
situation there is a clash of the Agonist and Antagonist as they exhibit opposite
inclinations. The peculiarity of needn’t and don’t have to, as in (3.2.13) and
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(3.2.14), consists in the fact that in both cases the Antagonist chooses to
withdraw. To say ‘you needn’t do’ or ‘you don’t have to do’ amounts to
leaving much freedom to the Agonist, who is free to realize his or her tendency
whatever it may be. If the Agonist’s tendency is satisfied, the nature of the
Antagonist plays second fiddle. As a result, a situation when the role of the
source of necessity, i.e. the Antagonist, is played down or when the Antagonist
is not clearly stated may invite an inference in the sense of TRAUGOTT and
DASHER (2005) that the source is different than it really is. Hence, (3.2.13) may
be taken to imply that the source of necessity is other than subject-internal,
thereby bringing the meaning of needn’t to close to that of don’t have to.
The same premises, I believe, underlie the development of þearf. If the
speaker of (3.2.15) means PI necessity in that: “we have got no internal need to
doubt:”
(3.2.15) Ne þearf nanne man tweogian: æfter his deaþe oðrum þissa
not need no man doubt: after his death other this
he onfehð,
he receives,
‘No man need have doubts about this: after his death he will
receive something else’
(HomU 9 (Ver 4) 93)
yet ends up being interpreted otherwise, an inference appears that: ‘we don’t
have not doubt’ because of some external circumstances. All in all, if a verb of
PI necessity is commonly used in negative contexts, as is the case with þearf, it
stands a good chance of being inferentially reanalyzed as a verb of PE/deontic
necessity. The former signification is, of course, still preserved in appropriate
contexts, so the older and later meanings work in parallel with each other (cf.
TRAUGOTT 1989 and HEINE 1993 for other examples of such co-existence).
3.2.4.3. PE and deontic necessity of þearf
When þearf is employed as a token of PE necessity, it is primarily the case that
the source of the necessity can be determined with better or worse precision. In
other words, general PE necessity does not play any crucial role in the
occurrences of the verb in the DOE Corpus. With the exception of nine
examples where the source of necessity is nebulous and circumstantial,
necessity emerging from the remaining occurrences of the verb in the sample is
deontic. As the weakest instances of deontic necessity of þearf border on
general PE necessity, the circumstantial nature of the source of necessity will
be touched upon in the following discussion.
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Þearf with the sense of deontic necessity embraces various degrees of the
force of necessity and a diversified extent of subjectivity and speaker
involvement. For this reason, a cline showing the gradience of deontic
necessity proves the best means of doing justice to this meaning of þearf.
Without too much distortion, the range of deontic necessity is illustrated by the
following examples:
(3.2.16) ic eow secgan mæg þoncwyrðe þing, þæt ge ne þyrfen
I you say may pleasing thing, that you not need
leng murnan on mode.
longer mourn in spirit
‘I can tell you a pleasing thing, you need no longer mourn in
your spirits’
(Jud 146)
(3.2.17) Ða cwæþ he Crist to me, Ne þearft þu þe ondrædon,
then said he Christ to me, not need thou thee fear
forþon þe ic eom mid þe,
because I am with thee
‘then Christ said to me, »You need not fear because I am
with you«,’
(LS 32 358)
(3.2.18) him þincð on his geþance, þæt he þam abbode ne þyrfe
him seems on his mind, that he to-the abbot not need
hyran,
hear
‘it seems to him in his mind that he is not obliged to obey the
abbot’
(BenR 65.124.12)
(3.2.19) Ne us ne þearf na twynian, þæt we gebyrian ne
not us not need not have-doubts, that we belong not
sceolon oððe heofonwarena cyninge oððe hellewites
shall either heaven-inhabitants king or hell-torment
deoflum
devil
‘we need not doubt that we will belong either to the king of
the inhabitants of heaven or to the devil of hell’
(HomU 27 (Nap 30) 261)
(3.2.20) se þegen [...] moste his hlaford aspelian 7 his onspæce
the servant must his master substitute-for and his law-suit
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geræcan mid rihte, swa hwar swa he þorfte.
obtain with right, so where so he needed
‘The servant was allowed to substitute for his master and
have his lawsuit wherever he needed to’
(LawGeþyncþo 3)
(3.2.21) Micele maran gyltas man mæg gebetan her on þisum life,
many more guilts man may repair here on this life,
and þone Hælend gegladian, þæt he ne þurfe þrowian on
and the Savior gladden that he not need suffer on
ðam toweardan life.
the future life
‘A man may compensate for many more sins here in this life
and thus gladden the Savior so that he will not have to suffer
in the future life’
(ÆHom 16 157)
(3.2.22) Petrus cwæð: nis nu ofer þis naht, þæt þurfe beon
Peter said: not-is now over this nothing, that need be
andswared swa openre gesceadwisnesse
answered so open sagacity
‘Peter said, »There is nothing about it now that need be
answered with such open sagacity«’
(GDPref and 4 (C) 46.336.28)
Example (3.2.16) figures high on the scale of subjectivity as the speaker is
shown to have some involvement even though he is only reporting the lack of
necessity which is dictated by a third party. The meaning of ge ne þyrfen,
paraphrasable as ‘you needn’t’ or ‘you don’t have to’ could be labeled as
prototypical among the negated examples of the deontic necessity of þearf.
Note that given the authority and involvement of the speaker and despite the
fact that the main verb is not a typical activity verb, the sentence verges on
performativity in that the subject is positively urged to stop mourning.
Example (3.2.17) is representative of quite a large group of 24 occurrences
which contain the second person singular subject, hence they are expected to
be the most subjective and to have the sense of necessity strongest. The reality
only partly lives up to the expectations. (3.2.17) has no overt marker of the
involvement of the speaker who, however, undoubtedly speaks from a position
of authority and generates the necessity himself. The status of such use of
þearf is only marginal, though. This can be gathered from the fact that for the
speaker to be interpreted as the source of necessity in a given instance of þearf,
an explicit indication must be provided by the context. Christ, designated as the
speaker in (3.2.17), is clearly in a position to lay obligations, which is yet
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enhanced by the clause forþon þe ic eom mid þe, which precisely elucidates the
grounds of the lack of necessity and points back to the speaker as the source of
the modality. What drags the necessity force down the scale is the
non-agentivity of the main verb following þearft. As is clear from Table 12,
ondrædan is one of the three most frequent verbal complements of þearf in
general and the most frequent complement of þearf with the meaning of
PE/deontic necessity. A common denominator of those three verbs in Table 12
is that none of them is an activity verb, a trend which runs through the
majority of the occurrences of þearf (in the group of the 118 instances of
þearf, an activity verb follows the pre-modal 39 times). The meaning of þearf
in (3.2.17) approximates to that in (3.2.16) to the extent that it could be
paraphrased as ‘you needn’t/you don’t have to.’ It is also of significance that in
this case the source of the necessity can be linked to the authority of the
speaker.
Further, (3.2.18) is of interest since it has a third person singular subject as
well as the meaning that can be seen essentially along the same lines as those
in (3.2.16) and (3.2.17). There is no speaker involvement and the necessity is
conditioned by the official regulations, which renders this example more
objective. It is noteworthy, however, that the main verb is at least an activity
verb. (3.2.19) goes further down the cline on the virtue of its being a pseudo-
exhortation of which COATES (1983: 35) says that “such examples seem weak
in their imperative force [...].” Formally the sentence belongs to the class of
“impersonal constructions which have oblique arguments, but which lack
a nominative subject” (WARNER 1993: 122), example (3.2.19) being one of 18
appearances of this construction that I find in the DOE Corpus. The logical
subject of (3.2.19) is us, which indicates that the speaker counts himself as
a member of his audience with a view to implying that he is subject to the
same external necessity. Purely a rhetorical device, it fails to carry any strong
modality.
The only non-negative example among the ones that I have selected as the
best illustrations of the cline, (3.2.20) has þearf with the meaning referred to
by TELLIER (1962: 114) when he observes that “dans quelques contextes son
sens apparaît comme étonnamment proche de celui qu’aurait SCULAN” [in
some contexts the sense of the verb appears surprisingly close to that of
3.2. Þearf 93
Verbal complement
Meaning
wenan ondrædan tweogan Other Total
PE/deontic necessity 8 13 7 90 118
other meanings 17 11 6 75 109
Table 12. Frequency of verbal complements of þearf
SCULAN — translation J.N.]. This assessment tallies with MOLENCKI’S (2002:
12) observation that “þearf often expressed the idea of compulsion, or where
the inevitability of consequence is expressed, and is thus synonymous with
sceal in the sense of modern ‘should, ought to’.” With the third person singular
subject, a past reference and the necessity which is a concomitant of the legal
regulations, (3.2.20) is located toward the periphery of the cline, though.
Subsequently, example (3.2.21) is a member of quite a numerous set of
occurrences with a clearly future reference. It implies the necessity to suffer
from some unfavorable conditions in the future unless appropriate precautions
are undertaken in the present. Note that the future necessity derives from the
generally accepted system of religious rules which are not to be questioned.
Obviously, with the necessity projected far upon the future, (3.2.21) is devoid
of any performative value and subjectivity and hence figures very low on the
cline. Finally, the bottom of the cline is occupied by examples such as (3.2.22),
which can be seen to contain an inanimate subject and a passive construction.
With the Agonist being demoted, the obligative force of (3.2.22) turns out very
weak. Moreover, (3.2.22) fails to unequivocally locate the source of the
necessity. Given this, it seems most likely that the speaker reports a necessity
arising out of vague external circumstances. If this interpretation is accepted,
we have to do with an instance of þearf extending beyond mere deontic
necessity to general PE necessity.
Once the occurrences of þearf of deontic necessity have been shown to vary
in the amount of necessity and subjectivity, the next step is to balance these
occurrences against the parameters set out by COATES (1983: 36) in a way no
different than in the case of agan. The aim of this task is to make an attempt at
determining the force of the modality of the particular instances of þearf by
laying them out on a matrix. The parameters need to be rearranged slightly so
that they will reflect the true nature of the semantics and syntax of þearf. The
final order, after some necessary adjustment, is presented below:
(a) second person subject,
(b) speaker involvement,
(c) speaker has authority over subject/Agonist*
(d) verb is agentive,
(e) paraphrasable by ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that’
(f) animate subject/Agonist occurring as oblique NP*
(g) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’,
(h) paraphrasable by ‘it is not necessary that’,
(i) inanimate subject.
* the second option applies to þearf in impersonal constructions
(adapted from COATES 1983: 36)
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As can be seen, feature (h) has been added as it is implicated in the bulk of the
negative occurrences of þearf.10 Also, it will not go unnoticed that feature (e),
an indicator of strong necessity, is virtually absent from the meaning of þearf,
yet it is preserved in the matrix as it makes comparisons with the matrix of
agan more easily available.
An initial observation that can be made on the basis of Figure 13 is that the
examples of þearf spread over the matrix somewhat less consistently than those
of agan and PDE must (for the former, see Figure 12 for the latter, see COATES
1983: 37). The most subjective examples of þearf, for instance, such as
(3.2.16) and (3.2.17), are responsive to the features typical of the low extreme
of the cline, e.g. feature (h). Likewise, the only feature-(i)-positive example,
(3.2.22), is at the same time sensitive to feature (d) which is indicative of
stronger necessity. It is worth emphasizing that such a trend is not noticeable in
the case of agan and must. Further, it can be noticed that examples (3.2.16)
and (3.2.17) stand out by virtue of embracing the crucial features of the strong
end of the cline. Considering that overall there are 31 cases of a second person
pronoun used with a present indicative form of þearf with the sense of deontic
necessity, I conclude that subjective contexts with þearf have quite a strong
foothold in Old English. The remaining occurrences fail to show any
significant internal divisions and thus can be lumped together as the residents
of the skirt and periphery of the cline. Importantly, they make up the majority
of all the instances of the verb.
Also, two points should be given some consideration in relation to
Figure 13. Firstly, it cannot escape anyone’s attention that none of the
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10 Feature (h) is indicative of much weaker and less intensive modality than feature (e) even
though the former is only a negative variant of the latter. As shown by HORN (1989) and DE HAAN
(1997), however, negation of strong necessity results in weak modality equivalent to
permission-not-to.
a b c d e f g h i
(3.2.16) + + + – – + – + –
(3.2.17) + + + – – + – + –
(3.2.18) – – – + – + – + –
(3.2.19) – – ? – – + – + –
(3.2.20) – – – – – + + – –
(3.2.21) – – – – – + – + –
(3.2.22) – – + + – – + – +
strong necessity/subjectivity weak necessity/subjectivity
(core) (periphery)
Figure 13. Matrix to show gradience of deontic necessity of þearf
examples of þearf yields a paraphrase ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential
that.’ Instead, the nature of the deontic necessity of þearf is best described in
terms of features (g), i.e. paraphrasable by ‘it is important that,’ and (h), i.e.
paraphrasable by ‘it is not necessary that.’ The former applies to the
affirmative instances whereas the latter is preferred by the negative ones. The
deontic necessity which underlies the use of þearf is then not to be taken as
very forceful. Witness examples (3.2.20) and (3.2.22) where it is relatively
easy to overcome the force of the necessity. In the explicitly negative
examples, e.g. (3.2.16), the subject’s freedom of choice is not significantly
constrained either in that they are given an option: to act or not to act (to
mourn or not to mourn in (3.2.16)). The final decision rests with the subject,
a natural consequence of there being no necessity for the subject to act. The
second point to be commented on centers on the inanimate subjects of þearf.
As can be seen in Figure 13, þearf+infinitive expands its use to the degree that
it accepts inanimate subjects. Even if this innovation verges on negligibility in
frequency terms (five times total, including four cases of deontic necessity and
one case of indeterminacy between PE/deontic and PI necessity), in light of my
discussion of wide and narrow scope with deontic modality in section 3.1.5,
þearf proves a pre-modal mature enough to enter wide scope constructions. It
should be remembered that, as shown by NORDLINGER and TRAUGOTT (1997)
and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005), such a development is implemented only
after the use of a deontic modal in conjunction with narrow scope is firmly
established. With the Agonist being unexpressed, example (3.2.22) provides an
illustration of wide scope with þearf.
3.2.5. Þearf with negation
To all intents and purposes, it is negation that seems the proper locus for
a discussion of the modality of þearf+infinitive. Table 13, which builds on
Table 10, undisputedly demonstrates that the sense of necessity of þearf, be it
internal or external, relies mainly on the negation of this necessity. This
statement is only weakened when some other meanings than necessity come to
the fore in þearf (cf. 3.2.6). Otherwise, the quantitative summary of the clause
types points to steady and prevalent incidence of negation. This finding lends
further support to my account of the role played by negative contexts in the PI
necessity of þearf being extended to PE and deontic necessity, which I detailed
in 3.2.4.2. It is crucial to note that the semantic change in þearf+infinitive
leaves the preference for negative contexts unaffected or even strengthened.
This, in turn, suggests that negation might have a hand in this semantic change.
Also, in order to arrive at a thorough picture of negation with þearf, in
Table 13 I include the lowest row which, by virtue of presenting the
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distribution of þearf+NP with respect to the clause type, naturally belongs to
section 3.2.1. Due to this inclusion, one can observe that the convergence of
þearf and negation is a theme underlying all the various uses of þearf in Old
English.
A word of caution seems proper in connection with Table 13, however. The
division line between the affirmative and negative sentences is, predictably, the
presence of the clitic ne in the same clause as þearf. Such an approach, even if
necessary and helpful, might be felt to explain away some other facets of the
negative contexts containing þearf, to which there is much more than just
explicit negation. A closer inspection of the 37 instances of þearf+infinitive
subsumed under the label AFFIRMATIVE in Table 13 reveals that as many as
21 appear in assertive contexts whereas the remaining examples can be divided
into emphatic and non-assertive (see Table 14). As for the emphatic subgroup,
it comprises complex sentences in which the clause with þearf is itself positive,
yet, at the same time, it is an embedded clause whose matrix clause is negative,
as in (3.2.22):
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7 — Expressing...
Clause type
Meaning
Affirmative Negative Interrogative Total
þearf+infinitive
PE/deontic necessity
16
(13.6%)
101
(85.6%)
1
(0.8%)
118
(100%)
þearf+infinitive
indeterminate
7
(21.2%)
25
(75.8%)
1
(3%)
33
(100%)
þearf+infinitive
PI necessity
9
(13.6%)
55
(83.4%)
2
(3%)
66
(100%)
þearf+infinitive
other
4
(54.6%)
5
(45.4%)
0
(0%)
10
(100%)
þearf+infinitive
total
37
(16.3%)
186
(81.9%)
4
(1.8%)
227
(100%)
þearf+NP 12
(35.3%)
20
(58.8%)
2
(5.9%)
34
(100%)
Table 13. Distribution of clause types with þearf
Context
Pre-modal
Emphatic
Other
non-assertive
Assertive Total
þearf+infinitive 7 9 21 37
Table 14. Þearf in assertive and non-assertive contexts
(3.2.22) se wilniaþ ðætte nan ðing ne sie ðe he him ondrædan
who desires that no thing not be that he him dread
ðyrfe,
need
‘who wishes that there was not a thing that he need dread’
(CP 37.265.7)
Importantly, besides a two clause paraphrase along the lines of ‘that there was
no thing that he should/need dread,’ a single clause paraphrase of (3.2.22) also
comes into play: ‘that he shouldn’t/needn’t dread anything.’ Note that both
paraphrases cited are negative sentences. Overall, the structure of (3.2.22)
brings to mind negative raising in that out of two juxtaposed clauses, main and
embedded, it is the former that is negated. The notion of negative raising is
elucidated by HORN (1989: 308) when he says it is “the availability of a lower
clause reading or understanding for a higher-clause negation.” Earlier, PALMER
(1979: 95) acknowledges negative raising in his consideration of the PDE
modals’ interaction with negation and offers an exemplification:
(3.2.23) “I don’t think we need worry about that any more now. [...]
[...] [(3.2.23) — J.N.] is a sentence with ‘negative raising,’
where it is THINK that is formally negated, although the
negation clearly belongs semantically to the subordinate
clause. I don’t think that... is to be interpreted as I think
that... not...” (Palmer 1979: 95).
On the other hand, the parallels between (3.2.22) and negative raising are not
far-reaching. Without the transposition of not to the main clause, (3.2.22)
would yield a paraphrase incongruent with its original meaning, viz. ‘There is
a thing he shouldn’t/needn’t fear.’ Another difference between example (3.2.22)
and negative raising is that the former is validated on the grounds of emphasis,
the resultant double clause structure of (3.2.22) being conditioned by the
speaker’s desire to shift the focus to nan ðing, a procedure reminiscent of the
motivation behind existential or cleft sentences in PDE (cf. QUIRK et al. 1985).
Interestingly, the effect achieved by negative raising is that of turning the focus
away from the negation since, as HORN (1989: 316) puts it, “negative force
weakens with the distance of the negative element from the constituent with
which it is logically associated.” All in all, the seven negative-raising-like
instances of þearf+infinitive, albeit seemingly positive, when interpreted in
their double clause entirety, cannot be disentangled from the negation in the
first clause. I therefore suggest that they be treated as no less negative than
those which take overt syntactic negation.
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Furthermore, there are nine cases of þearf+infinitive without any overt
syntactic negation, yet occurring in what QUIRK et al. (195: 54) call non-
assertive contexts and what HUDDLESTON and PULLUM (2002: 834) label
non-affirmative contexts. MOLENCKI (2002) and LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005) pay
attention to this inclination of the verb and, by way of illustration, it bears
enumerating the types of the non-assertive contexts which employ þearf. In
seven out of the nine times it is a comparative clause:
(3.2.24) ða ðe ma swugiað ðonne hie ðyrfen,
those who more keep-silent than they need
‘those who stay silent more than they should’
(CP 38.273.24)
I also find one instance of a present counterfactual with þearf+infinitive whose
non-assertive nature consists in the fact that a certain imaginary situation is
talked about (cf. MOLENCKI 1999):
(3.2.25) ac ic wolde swiðor sweltan gif ic þorfte for minum agenum
but I would sooner die if I needed for my own
earde,
native-land
‘but I would rather die if I needed for my native land’
(ÆLS (Edmund) 78)
On a similar note, QUIRK et al. (1985: 747) stress the affinity between
non-assertion and conditionals to the degree that “if clauses (especially those
expressing open conditions) are like questions in that they imply uncertainty
about the actual existence of the circumstances referred to. Therefore they tend
to contain non-assertive forms.” Finally, there is a single instance of
þearf+infinitive in an adverbial clause of purpose introduced by þy læs,
a conjunction which is inherently negative, yet does not require any other
marker of clausal negation (cf. MITCHELL and ROBINSON 1986: 94):
(3.2.26) Span þu hine georne þæt he þine lare læste, þy læs
urge thou him earnestly that he thy bidding do, lest
gyt lað gode, incrum waldende weorðan þyrfen.
you loath to-god, to-your lord become need
‘Urge him earnestly to do your bidding lest you should
become loath to God, your lord’
(GenA,B 575)
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The theme of non-assertive contexts should not be passed without a few
words about the four interrogative clauses with þearf+infinitive. Infrequent as
they are, they subscribe to the verb’s overwhelming preference for non-
assertive environments. In 3.2.4.1 I exemplify a fine line between a rhetorical
question and its interpretation in terms of negation (cf. example (3.2.11) and
the subsequent discussion), which finds further support in the fact that scholars,
for example QUIRK et al. (1985) or HUDDLESTON and PULLUM (2002), assign
a non-assertive function to interrogatives.
3.2.6. Þearf with other than necessity-related meanings
In the present section I seek to provide an illustration of the fringe areas in the
verb’s semantics. In Table 11 ten instances of þearf+infinitive are assembled
under the heading OTHER, which is to imply that the meaning of the verb in
these instances is only tangential to the prevalent meanings revolving around
necessity. Two major trends in the semantics of these ten examples can be
detected: some of the examples swerve in the direction of dearr ‘to make bold’
and some have potentially epistemic readings. Both trends receive proper
exemplification in (3.2.27) and (3.2.28) respectively:
(3.2.27) ne nan man ne ðearf him cweðan to, Hwi dest ðu swa?
nor no man not need him tell to, why dost thou so?
‘and no man dare ask him, ‘Why do you do this?’’
(ÆGenPref 105)
(3.2.28) ða cwæð he: Gif he nauht næfde þæs ðe he ondrede
then said he: If he nothing not-had this that he feared
þæt he forleosan þorfte,
that he lose needed
‘then he said: ‘If he had nothing that he feared that he
should/might lose’
(Bo 26.59.30)
In the preceding context of (3.2.27) we learn how God created man and what
he endowed man with. The passage ends with the sentence cited. Considering
that him and ðu both have God as the antecedent, it is rather unlikely that any
necessity-related meaning is involved. Rather, the meaning intended should
read ‘no man is bold enough to ask/has a good enough reason to ask him.’
TELLIER (1962), MOLENCKI (2002), and LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005) all consider
such uses of þearf+infinitive worthy of note. MOLENCKI (2002: 13) speculates
that the semantic affinity of þearf and dearr “might be treated as a harbinger of
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the confusion between the two verbs in Middle English” and is thereby the
beginning of the end of þearf in English. When it comes to the epistemic
potential of þearf, it seems to emerge when the verb is found in a subordinate
clause. In (3.2.28) þorfte follows in a clause that complements ondrede and in
(3.2.26) the clause containing þyrfen is introduced by þy læs. In both cases the
meaning of þearf+infinitive is future-oriented, which makes an inference of the
possibility of the action taking place viable. This shows that þearf+infinitive is
receptive to epistemic possibility although, on the other hand, it is a moot
question whether the allegedly epistemic uses of the verb do not, in fact,
actualize periphrastic subjunctive (see also 3.3.5).
3.2.7. Summary of þearf
In the preceding sections I have tried to elaborate on the sequence of steps that
þearf takes while advancing on its way to deontic necessity and gradually
increasing subjectivity. As might be expected, the line of the development is
determined by the meaning of the lexical source (cf. AIJMER 1996), and þearf,
initially a verb expressing need, enters the area of PI necessity and
subsequently PE and deontic necessity. All the stages of this development are
represented in the sample of 261 instances of þearf obtained from the DOE
Corpus. It is surprising to find that þearf+infinitive, despite the suggestions of
WARNER (1993) pointing otherwise, primarily functions as a token of deontic
necessity. Still, the deontic necessity associated with the verb turns out fairly
weak. Two factors can be blamed for the majority of the occurrences of
þearf+infinitive residing at the skirt and periphery of the cline indicating the
modal strength and subjectivity of the verb: 1) a strong attachment of the verb
toward non-activity verbs selected as infinitival complements, which alienates
þearf+infinitive from performative contexts, 2) inability of þearf to establish
itself as a carrier of the speaker-generated necessity without the aid of the
context. Interestingly, a similar circumstantial frame is noted by PERKINS (1983:
62—63) with reference to a semantic continuation of þearf in Present-Day
English, i.e. need, in that ‘the core meaning of NEED TO denies the speaker’s
involvement, although it may sometimes be used in an utterance which has the
overall illocutionary force of a directive, in which case the directive element,
which is ultimately due to the speaker’s wishes, must always be supplied by
the cotext of NEED TO or by the context of utterance.’
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3.3. Sceal
Linguistic literature abounds in pages dedicated to the intricacies of the
semantics of sceal (cf. B&T; OED; TELLIER 1962; VISSER 1963—1973;
MITCHELL 1985). GOOSSENS (1987a) looks into a sample of 200 instances of
sceal taken from Ælfric and Wulfstan with a view to examining the degree of
auxiliarization of sceal from the perspective of Functional Grammar. Even if
the account of the meanings of sceal is more a tool than an end in itself for
GOOSSENS (1987a), this account will provide a relevant landmark for the present
investigation. TRAUGOTT (1989) extensively uses the semantic development of
sceal as an illustration of the semantic progress from non-modal meanings
through deonticity and even as far as epistemicity. Importantly, all those stages
can be observed in the case of sceal without going beyond Old English, which
renders the case of sceal a point of crucial importance for TRAUGOTT (1989) in
her pursuit of the increasing subjectivity of meanings. Interestingly enough,
sceal is often cited as a major counterexample to LIGHTFOOT’S (1979) theory of
rapid auxiliary-bound change in the status of English modals in the sixteenth
century in that the verb is in the vanguard when it comes to approaching
auxiliaryhood as early as in Old English (cf. PLANK 1984; HARRIS 1987; NAGLE
1989).
Turning to the semantic road traveled by sceal, the verb is originally
associated with the sense of owing and subsequently becomes a verb of deontic
necessity. CONRADIE (1987: 177) cites the words of POKORNY (1959) and says
that “[t]he Indo-European stem (s)kel probably meant: ‘to owe, be guilty, be
indebted/obliged to.’” In OED we find that “[t]he Teutonic root (*skel-) *skal-,
*skul-, to owe [...] is represented by Goth. skula.” Related to this root, as also
noted by OED is the OE noun “scyld” which is assigned two meanings by B&T:
“guilt”, “sin” on the one hand and “debt” on the other. The noun then preserves
the traces of the earliest signification of the root. As for the verb, by the OE
times it evolves into an exponent of deontic necessity and throughout Old
English continues to be what might be conceived of as the most important and
the most popular tool that deontic necessity has at its disposal. At the same
time, sceal rather than jettison its non-modal past altogether, can still be attested
with the meaning ‘to owe’. As might be expected, much in the same mode as
agan and þearf, the older meaning goes together with a less grammaticalized
form, viz. sceal+NP whereas deontic necessity is to be searched for among the
more grammaticalized occurrences of sceal complemented by an infinitive.
The sample of 394 instances of sceal to be looked into in the following
sections has been obtained from the following works included in the OE part
of the Helsinki Corpus: Alfred’s Cura Pastoralis, Laws (Alfred’s Introduction
to Laws; Alfred; Ine), Chronicle MS A, Genesis, West-Saxon Gospels, Ælfric’s
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Catholic Homilies, A Homily for the Sixth [...] Sunday, The Blickling Homilies,
The Benedictine Rule, Laws (Late; William), Wulfstan’s Homilies (03/4) and
Chronicle MS E (03/4) (see KYTÖ 1993 for the full list of texts within the
Helsinki Corpus). All these works, when combined, constitute a 115, 769 word
corpus. In Table 15, the occurrences of sceal in the sample are confronted with
the two complementation types. It becomes obvious that the older construction
sceal+NP barely holds its own in the sample when its 14 occurrences are cast
against 380 instances of sceal+infinitive. Given this introductory outline,
section 3.3.1 deals with the background of the use of sceal+NP whereas the
focus in the next sections falls exclusively on some diachronic and synchronic
issues pertaining to sceal+infinitive: the theme of 3.3.2 is the motivation behind
the transition from sceal+NP to sceal+infinitive, in 3.3.3 the syntactic side of
sceal+infinitive is looked into, then I turn to the semantics of the construction
in 3.3.4 Separate sections are devoted to the growing independence of the
past/subjunctive form sceold- and the issue of negation with sceal: 3.3.5 and
3.3.6 respectively.
3.3.1. Sceal+NP
As hinted at in the previous section, sceal+NP carrying the meaning ‘to owe’
constitutes the earliest layer in the use of the verb which, despite being clearly
on the decline in Old English, manages to stay alive till well into Middle
English. The last example given by OED comes from 1530, which might even
suggest the postponement of the demise of the structure till the beginning of
Early Modern English, yet in light of a 150 odd year gap between this example
and a previous one, the statement seems warranted that the construction to
a large extent dies out in Middle English. It is also worth noting how limited
the sense of owing in the case of sceal+NP is. As corroborated by the fourteen
instances in my sample as well as by the sentences given by B&T and OED,
the debt denoted by sceal can only be financial. Witness that in Old English we
do not observe any bleaching of the meaning of the debt à la agan to geldanne
(cf. 3.1.3). Thus each of the fourteen examples comes from a code of law
where either a particular sum of money is meant:
(3.3.1) Gif monnes sconca bið ofaslegen wið ðæt cneou, ðær
if man’s shin is cut-off against that knee, there
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Complement
Pre-modal
+infinitive +NP Total
sceal 380 14 394
Table 15. Distribution of complementation types with sceal
sceal LXXX scillinga to bote.
shall 80 shillings to compensation
‘If a man’s shin is cut off the body, then he is to be paid 80
shillings in compensation.’
(COLAW2 72)
or some less specified financial commitment is talked about:
(3.3.2) weaxe sio bot be ðam were, swa ilce
increase the fine according-to the price-of-man, as same
swa sio manbot deð þe þam hlaforde sceal
as the fine does that to-the lord shall
‘The fine (for killing a man) increases according to the price
of the man, so does the fine due to the lord.’
(COLAW2 76)
The application of sceal+NP in my sample is restricted to positive clauses
where the subject remains unexpressed. The impossibility to point to the debtor
is a direct consequence of the universality of law statutes. Any person guilty of
the crime described in (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) becomes the debtor.
As might be gathered from B&T, the meaning ‘to owe’ of sceal+NP is
interchangeable with that of agan to geldanne, consider the following
illustrations from the West-Saxon Gospels — (3.3.2) — and from the
Lindisfarne Gospels — (3.3.3):
(3.3.3) þa sæde he þam forman, hu mycel scealt þu minum
then said he to-the first how much shalt thou to-my
hlaforde?
lord?
‘Then he asked the first, ‘How much do you owe my lord?’’
(LK (WSCp) 16.5)
(3.3.4) sui dicebat primo quantum debes domino meo
cuoæð ðæm forðmesto huu micel aht ðu to geldanne
said to-the first how much ought thou to pay
hlaferde minum.
to-lord my
‘(He) asked the first, ‘How much do you owe my lord?’’
(LKGL (Li) 16.5)
Although far from qualifying for a conclusive piece of evidence, this
equivalence may suggest that agan to geldanne is ousting sceal+NP at least in
the Northumbrian dialect. Much more certain is the fact that it is not sceal
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gyldan that takes over the meaning of sceal+NP even though such a scenario
would be imaginable. In my sample there is only one sentence where
a material obligation is communicated via sceal gyldan, an indication of the
structure enjoying no incidence boost expected from an item gradually
extended to new contexts.
To sum up this brief attempt at characterizing the use of sceal+NP in Old
English, it needs to be said that the construction shows incipient signs of
obsolescence. The instances of sceal+NP make up 3.5 per cent of the total
number of the occurrences of the verb sceal in the sample and another vibrant
construction agan to geldanne seems to encroach upon part of the territory
originally reserved for sceal+NP. With the wisdom of hindsight, the ultimate
ME demise of the NP complements of sceal along with the sense of owing,
which accompanies the verb, is not surprising. What is more, the obsolescence
of both, the form and meaning, at the same time, helps realize the bond
between the two and lends support to PLANK’S (1984: 311) conjecture that
“I doubt that the loss of premodal-object constructions can be made sense of
when seen in isolation from the semantic development of the (pre)-modals.
This ability to take plain direct objects, without intervening main verb, would
definitely seem to correlate with the presence of what is usually called
‘notional’ meaning, and consequently ought to disappear when a verb loses this
kind of meaning, exchanging its lexical status for a grammatical one.”
3.3.2. From sceal+NP to sceal+infinitive
It will sound like a truism if I quote AIJMER (1996: 72) saying that “there are
many possible semantic paths which are only constrained by the lexical source.”
She is here concerned with the developmental paths of ability expressions, yet
the statement is universal enough to embrace sceal. BYBEE, PAGLIUCA and
PERKINS (1991) and BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) make numerous
references to the PDE cogener of sceal, i.e. shall, while discussing the origins
of futurity markers cross-linguistically. Shall then, prior to becoming eligible to
express various notions associated with futurity, is shown to have gone through
the stage of obligative meaning, which ensues the pre-modal sense ‘to owe.’
With the shift from obligation to future being widely attested, the earlier one,
that is, from ‘to owe’ to obligation is more difficult to stumble upon. BYBEE,
PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994: 258—259) identify two parallels. One of them is
the Danish cognate of shall, i.e. skal, which treads the same path, the other
parallel being from Cantonese. Eventually, BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA
(1994) reconstruct a frequently attended diachronic path in accordance with
which lexical sources of various specified origins, including those centered on
the concept of owing, converge to proceed toward future via obligation.
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DENNING (1987) provides a few partial parallels. Since his paper concentrates on
obligation expressions, he does not specify any post-obligation stages of their
semantic paths. His examples of obligation expression which originate from
forms meaning ‘to owe’ include: Latin de–be–re, Breton dle, Welsh dylai and
Mandarin gai.11 As pointed out in 2.4, in van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S
(1998: 95) view, which has a slightly different take on the obligative side of the
path, lexical items denoting such concepts as ‘owe’, ‘duty’, ‘belong’, ‘be
good/proper’, sceal being clearly one of them, head for deontic necessity.
Future, obviously, is also acknowledged as a direction to take by sceal, yet,
future, as such, remains outside the purview of this monograph.
Although agan and sceal begin their deontic necessity bound paths at
diverse starting points, the former as a verb of possession, the latter as verb of
owing, the both paths cross when the structure agan to geldanne comes into
being with the sense ‘owe’ (cf. 3.1.3 and 3.3.1). While passing through the
field of necessity, the two paths stay relatively close to each other and come to
have more crossing points. One of them is a selective approach to necessity in
that both verbs “skip the participant-internal dimension and go directly to the
deontic subtype of participant external necessity” (van der AUWERA and
PLUNGIAN 1998: 95). In 3.1.8 I made an attempt at accounting for the omission
of PI necessity in the case of agan. Since both verbs make the same move, the
semantic motivation behind it must be similar, if not the same. Let me
therefore repeat my main argument adjusted to the whereabouts of sceal. The
situation created by sceal meaning ‘to owe’ as in (3.3.1), (3.3.2), and (3.3.3)
assigns the roles to two participants, namely a creditor/victim and a debtor. The
relationship between the participants, describable in terms of a socially agreed
commitment, causes an inference of deontic necessity to arise easily. The
debtor is obliged to return the money or financially compensate for a loss. The
source of the necessity is clearly defined as, on the one hand, coming from
outside the debtor/obligee and, on the other hand, totally contingent on a social
agreement or legal norms rather than on some objective circumstances. The
former matters as much as the inference of necessity is instantly bonded to an
obligee-external source, hence the omission of PI necessity. A direct
consequence of the latter is that sceal comes to express deontic necessity with
the domain of more general PE necessity taken no notice of.
It is noteworthy that if for sceal the semantic change goes hand in hand
with syntactic change in that infinitival complements are substituted for NP
complements, a sign of progress on the way toward grammaticalization
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11 As noted by BORYŚ (2005), a similar development takes place in Polish to the extent that
the verb powinien ‘should’ stems from the noun wina ‘guilt, trespass’ (proto-Slavic *vina, Old
Church Slavic vina). The intermediate stages that facilitate the shift are the adjective winny
‘guilty, indebted’ and the prepositional phrase po winie.
(cf. BOLINGER 1980, also FISCHER 1994 for discussion), agan is already one step
ahead of sceal. That is to say that while the semantic shift from ‘to owe’ to
deontic necessity is underway in the case of agan, infinitival complements are
not a novelty, as they are accepted as a pivotal part of the construction agan to
geldanne, which cumulatively amounts to the meaning ‘owe.’ The equivalent
syntactic change in the complementation of agan takes place earlier, as shown
in 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, which may be explained on the grounds of the different
lexical origins of the two verbs.
3.3.3. Sceal with the infinitive — syntactic points
As for the type of the infinitival complements, sceal, much like þearf, exhibits
full attachment to plain infinitives (cf. WARNER 1993). In my sample I do not
find any examples to the contrary except for a) six instances of what WARNER
(1993: 113) would refer to as ‘postverbal ellipsis’ and b) three instances where
sceal is followed by a prepositional phrase and one where instead of an
expected infinitive of a verb of motion we encounter a directional adverb. The
b) types are illustrated respectively below:
(3.3.5) Wa me, forþam þe ic sceal to helle for þinum yfeldædum
woe me, because I shall to hell for your evil-deeds
‘Alas, because I shall go to hell for your evil deeds.’
(COEPIHOM 88)
(3.3.6) þonne sceolde fyrd ut eft ongean þæt hi up woldon.
when should army out again toward that they up would
‘when the army should have gone out again to meet them as
they went up.’
(COCHROE4 1010.19)
On a purely semantic side, there is a remarkable affinity between such
a construction and other instances of sceal+infinitive as the meaning involved
here is that of deontic necessity/future. DENNING (1987: 53) calls modals used
with a prepositional phrase and no main verb following “semantically
auxiliary” as the absence of the main verb makes them stop short of meeting
the formal criteria for auxiliaryhood (cf. WARNER 1990, also HUDDLESTON 1980
for Present-Day English). Also, DENNING (1987: 53) remarks that such
constructions are preserved in present day German “when a verb of motion is
not expressed (e.g. Ich muss zu Hause ‘I must go home,’ with gehen ‘to go’
implied).” It is of relevance that the unexpressed main verb is not semantically
arbitrary, witness the following statement made by PLANK (1984: 325): “Surely
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the modal expressions together with the adverbs or prepositional phrases did
convey the notion ‘direction towards (or from)’, there being always the
possibility of inferring a semantically neutral verb of movement in such
contexts. [...] In the 17th century [in English] directional adverbs and
prepositional phrases largely cease to occur with the modals, but also with the
modality expressions which definitely retain verbal status, and an infinitival
verb of movement now has to be employed to convey directional notions.”
Considering these assessments, in the following sections the constructions of
the type characterized above are discussed on a par with other instances of
sceal+infinitive.
As for postverbal ellipsis, an analysis of my sample matches the results
obtained by GOOSSENS (1987a: 126) in that, barring one exception, my
examples belong to those “with an ellipted infinitive in a clause of comparison
introduced by swa (swa).” All of them conform to the major criterion of
post-auxiliary ellipsis, namely, an antecedent of the ellipted VP should be
retrievable from the context (cf. HANKAMER and SAG 1976; SAG 1979; WARNER
1993; MILLER 1997). Consider (3.3.7):
(3.3.7) And se ðe nele Godes bodan hyran mid rihte
and this who not-wants God’s messengers hear with right
ne godcundre lare gyman swa he sceolde
nor God-given teaching heed as he should
‘And that who is not willing to rightfully listen to God’s
messengers nor heed God’s teaching as he should’
(COWULF4 47)
where the complements of nele, viz. Godes bodan hyran mid rihte and
godcundre lare gyman are also to be taken as the logical complements of
sceolde. To be sure, no example of pseudogapping is to be found in my sample
(cf. WARNER 1993: 114 for sceal with pseudogapping).
Before I go on to the discussion of the semantic tenets connected with
sceal+infinitive, it seems feasible to present the statistics attained after the
obligative instances of sceal+infinitive have been cast against the three clause
types: affirmative, negative and interrogative. Table 16 provides the resultant
numbers with a proviso that I have excluded 58 cases of sceal+infinitive which
clearly carry the meaning of future. Future per se will not be dealt with in this
monograph.
While Table 16 is supposed to have a merely referential function and
I reserve more space for a detailed discussion of negation with sceal in 3.3.6, it
bears highlighting the fact that sceal, unlike agan and þearf, displays no
preference for negative contexts. This time an asymmetry which holds between
the number of affirmative and negative clauses indicates an unquestionable
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preponderance of the former. Also, it should be noted that the interrogative
sentences fail to play any significant role in a way no different than in the case
of the other two pre-modals discussed so far.
3.3.4. Semantics of sceal+infinitive
In distinguishing different senses of sceal+infinitive, one has to focus on two
areas: deontic necessity and futurity. Furthermore, the two meanings turn out to
overlap to a certain degree, thereby becoming fertile ground for merger.
Table 17 presents the results of my interpretation of the meanings of the
instances of sceal+infinitive in the sample. As with the previous verbs, a word
of caution should ensue concerning the tentative nature of the numbers
obtained in Table 17. Suffice it to say that the meanings of the pre-modals, due
to their indeterminacy, must be approached with a healthy dose of likelihood
and common sense. In my sample, over 70 per cent of the examples belong to
the necessity type (notice that GOOSSENS (1987a: 127) finds the merger type
prevalent in his sample), a number not left unaffected by my intentional
selection of texts where a considerable quantity of necessity expressions could
be expected, viz. the OE Laws, the Benedictine Rule, etc. It should be stressed,
however, that an access to a rich number of necessity expressions takes priority
over an attempt at establishing the precise distribution of the meanings with
which sceal+infinitive is used.
The 58 examples carrying a sense of futurity are not going to be discussed
further in any capacity whatsoever. What is of interest, however, is the rationale
behind an expression of PE/deontic necessity raising the possibility of its gradual
encroachment upon futurity. CONRADIE (1987) proposes the blame be put on the
existence of a semantic axis which is neatly adumbrated in Figure 14:
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Clause type
Pre-modal
Affirmative Negative Interrogative Total
sceal+infinitive
with a sense of necessity and
necessity/future
284
(88.2%)
34
(10.6%)
4
(1.2%)
322
(100%)
Table 16. Distribution of clause types with sceal+infinitive
Meaning
Pre-modal
Necessity Necessity/future Future Total
sceal+infinitive 268
(70.53%)
54
(14.21%)
58
(15.26%)
380
(100%)
Table 17. Distribution of meanings of sceal+infinitive
KNOWLEDGE > ABILITY > PERMISSION > OBLIGATION > PROMISE > FUTURITY
Figure 14. Semantic axis of modal meanings
The meanings, shown on the example of the Afrikaans modals, have
a tendency to gradually move in a right-hand direction. Thus, say, a marker of
permission is likely to come to signal obligation and subsequently promise.
According to CONRADIE (1987), two factors facilitate this progress: the fuzzy
nature and performative value of the modal meanings. While both of these
points are addressed in 2.1 and 2.3, the latter deserves some more
consideration. A performative aspect is ascribed to, inter alia, obligation and
an expression of obligation can be understood as a transaction between the
speaker and hearer. In a default case the speaker makes use of his or her
authority in order to get the hearer to act. At the same time, CONRADIE (1987)
observes that the speaker may choose to achieve his or her aim, viz. to get the
hearer to act without explicitly showing his or her authority and/or overtly
indicating the hearer’s involvement. This is a stage at which the expression of
obligation takes on a shade of indirectness. What was formerly an obligation to
do something turns into an intention/promise to get something done. Once
deprived of performativity, the expression is generalized into a token of
future-oriented intention, as illustrated on the development of the Afrikaans
cognate of sceal, i.e. zullen. Thus an erstwhile obligation in (3.3.8):
(3.3.8) Jy sal doen wat ek sê.
‘You shall do what I say.’
becomes an intention, (3.3.9), and a clear future reference sneaks in, (3.3.10):
(3.3.9) Ek sal jou help.
‘I will help you’
(3.3.10) Ic sal dief sijn.../Al soudic hanghen bider kelen...
‘I shall be a thief, even though I’ll be hanged’
(all examples and translation from CONRADIE 1987: 177)
Another hypothesis, which partly ties in with CONRADIE’S (1987), is the one
already invoked in 3.3.2 and proposed by BYBEE, PAGLIUCA and PERKINS (1991)
and BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994). They dismantle the development of
modal meanings into a series of paths, one of which, that alluded to in 3.3.2, is
shown in Figure 15:
OBLIGATION > INTENTION > FUTURE
Figure 15. Simplified path of development of obligation into future (adapted from BYBEE,
PERKINS and PAGLIUCA 1994: 240)
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BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) argue that the change from obligation to
futurity is inferential in nature.
Especially in the first person, a statement of obligation such as I have
to go now [...] strongly implies that the speaker intends to leave soon.
For example, this implication had become part of the meaning of shall
by the Middle English stage and is amply represented in texts.
Similarly, Old Spanish uses of the future from infinitive plus haber
frequently express intention of a first person subject, for example in El
Cantar del Mio Cid. [...] [I]t is from the intention sense that the
prediction use can develop. Especially with regard to a third person,
a statement of intention implies prediction. (BYBEE, PERKINS and
PAGLIUCA 1994: 264)
Also supportive of the inferential mechanism of change are TRAUGOTT and
DASHER (2005), who stress that obligation expressed by the present forms of
the English modal verbs is often future-oriented. It is frequently future that is
the time indicated or implied for acts rendered necessary to be carried out,
which paves the way for a resultant inference of futurity in the meaning of
a modal of obligation. Finally, an interesting undertaking is an attempt made by
BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1991) at assessing the degree of advancement
of an expression of obligation on the way to becoming a marker of futurity.
Four stages are distinguished in the process of this change, called futage 1,
futage 2, etc. respectively. The earliest stage futage 1 will be characteristic of
the prevalent obligative semantics of the item, the last stage futage 4 being
reached when the futurity of the expression evolves into epistemicity. Relevant
is the fact that in this scenario, OE sceal, as barely drafted into the service of
futurity, is seen to be going through futage 1 (cf. Table 17).
3.3.4.1. Deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive
The use of sceal+infinitive in the field of deontic necessity has been widely
recognized as the primary function of the verb. TELLIER (1962), VISSER
(1963—1973), MITCHELL (1985), GOOSSENS (1987a), and WARNER (1993) to
name few, while using different nomenclature, all address deontic necessity as
the context behind most of the occurrences of sceal+infinitive. Dictionaries
such as B&T and OED, quite understandably, point to a complex analysis as
relevant to the obligative semantics of sceal; B&T, for example, lists nine
meanings which could be gathered under the heading of deontic necessity.
I side with those linguists who opt for a holistic approach which puts the
various meanings enumerated by B&T in a uniform perspective of deontic
necessity. Additional support for such a stance is gathered from TALMY’S
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(2000) force dynamics which posits one conceptual scheme for a context of
deontic necessity. Invariably, two participants in this scheme, the Agonist (the
obligee) and the Antagonist (the source of necessity) clash by virtue of being
driven by opposing tendencies, the alternating factor being the nature of the
Antagonist.
Even a homogenous approach must, however, be able to account for all the
nuances of the deontic necessity inherent to sceal+infinitive. These, it seems,
can be handled by showing that occurrences of sceal+infinitive are stretched
along a cline, which find its illustration below:
(3.3.11) Hælend him þa ondswarede 7 cwæþ, þu scealt fylgean
Lord him then answered and said, thou shalt follow
me, 7 lætan þa deadan bergean heora deade.
me, and let the dead bury their dead.
‘The Lord then answered him saying, ‘You shall follow me
and let the dead bury their dead.’’
(COBLICK 154)
(3.3.12) Hælend hire þa ondswarode, 7 cwæþ, Martha, ... þu
Lord her then answered, and said, Martha, thou
scealt on æghwylce tid Godes willan wercan,
shalt on each time God’s will work
‘The Lord then answered her saying, »Martha, you shall
fulfill God’s will at any time«.’
(COBLICK 36)
(3.3.13) Ic awyrged sceal, þeoden, of gesyhðe þinre hweorfan.
I accursed shall lord from sight thy depart
‘And I must go forth, accursed, from Thy sight, O Lord.’
(COGENESI 1034)
(3.3.14) On ðisum wræcfullum life we sceolon earmra manna helpan.
in this wretched life we should poor men help,
we sceolon ða hungrian fedan. nacode scrydan. cuman
we should the hungry feed, naked clothe, visitors
underfon.
receive
‘In this wretched life we should help the poor, feed the
hungry, clothe the naked and receive visitors.’
(COAELHOM 258.83)
(3.3.15) 7 gyf he wel gelend bið, he sceal beon
and if he well provided-with-land is, he should be
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gehorsad,
horsed
‘If he is a landowner, he should be horsed.’
(COLAW4 5.3)
(3.3.16) Hwylc se abbod beon scyle.
what the abbot be shall
‘What the abbot should be like.’
(COBENRUL 2)
(3.3.17) Abbod, ðe ðæs wyrðe sy, þæt he mynsteres wealde, he
abbot, who that worthy be, that he monastery run, he
sceal a gemunan, hwæt he is
shall always remember, what he is
‘The abbot, who is worthy to run the monastery, should
remember what he is.’
(COBENRUL 2.1)
(3.3.18) Sceap sceal gongan mid his fliese oð midne sumor;
sheep shall go with his fleece until mid summer
‘A sheep should go with its fleece until midsummer.’
(COLAW2 69)
(3.3.19) Ceorles worðig sceal beon wintres 7 sumeres
churl’s homestead shall be in-winter and in-summer
betyned;
enclosed
‘A churl’s homestead should be fenced in winter and
summer.’
(COLAW2 40)
(3.3.20) Ealra hæfde   XII and nigonhund, þa seo tid
all had twelve and ninehundred, when the time
gewearð þæt he friðgedal fremman sceolde.
became that he death effect should
‘He was all nine hundred and twelve when the time came
that he was to die.’
(COGENESI 1140)
An analysis of the cline cannot but start with examples (3.3.11) and (3.3.12).
Both representative of the core of the cline, (3.3.11) and (3.3.12) turn out no
less modally strong and subjective than the core examples of PDE must
(cf. COATES 1983). A much cited example with reference to a high degree of
subjectivity (cf. WARNER 1993: 162), (3.3.11) carries necessity generated by the
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speaker. So does (3.3.12), yet (3.3.12) seems to lag one step behind (3.3.11) in
terms of the performative force as the main verb in the former, rather than
specify a single action, refers to an activity which is to be repeated over
a longer period of time. If one also allows for the authority of the speaker (it is
both times Jesus), the statement found in OED s.v. shall is fully warranted that
sceal ‘in the second person [is — J.N.] equivalent to imperative.’ Notice also
that both examples exhibit some potential for an inference of futurity. Perhaps
(3.3.12) less so, as the phrase on æghwylce tid enhances a sense of general
present-time reference.
Lower on the cline are two first person examples (3.3.13) and (3.3.14)
which, when juxtaposed, evince considerable differences. One with the speaker,
the subject of (3.3.13) acknowledges a necessity coming from an outside
source, seems resigned to it and, what is crucial, makes no effort to resist it.
Due to the sense of the acknowledgement of the deontic necessity, (3.3.13) is
not subjective at all. (3.3.14), on the other hand, belongs to the class of
pseudo-exhortations whose operation could also be seen in the case of agan
and þearf. Sceal yields the parallell picture in that the speaker is trying to
manipulate the audience by including himself among its members. The
necessity, religious or moral in nature, due to this manipulation is rendered less
painful by the speaker, which shows the speaker’s involvement in imposing the
necessity.
The next three examples, (3.3.15) through (3.3.17), all share a generic
third person subject as well as a piece of instructive literature as the source
from which they are taken. Another common thread running through all of
them is a non-activity main verb following sceal. (3.3.15), which contains
a passive structure, follows the already familiar formula of using a pre-modal
of deontic necessity in a code of law. Taken from The Benedictine Rule,
(3.3.16) and (3.3.17) have got subjects exposed to a slightly less urgent
necessity than that in (3.3.15). While in (3.3.15) there is a legal commitment,
in (3.3.16) and (3.3.17) the necessity could be equated with ‘what is
proper/good/reasonable.’ This weakening of the sense of the necessity is
brought about by the stative character of the main verb in (3.3.16) and the
mental activity verb in (3.3.17).
What is of prime interest in examples (3.3.18) and (3.3.19) is the wide
scope of sceal. It is, nevertheless, particularly interesting to note that in
(3.3.18) the criterion indicative of wide scope with non-epistemic modality,
that of the inanimacy of the subject, is not met. In other words, the subject of
(3.3.18) — a sheep — although by all accounts animate, cannot logically be
regarded as the Agonist. The genuine Agonist — a shepherd or owner — who
is in control of the event, remains defocused in the background. Cumulatively
then, there emerges a scenario in which wide scope co-occurs with an animate
subject, which hints at the inadequacy of the inanimate subject criterion.
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A solution to this problem would be to use the label “a non-controller
subject” in lieu of “an inanimate subject” as a factor behind wide scope. This
seems a reasonable and sufficient option as other than that the mechanism of
agonist demotion in (3.3.18) stays intact. So does it in (3.3.19), a prototypical
example of wide scope, agonist demotion and an inanimate subject both being
involved so that both examples boil down, in essence, to causative structures.
Causative paraphrases of (3.3.18) and (3.3.19) respectively are presented
below:
(3.3.18)a The shepherd/owner must/should make a sheep go with its
fleece on till midsummer.
(3.3.19)a The churl must/should make his homestead be enclosed in
summer and winter.
Witness that in (3.3.18)a and (3.3.19)a the obligee appears as the subject, agent
and Agonist all in one (cf. TALMY 2000: 442).
It is also noteworthy that in both (3.3.18) and (3.3.19) there is clear deontic
necessity of a legal nature whose impact is somewhat diluted due to the blurred
identity of the obligee. The passive structure in (3.3.19) also contributes to the
weakening of the necessity force by pushing this example closer to the
periphery of the cline.
The last example to go by in illustrating the cline of sceal, that is (3.3.20),
exemplifies an interesting case of a past necessity recurring in Genesis. This
type of necessity, used with reference to the subject’s death, is a force of
inevitability which falls upon the subject (cf. TRAUGOTT 1989: 40). The
peculiarity of such a force consists in the fact that neither the speaker nor the
subject are in a position to question it, let alone resist it. The speaker’s
involvement and authority over the subject being absent, the example cannot be
ascribed any subjectivity.
With the cline of the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive fleshed out above,
I can proceed to the next phase of this pursuit which is to gain an insight into
how sceal in examples (3.3.11) through (3.3.20) fares with respect to COATES’S
(1983: 36) parameters, which help gauge the strength of necessity as well as
subjectivity of a given occurrence of a necessity verb. The matrix obtained
after these examples are checked against the parameters is also to clarify the
gradience of the deontic necessity expressed by sceal. The parameters adapted
to reflect the obligative semantics of sceal largely coincide with those used
with agan (cf. 3.1.5), the only modification being the additional feature (i), i.e.
paraphrasable by ‘it is inevitable that.’ As a feature typical of rather objective
contexts, it is at the periphery of the cline, especially if we recall that the
necessity that arises in connection with feature (i) remains outside the control
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of the speaker and the subject. Another adjustment is the label non-controller
subject used instead of inanimate subject in (h) and the label “controller
subject” used in lieu of animate subject in (f) for the reasons discussed in
connection with example (3.3.18). The order of the parameters is shown below
and the resultant matrix follows in Figure 16:
(a) second person subject,
(b) speaker involvement,
(c) speaker has authority over subject,
(d) verb is agentive,
(e) paraphrasable by ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that’,
(f) controller subject
(g) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’,
(h) non-controller subject.
(i) paraphrasable by ‘it is enevitable that’
(adapted from COATES 1983: 36)
Even without going into much detail, it is plain from the above matrix that
the necessity of sceal+infinitive embraces the widest spectrum of the relevant
features among the verbs discussed so far. Each parameter is visibly pressed
into the service of the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive. Furthermore, the
gradience of the necessity in Figure 16 materializes into a finely drawn and
clearly defined core, a massive skirt and a slightly blurred yet noticeable
periphery. It is especially the quality of the core that sets apart the cline of
sceal from those of agan and þearf. The core of the deontic necessity of
sceal, embodied by examples (3.3.11) and (3.3.12) on the matrix, can be
defined as a context where the necessity is generated by the speaker who, with
3. The pre-modal verbs116
a b c d e f g h i
(3.3.11) + + + + + + – – –
(3.3.12) + + + + + + – – –
(3.3.14) – – + + – + + – –
(3.3.15) – – + – + + – – –
(3.3.16) – – + – – + + – –
(3.3.17) – – + – – + + – –
(3.3.13) – – – + + + – – –
(3.3.18) – – + – + – – + –
(3.3.19) – – + – + – – + –
(3.3.20) – – – ? – + – – +
strong necessity/subjectivity weak necessity/subjectivity
(core) (periphery)
Figure 16. Matrix to show gradience of deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive
the aid of his authority and active involvement, imposes the necessity upon
the Agonist hidden under a second person pronoun. Of course, even within
the core there is some gradiance to be observed, e.g. the contrast between the
single action in (3.3.11) and an action to be repeated in (3.3.12), which bears
upon the force of the necessity. Sceal possesses the core of the necessity
meaning whose strength and subjectivity are reminiscent of that of PDE must
(cf. COATES 1983: 37). As with the other two verbs, the core examples of the
deontic necessity of sceal are few, five in my sample to be exact, which is in
accordance with COATES’S (1983) observation that usually only minority of
examples meet the criteria required for inclusion within the core. The skirt of
the cline is represented by the most numerous group of sentences as here
I include examples (3.3.14) through (3.3.13). Many skirt examples come from
homiletic and legal contexts, hence the authority of the speaker achieves the
distinction of a common factor, and so does a generic human subject. Observe
that throughout the skirt, the force of the necessity alternates between stronger
and weaker, features (e) and (g) respectively, which further adds to the
gradience. The borderline between the skirt and periphery, despite all its
fuzziness, has got two focal points: the appearance of subjects which,
regardless of whether animate or inanimate, are not real addressees of the
necessity on the one hand and a special type of necessity, viz. inevitability on
the other hand. Examples which are responsive to the former often have the
force of the necessity attenuated by a passive structure and a non-activity
verb. At the same time, however, the authority of the speaker, a feature
typical of the core, can be relevant for periphery examples. The examples
where the force of inevitability is the case figure lowest on the scale of
subjectivity, as such a force is merely reported and stays beyond the
participants’ control. What is more, inevitability as a force without any
definite Antagonist shows that the deontic necessity of sceal shades into
general PE necessity (cf. van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN 1998: 80—81).
Finally, it should be pointed out that the configuration of the features accepted
by the peripheral examples considerably diverges from COATES’S (1983: 37)
matrix of must in that my peripheral examples rather than, crudely speaking,
stay around the lower righthand corner of the matrix, dare to reach for
features reserved for the skirt, if not for the core of the cline.
By way of summary, I gather the cline shown in Figure 16 has enough of
a hint that the modality of sceal+infinitive is rather mature. The verb has no
difficulty in accepting features like speaker-generated necessity and wide scope,
which brings to mind long established modals of necessity. Nor does the main
verb complement of sceal hamper the force of the necessity as was the case
with þearf. Table 18, where I have assembled the types of verbal complements
of sceal, substatntiates this claim since non-activity verbs and passive
structures, that is, complements potentially responsible for weakening the force
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of necessity and pushing the instance of sceal toward the weak end of the
cline, turn out to make up significantly less than half of all infinitival
complements of sceal.
3.3.4.2. Indeterminacy between deontic necessity and futurity
In this section I would like to turn back to the coexistence of the senses of
deontic necessity and futurity in sceal+infinitive. In 3.3.4 the trajectory of
development from PE necessity to futurity is accounted for and the remarks of
TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005) concerning the inferences of futurity in the
meaning of the PDE modals of necessity are invoked. At this point it is worth
repeating that the indeterminate cases are those of merger rather than ambiguity.
It is not picayune that in sentences like (3.3.21) and (3.3.22) one is not left to
decide between deontic necessity and futurity. The two senses fill the semantic
space offered by the verb and complement each other thereby bringing on an
effect of a necessity to perform an act in the future. (3.3.21) and (3.3.22) serve to
illustrate the group of 54 cases where the merger most obviously comes to the
fore, which is not, in fact, to deny that in the majority of the necessity examples
a notion of futurity is, to a lesser or greater extent, also present.
(3.3.21) Wa þam þe þær sceal wunian on wite.
Woe to-those who there shall remain in punishment.
‘Woe to those who will (have to) be punished’
(COWULF4 67)
(3.3.22) þæt he æt Godes dome be heom eallum gescead agyldan
that he at God’s doom to them all account render
sceal.
shall
‘That he will (have to) render an account to all of them on
the judgment day.’
(COBENRUL 31.12)
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Complement type
Meaning
Activity verb Non-activity verb Passive structure Total
sceal
(necessity)
171
(63.8%)
85
(31.72%)
12
(4.48%)
268*
(100%)
sceal
(necessity/future)
41
(76%)
12
(22.2%)
1
(1.8%)
54
(100%)
* Here are included the 3 examples of sceal+PP/AdvP as the missing verb implied is each time an activity verb (cf. 3. 3. 3).
Table 18. Frequency of main verb complements of sceal with the sense of necessity and
necessity/future
3.3.5. A note on sceolde
The theme for this section is inspired by an interesting aspect of sceal
evidenced by GOOSSENS (1987a). The researcher shows that the past/subjunctive
forms sceolde/sceoldon/sceolden achieve the distinction of being more
grammaticalized than the present forms of the verb. It is GOOSSENS’S (1987a)
suggestion that sceal and sceolde be assigned to different categorial classes
within Functional Grammar in that the former should be understood in terms of
predicate formation and the latter is an operator. The two labels correspond to
two stages on a tentative, as we are warned by GOOSSENS (1987a: 119),
grammaticalization path (cf. 2.7.1). Thus, predicate formation covers the uses
of modals with PI, PE, deontic and epistemic notions whereas an operator is
a diachronically subsequent stage when a modal comes to have a function of
a marker of futurity or a conditional or subjunctive mood. This grammatical
advancement of sceolde can be seen in the following: 1) the fact that sceolde
does not seem to occur with NP objects — in my sample there is not any such
example to be found, 2) the idea of necessity in sceolde is weakened as the
form is primarily used in other contexts than those which might point to
sceolde qualifying for a mere past equivalent of sceal. In what follows the
arguments presented are based on my sample, yet it should be borne in mind
that they both draw inspiration and correspond to those put forward by
GOOSSENS (1987a).
Thus in my sample there are 75 instances of the past/subjunctive form
sceolde/scolde/scoldon/sceolden/scolden. Whereas the last two forms are
subjunctive, the first three can be either subjunctive or indicative. Out of the 75
instances, twelve and six occur in main and relative clauses respectively so it is
among these eighteen instances that one can look for genuine cases of past PE
necessity. Consider (3.3.23), which exemplifies the former category:
(3.3.23) ða sceolde se ealdorman Ælfric lædan þa fyrde. ac he
then should the commander Ælfric lead the army but he
teah forðþa his ealdan wrenceas
draw forth his old tricks
‘Then commander Ælfric was to lead the army but he brought
forth his old tricks.’
(COCHROE4 1003.7)
or (3.3.20) above. The remaining 57 instances, those engendered in other
dependent clauses, branch into 27 cases where the sceold-/scold- forms are
hardly questionable exponents of futurity in the past, which is classified as
a postmodal use by van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998: 98), and 30 cases
where the notion of PE necessity, albeit apparently expected, is seen to overlap
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with non-factuality triggered by a potential subjunctive reading. Such
overlapping can be observed when sceold-/scold- comes in a dependent clause
whose matrix clause contains a form, be it a verb, adjective or noun, with
a meaning permeated by a more or less visible sense of PE necessity. The most
prominent of such expressions in my sample are hatan, biddan, cyþan, læran,
gerædan, gebyrian, as in
(3.3.24) se cyng sende Ælfun biscop mid þam æþelinge Eadwarde.
the king sent Elfun bishop with the princes Edward
7 Ælfrede ofer se. þæt he hi bewita sceolde.
and Alfred over sea. that he them guard should
‘The king sent bishop Elfun with the prince Edward and
Alfred over sea so that he should guard them.’
(COCHROE4 1013.35)
(3.3.25) Him gebyrode þæt he sceolde faran þurh Samaria
To-him was-needful that he should go through Samaria
land
land.
‘He needed to go through the land of Samaria.’
(COWSGOSP 4.4)
In (3.3.24), the king sends the bishop with a task to perform. The sceolde
clause is a purpose clause, which invites two diverse readings. On the one
hand, this can be a question of periphrastic subjunctive where sceolde, virtually
empty of any obligative semantics, serves to mark non-factuality of the action
specified by the main verb. Such an interpretation ties in with KRZYSZPIEŃ’S
(1980) scheme where the subjunctive forms of the OE pre-modals are shown to
alternate with inflectional subjunctive only to oust it eventually. If interpreted
otherwise, sceolde is a past form of sceal which repeats the necessity encoded
in the matrix verb. PLANK (1984: 343), far from being bewildered by the
appearance of such modality repetitions, refers to them as “redundant modality,
viz. the presence in a sentence of more than one modality expression where
one would seem to suffice, or also of one modality expression where none
seems required.” Furthermore, redundant modality, according to PLANK (1984),
and the demise thereof in Middle English instantiates a trend whereby modality
gradually more and more often comes to be conveyed inferentially without any
explicit marker, e.g.
(3.3.26) Everybody dies someday. = Everybody must die. (example
from PLANK 1984: 342)
3. The pre-modal verbs120
Similarly, example (3.3.25) opens up a possibility of the two-fold analysis.
Observe also that on either interpretation, it is not entirely clear whether we
have got to do with PI or PE necessity. The context stops short of clarifying
the details of the source of the necessity that Jesus, the person behind both the
oblique pronoun in the matrix clause and the subject of sceolde, is subject to.
The form gebyrode hints at PI necessity, yet it cannot be verified beyond any
shadow of a doubt.
Overall, it seems that both lines of interpretation, periphrastic subjunctive
and redundant modality are tightly interlaced. In instances like (3.3.24) and
(3.3.25), the proposition in the dependent clause, at least from the perspective
of the subject of (3.3.24) and the logical subject in (3.3.25) is non-factual,
hence the resort to the subjunctive is justified. At the same time, periphrastic
subjunctive is only trying to hold its own in Old English against the still vital
inflectional subjunctive and, consequently, given its not yet solidified status,
sceolde cannot be expected to be a fully grammaticalized subjunctive form
totally divorced from any meaning of necessity (cf. KRZYSZPIEŃ 1980).
Finally, in trying to address the initial question of whether sceolde should
be treated as separate from sceal, I have presented, following GOOSSENS
(1987a), the major arguments showing that sceolde has a higher degree of
grammaticalization than sceal. Nevertheless, it seems that there are not enough
semantic grounds on which this detachment of sceolde could be ultimately
validated. Were sceolde an independent form, one could expect it to appear in
present tense context. In my sample, all the main clause instances of sceolde
are seated in a past context, the dependent clause instances having a matrix
clause marked for the past tense as well. According to BYBEE (1995), the rise
of sceolde/should as an independent present tense form is observed in Middle
English and it goes together with the idea of hypotheticality traceable to the
verb’s meaning.
3.3.6. Negation with sceal+infinitive
As noted in 3.3.3, sceal emerges as a verb of necessity which, unlike agan and
þearf, generally steers clear of negative contexts (cf. Table 16). Left with the
group of 33 negative instances of sceal+infinitive, one can still elicit some
quite clear cut formulas. First of all, one far-reaching parallel between the
negation of sceal and PDE must is cast into view. Much like must, sceal is
a modal of PE necessity which has got the proposition under negation, not the
modality. The change that such a mode of negation brings to the table is
noticeable in, for example, the following sentence culled from the Benedictine
Rule, which is, quite matter-of-factly, the seat of a great majority of the
negative examples of sceal in my sample:
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(3.3.27) Ne sceal mon yfel mid yfele gyldan, ne nanum men nænne
not shall man evil with evil pay, nor to-no men no
teonan ne don,
calumny not do
‘One cannot return evil for evil or cause any calumny to
anyone.’
(COBENRUL 4.19)
(3.3.27), being one of the rules prescribed for a good abbot to observe, is best
conceivable as a necessity not to act, rather than lack of necessity. None of the
negative examples in my sample admits modality negation as a more feasible
or likely option when interpreted, an index to the verb’s consistent behavior
with respect to negation. This consistency seems to continue till Present-Day
English as PALMER (1979: 64) concludes that “must not (mustn’t) and shall not
(shan’t) negate the event, i.e. they lay an obligation or give an undertaking that
the act will not take place” and that “there is no way of negating modality with
SHALL.”
Negation of the proposition seems to have little, if any, effect upon the overall
force of necessity of a pre-modal in a given sentence. It is because with negation
of the proposition, the status quo between a particular Antagonist and Agonist is
preserved in that the Antagonist persists in imposing a necessity upon the
Agonist, the only difference being that it is a necessity not to act in a given way.
Observe that modality negation brings about a considerable change in the
involvement of the Antagonist and Agonist. In 3.2.4.2 the withdrawal of
a potential necessity by the Antagonist, a fact associated with the sense of
no-necessity-to in the case of þearf, is seen as a direct consequence of modality
negation. Sceal, being susceptible to negation of the proposition, carries the same
force of necessity regardless of whether it is in a positive or negative clause.
There is then no obstacle to some negative examples being included among the
sentences illustrating the cline of the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive in
3.3.4.1. Nevertheless, I find it more plausible to illustrate and analyze negative
examples here so that it would not escape anyone’s notice that the continuum of
deontic necessity embraced by the negative examples of sceal+infinitive is not as
extensive as that in the case of the positive examples. Consider the following:
(3.3.28) Swelce he openlice cwæðe: Ne sculon ge no eallunga to
also he openly said: not shall you not entirely too
swiðe lufian ðisne middangeard,
much love this middleyard
‘He also openly said, »You should not have too much
affection for this world whatsoever.«’
(COCURA 51.395.27)
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(3.3.29) Ne sceal mon manslean, ne on unriht hæman, ne
not shall man man-slay, nor on sin have-intercourse, nor
stelan, ne unalyfedlice gelustfullian,
steal, nor unlawfully desire
‘One shall not kill, commit adultery, steal, unlawfully
desire’
(COBENRUL 4.4)
(3.3.30) Ond eac cuæð Salomonn ðæt [...] ure gesuinc ne scolde
and also said Salomon that [...] our labor not should
beon on oðres monnes anwalde.
be on another man’s power
‘And Salomon also said that our labor should not lie within
someone else’s power.’
(COCURA 36.249.25)
Example (3.3.27), with the second person pronoun, the speaker’s involvement
and authority, stakes a claim to the core, which seems reasonable even despite
the non-activity main verb. Otherwise, the core remains empty as the remaining
instances fail to meet the criteria for core inclusion. 27 out of the 33 negative
examples have a profile illustrated in (3.3.27) and (3.3.29), namely a generic
third person subject and no overt mark of the speaker’s involvement. All such
instances having a form of a rule or regulation reminiscent of the biblical
commandments, the actual force of the necessity is felt as rather strong and can
be paraphrased as ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that not.’ Still, they
reside in the skirt of the cline. The periphery of the cline is as poorly
represented as the core since (3.3.30) is the sole instance eligible for relegation
to the periphery on the grounds of the inanimate/non-controller subject and
state verb beon.
On the whole, allowing for a very small number of negative instances of
sceal+infinitive in the total number of all the occurrences of the structure in the
sample, I conclude that negative sceal appears to suffer from a syndrome of
a relatively young form used to express deontic necessity. The differences
between the clines of the necessity of positive and negative sceal are striking.
While the deontic necessity of positive sceal is endowed with a strong and
subjective core as well as a weaker and blurred periphery, the core and
periphery of the deontic necessity of negative sceal are virtually non-existent,
barring the two solitary examples (3.3.28) and (3.3.30). The lack of
a fully-fledged core is a feature that the deontic necessity of negative sceal
shares with that of agan (to) infinitive, a verb whose obligative semantics is in
a state of emergence. It is also of importance that the negative instances of
sceal are more amenable to non-activity verbs as infinitival complements than
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all the instances of deontic sceal+infinitive when taken cumulatively
irrespective of a clause type (cf. Table 19 and Table 18).
This outline of negation with sceal+infinitive leads me to argue that the
rarity of the structure has as its basis a strong association with formal and/or
official prohibition. Reliance on third person generic subjects and high
percentage of non-activity verbs following the pre-modal render the deontic
necessity conveyed by negative sceal regulation-like in character. Negative
sceal seems somewhat fossilized in those formal contexts and, unlike its
positive counterpart, fails to filter through to more subjective and performative
discourse.
3.3.7. Summary of sceal
The story of sceal delineated above shows an erstwhile verb of owing turning
into an accomplished verb of deontic necessity and subsequently slowly
branching into the post-modal uses as a marker of futurity and periphrastic
subjunctive. As with agan and þearf, all the layers are represented in the
sample. Importantly, as is the case with agan (to) infinitive, sceal has much
mileage out of the fact that an inference of deontic necessity is already present
in the earlier meaning of the verb, namely ‘to owe.’ The inference with
a specific Antagonist comes to define the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive
in Old English. This meaning of sceal+infinitive eclipses all the other uses of
the verb. If it is borne in mind that sceal is the most frequent pre-modal, as
made clear in Table 4, and that in over 70 per cent of instances it carries
deontic necessity, sceal+infinitive shapes up as a primary token of deontic
necessity among the pre-modals. The high frequency translates into
a predictably extended continuum of the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive.
The continuum provides a close parallel to that of must, i.e. a PDE modal of
deontic necessity in that apart from the skirt and periphery, it yields
a consistent subjective and performative core. Interestingly, the burden of the
deontic necessity is carried in broad strokes by sceal+infinitive in positive
clauses. Negated sceal+infinitive, taking up 10.6 per cent of all the instances of
the construction in the sample, stops short of constituting a full-fledged
counterpart to positive sceal+infinitive.
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Complement type
Pre-modal
Activity verb Non-activity verb Passive Total
Negative sceal+infinitive 16 16 1 33
Table 19. Frequency of main verb complements of negative sceal with sense of necessity
and necessity/future
3.4. Mot
Although not central to the study of the expression of necessity in Old English,
mot has received due attention from linguists more on account of its later
development which culminates in the verb’s status as a marker of necessity in
Present-Day English (cf. COATES 1983 for British English, MYHILL 1996 for
American English, COLLINS 1991 for Australian English). Most grammarians
touch upon the semantics of OE mot in the course of pursuing diachronic
studies (cf. OED; ONO 1958; TELLIER 1962; VISSER 1963—1973; DENISON
1993; WARNER 1993; TAGLIAMONTE 1996; TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005) and
some researchers focus solely or primarily on the OE stage (cf. B&T;
MITCHELL 1985; GOOSSENS 1987b). Such a variety of studies implies that
a wide range of nuances relevant to the meaning of mot has been elaborated
on. For the sake of scratching the surface, let me briefly report on how some of
those scholars characterize the meaning of mot. While B&T offers a fairly
concise approach in that their dictionary specifies two senses of mot, viz. ‘to be
allowed’ and ‘to be obliged,’ ONO (1958) relates the semantic areas of mot to
those of PDE may and must. The possibility and permission of mot have been
taken over by may in Present-Day English and necessity has remained the main
domain of the PDE cogener of mot/most, namely must. The main thread of
TELLIER’S (1962) account is to put in sharp contrast the semantics of mot and
mæg as well as to stress a steady increase in the incidence of the occurrences
of the sense of necessity with mot by the eleventh century. DENISON (1993) and
WARNER (1993), on top of citing mot in connection with such notions as
possibility, permission and necessity, caution against ignoring epistemic
readings of the verb. Among all those undertakings, it is GOOSSENS’S (1987b)
that, by means of a corpus based method, casts the semantics of mot in
a meticulous diachronic framework. With 100 examples of mot obtained from
Ælfric’s Homilies, the researcher looks into the meanings of mot as arranged
on a modal track, which is simultaneously reconstructed in the process.
Needless to say, GOOSSENS’S (1987b) article has got many premises in common
with the present research, e.g. the fuzziness of modal meanings, and will be
invoked once a need arises. Otherwise, this section will be taken up with
scrutinizing two areas of the meaning of mot, namely permission and PE
necessity, without an analysis of which the system of the necessity markers in
Old English would prove far from complete.
The path of the semantic development of mot is alternative to the paths
implicated in the cases of agan, þearf, and sceal. TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005:
122) note that the roots of mot are to be searched in “[P]IE *med- ‘take
appropriate measure, be fitting/mete.’” Due to the operation of Grimm’s Law,
Gothic has (ga)mot which PROKOSCH (1939: 193) cites as belonging to Class VI
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of the preterite-presents. The only signification of (ga)mot adduced by
PROKOSCH (1939) is ‘to have room,’ the verb’s Old High German and Old
Saxon cognates, muoz and mot respectively, developing meanings which
integrate such notions as ability, PE possibility and permission (cf. TELLIER
1962). In BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA’S (1994: 199) picture, mot is a token
whose meaning could be seen as evolving along the following path:
TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 122) observe that “the OE meanings [of mot
— J.N.] were inherited from Gothic and Early Germanic mot- ‘ability,
measure, to have room for,’” hence they can be said to have arisen in the
contexts of physical ability. As further argued by BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA
(1994), the physical aspect in physical ability undergoes bleaching, which
yields physical ability being generalized into less specific ability. At this stage,
ability is seen to be sucked into the vortex of even more intensive
generalization. Working with an example of PDE can, BYBEE, PERKINS and
PAGLIUCA (1994: 192) maintain that:
The [...] [next — J.N.] step in the progression [...] is the generalization
from ability to root possibility. [...] this step can also be seen as the
loss of a specific component of the meaning, the component that
requires that the enabling conditions reside in the agent. This
generalization resembles the one just described: since the enabling
conditions for an agent to perform an act do not lie entirely in the
agent, but also depend on the external world, can would also be used
in cases in which the enabling conditions are both in the agent and
outside the agent, as in I can ride that horse or I can play that sonata.
In these cases the properties of the horse and the sonata are of some
significance in determining the agent’s ability, since horses can be
more or less difficult to ride, sonatas can be more or less difficult to
play. Thus can generalizes to predicate all sorts of enabling conditions
— those internal to the agent as well as external conditions [...].’
(BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA 1994: 192)
Along the same lines, mot finds itself in a position to convey root possibility
which, somewhere along the way, swerves in the direction of permission.
Although it is not made explicit in Figure 17, BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA
(1994) leave no doubts as to the permission of mot subsequently jumping over
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ability root possibility epistemic possibility
permission
Figure 17. Semantic path leading to permission and epistemic possibility
to obligation. It should also be pointed out that cross-linguistically the path in
Figure 17 is frequently attested. BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994: 189) list
50 forms from 27 languages in their sample which are seen to have made
a smaller or greater number of stops along the path. Interestingly enough,
permission is only one of the two options of development from root possibility,
some forms choosing the epistemic possibility destination.
The transition from permission (deontic possibility) to obligation (deontic
necessity) is overtly marked on van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S (1998: 111)
map of modality. Interestingly enough, beside examples of forms making
a leap from deontic possibility to deontic necessity, e.g. mot, Dutch moeten,
German müssen, Danish må or Hungarian -hat/-het, van der AUWERA and
PLUNGIAN (1988: 99) cite German dürfen which travels the same distance in the
reverse direction.
The most significant difference between the paths etched by BYBEE,
PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) and van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998) on the
one hand and the modal track of mot in GOOSSENS (1987b) on the other hand,
is the fact the latter foresees the derivation of a permission reading from an
ability reading without a salient intermediate stage in the vein of BYBEE,
PERKINS and PAGLIUCA’S (1994) root possibility or van der AUWERA and
PLUNGIAN’S (1998) PE possibility. Instead, GOOSSENS (1987b) admits blends
between ability and permission, which facilitate the derivation. A notion à la
root/PE possibility occurs later on the modal track in the disguise of
contingency which GOOSSENS (1987b: 231) characterizes as a case where “the
shift is [...] away from some enabling/permitting/compelling authority to some
external circumstance with respect to which the state of affairs is regarded as
possible. Since this state of affairs is state-like and beyond the control of the
subject, there is no focus on enablement of the subject [...].” There really seems
to be no obstacle to equating contingency with root/PE possibility with
a proviso, however, that, according to GOOSSENS (1987b), it enters once
permission and even obligation with mot are established. Also, in his sample,
the author does not find any example where contingency would be the only
interpretation available; rather, the sense of contingency is intermingled with
those of permission and obligation.
The research that ensues is conducted on a sample of 190 examples of mot
from the following texts making up the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus: Bede’s
Ecclesiastical History, Ælfric’s First and Second Letter to Wulstan, Ælfric’s
Letter to Sigefyrth, Ælfric’s Preface to Catholic Homilies I, II, Ælfric’s
Catholic Homilies II, Ælfric’s Lives of Saints, Ælfric’s Letter to Sigeweard,
Ælfric’s Preface to Genesis, A Homily for the Sixth (or Fourth) Sunday after
Epiphany, Wulfstan’s Institutes of Polity, Wulfstan’s Homilies, The Blickling
Homilies, Alfred’s Preface to Cura Pastoralis, Alfred’s Cura Pastoralis,
Alfred’s Preface to Soliloquies, Alfred’s Introduction to Laws, Lacnunga, The
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Benedictine Rule, The Battle of Brunanburh, The Anglo Saxon Chronicle MS
A and E, Marvels, Laecboc, Alfred’s Boethius, Fates of Apostles, Elena,
Juliana, Genesis, Dialogues of Gregory the Great, Laws (Eleventh Century),
West-Saxon Gospels, The Old Testament, Meters of Boethius and Laws (Late;
William). The corpus thus assembled contains 255, 338 words.
A semantic analysis of my sample, the results of which are presented in
Table 20, bolsters BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA’s (1994) and van der AUWERA
and PLUNGIANS’S (1998) approaches in that the notion of PE possibility does
heavily overlap with PI possibility. Since the issue of PI and/or PE possibility
is not per se relevant to the topic of this study, I lump together the instances
where either of those two senses seems to prevail. I will briefly discuss those
instances in 3.4.2. Quantitatively it is the area of permission that
unquestionably dominates and those cases along with those of deontic necessity
and those ambiguous between the two meanings will be in the spotlight in
3.4.3, 3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.4, 3.4.5, and 3.4.6. Throughout these sections the
term permission is used despite its missing from the van der AUWERA and
PLUNGIAN’S (1998) map of modality, a major source of nomenclature in this
undertaking. I have chosen to avail myself of the term on account of its
commonly understood precision, yet it is taken to be synonymous with deontic
possibility. The five epistemic examples of mot, due to their frequent
compatibility with deontic necessity readings, are handled together with the
examples of deontic necessity in 3.4.5. Finally, a word of caution seems proper
concerning the tentative nature of the semantic analysis conducted in Table 20
for reasons discussed in 3.2.4.1.
3.4.1. Syntactic considerations
Unlike the other pre-modals of necessity, mot does not co-occur with any
special meaning that would require the verb to take NP complements. Neither
B&T nor OED adduce any instances pointing to the contrary. In my sample,
however, one example apparently contravenes this routine practice, consider
(3.4.1):
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Meaning
Pre-modal
PI/ PE possibility Permission
Permission
/deontic
necessity
Deontic
necessity
Epistemic Total
mot 23
(12.1%)
137
(72.2%)
4
(2.1%)
21
(11.0%)
5
(2.6%)
190
(100%)
Table 20. Distribution of meanings of mot
(3.4.1) Gif he hine triewan wille, þæt he to ðære læne
if he him clear-of-a-charge wants, that he to the loan
facn ne wiste, þæt he mot.
ill-design not knew, that he must.
‘If he wants to clear himself of the charge on the grounds of
being unaware of the ill-design of the loan, he may.’
(COLAW2 19.2)
Despite mot+infinitive regularly co-occurring with the sense of permission,
such a structure cannot be taken as an option in (3.4.1). Evidently, the
pronominal form þæt in þæt he mot stands for the phrase hine triewan in the
protasis and should be treated as an NP complement, as it were. DENISON
(1993: 307—308) provides a handy account of similar structures in later
English and echos PLANK’S (1984: 336) observation that they mark their
presence in English “about until the end of the 18th century or even longer.”
Both scholars reach a consensus on the treatment of the pronoun in (pre) modal
+ it/that as an anaphoric substitute for a VP which finds itself within the range
of a modal.
Mot follows in the footsteps of sceal to the extent that it shows unshaken
preference for plain infinitives. Also, no less than in the case of sceal, this
preference is overcome, or, perhaps, not materialized when the infinitive is
absent in the course of frequent operation of postverbal ellipsis. On such
occasions, mot goes either by itself, as in (3.4.2), or in conjunction with
another pre-modal mæg in a binomial expression, as in (3.4.3):
(3.4.2) þa ic for gode wille gemundbyrdan, gif ic mot, for eow
whom I for God will protect, if I must, from you
‘I will defend them against you before God, if so I may.’
(COGENESI 2476)
(3.4.3) utan don swa us þearf is, beorgan us georne wið
let’s do as us need is, protect us earnestly against
the terror and help our self while we may
þæne egesan 7 helpan ure sylfra þa hwile þe we magan
7 motan,
and must
‘Let’s do what is necessary, let’s protect ourselves from the
terror and help ourselves while we may.’
(COWULF4 72)
If in postverbal ellipsis, the infinitive can make no appearance by virtue of its
antecedent being present in the preceding clauses (cf. gemundbyrdan as an
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antecedent of mot in (3.4.2) and beorgan and helpan as antecedents of magan
and motan in (3.4.3)). Furthermore, my sample contains two cases of mot
followed by a directional adverb with an infinitive “to be inferred otherwise,”
as B&T s.v. motan puts it. The infinitive called for in both cases being
logically a verb of motion, the prerequisites for such constructions are given
a fair share of attention in 3.3.3 and will not be dealt with here. (3.4.4) serves
to epitomize this type of construction with mot:
(3.4.4) ne hi swa fule ne motan into his fægeran healle,
not they so foul not must into his beautiful residence
‘they, so foul, cannot enter his beautiful residence.’
(COAELET3 144)
The last point to be made from the domain of syntax concerns the clause
patterns with mot. Laid out in Table 21 is the distribution of the three clause
types, which unequivocally points to preponderance of the affirmative type.
While interrogative clauses, much in the same mode as with the previously
discussed pre-modals, have a negligible presence, it is only with the meaning
of permission that negative sentences make their way to a significant number
of examples. Negated permission, viz. prohibition, will be an important point
where permission and deontic necessity converge, section 3.4.3.2 being
a proper locus for a more detailed study of this convergence.
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Clause type
Meaning
Affirmative Negative Interrogative Total
PI/PE possibility 21
(11%)
2
(1.1%)
0 23
(12.1%)
Permission 81
(42.7%)
53
(28%)
3
(1.5%)
137
(72.2%)
Permission/deontic necessity 4
(2.1%)
0 0 4
(2.1%)
Deontic necessity 21
(11%)
0 0 21
(11%)
Epistemic 5
(2.6%)
0 0 5
(2.6%)
Total 132
(69.5%)
55
(29%)
3
(1.5%)
190
(100%)
Table 21. Distribution of clause patterns with particular meanings of mot
3.4.2. Mot with the sense of PI/PE possibility
As argued in 3.4, the prime mechanism responsibly for change from PI to
general PE possibility is the semantic bleaching of the agent’s potential as an
enabler of the action expressed in the proposition. As a result of the bleaching,
the role of the enabler is gradually taken over by some unspecified
agent-external circumstances (cf. BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA 1994: 192). At
the same time, these two meanings are most operative at the early stages of the
semantic evolution of mot and its cognates in the Germanic languages and, as
shown by GOOSSENS (1987b) and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005), in Old English
they are not common any more. The relatively small number of such examples
in my sample, namely 23, is corroborative of this statement. Remarkably, even
less common are cases where a PI possibility reading precludes any other
interpretation consonant with it, all of GOOSSENS’S (1987b) ability examples
being shown to be tainted with a sense of permission. (3.4.5) below seems to
me one of few good candidates for carrying “the putatively original Germanic
participant-internal ability meaning” (TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005: 122) with
a proviso that it is uttered as the speaker’s wish:
(3.4.5) ac ðær ic nu moste mod gefeðran, ðinne ferðlocan,
but there I now must mind furnish, thy soul’s-enclosure,
feðrum minum,
wings my
‘But if I might your mind furnish, your soul’s enclosure, with
my wings’
(COMETBOE 24.1)
Much more noticeable is the shift away from PI possibility toward PE
possibility especially in such elliptical sentences where mot is juxtaposed with
mæg as in (3.4.3). With mæg assuming responsibility for a sense of ability, the
very juxtaposition casts mot into a role of an exponent of PE possibility. Note
that if we magan can be glossed as we are able then motan is left with a gloss
it is possible for us, the possibility being agent-externally conditioned by some
generally accepted state of affairs. Besides, it is TELLIER (1962) who on more
than one occasion draws our attention to the fact that the primary difference
between mæg and mot consists in subject-internally-conditioned potential
typical of the former and subject-externally-conditioned potential inherent to
the latter.12
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12 Nevertheless, this interpretation of the binomial mæg 7 mot can only be tentative.
MOLENCKI (1991: 28) interposes a caveat that the two elements in a binomial may not and often
do not reinforce any difference in meaning. Even if the remark pertains to matrix clauses, which
Overall, GOOSSENS (1987b) is not mistaken in approaching most of the
occurrences of mot as semantic blends (he mostly applies double labels like
permission/obligation, etc.). Different senses are subject to intense intertwining
so that sometimes all three, namely PI possibility, PE possibility and
permission must be taken into account in one example, e.g.:
(3.4.6) Swa se Fæder ... sealde him anweald þæt he moste deman
so the Father gave him power that he must judge
forðam þe he is mannes sunu
because he is man’s son
‘So the Father gave him power so that he might judge because
he is man’s son.’
(COWSGOSP 5.27)
The meaning of moste in the subordinate clause is a logical development of
the meaning of sealde him anweald ‘gave him power’ in the main clause.
Given the authority of the giver, the power he gives implies granting Jesus
permission to make judgments. At the same time, the power to make
judgments equals endowing Jesus with potential to make them, hence the
sense of PI possibility. Nor can we rule out an option that the Father was just
establishing a state of affairs where it would be objectively possible for Jesus
to make judgments.
3.4.3. Mot with the sense of permission
It is mentioned in 3.4.1 that some markers of PE possibility are faced with an
option to take on an aspect of permission, mot constituting a prime case in
point. That this process of meaning change is gradual can be judged by
example (3.4.6) where the meaning of permission is seen to more or less
obviously creep in. Two teams of scholars, van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN
(1998) and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005) perceive the change in slightly
different terms. The former speak of a case of “semantic shrinking or
specialization” (van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN 1998: 88), that is to say, the
role of the enabler shifts from some nebulous objective circumstances to
a more and more definite source, say a religious doctrine, social establishment,
and, eventually, the speaker. Interestingly enough, given that an earlier
development of mot, that from PI to PE possibility, proceeds according to the
rules of semantic bleaching, i.e. deletion of one component of the verb’s
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the relevant clause in (3.4.3) is not, one cannot rule out a possibility that the juxtaposition of
mæg and mot is only a stylistic device.
meaning, the change from PE possibility to permission sees mot going through
the reverse process, i.e. a new component of meaning is added. Consequently,
permission differs from PE possibility in that the former is restricted by the
definiteness of the enabling/permitting force. For TRAUGOTT and DASHER
(2005), on the other hand, there are strong grounds for treating the whole
evolution from PI through PE possibility, which they term participant-external
ability, through permission as purely inferential. It is argued that just as a PI
possibility reading in some contexts invites inferences of an agent-external
source of the ability, so, along the same lines, ability contingent on some
unspecified external source may spark the inference that there is a concrete
entity that makes the action possible or permitted. Once such inferences
become inseparable from the meaning of mot, the verb gains access to the
expression of permission.
As a matter of fact, it seems that there is no good reason why the two
hypotheses could not be constructively married. If the operation of inferences
is the prime mechanism for the permission-bound change of mot, then
specialization is a direct consequence of the workings of this mechanism.
A permission reading arises inferentially as a possible interpretation after PI
and PE possibility meanings with mot are widespread, as can be seen in
(3.4.6). In time, such inferences of permission with mot spread over
a community of speakers until they are accepted as part of the meaning of the
verb (cf. LEVINSON 1995 and TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005 on how invited
inferences become first generalized invited inferences and then coded
meanings). Eventually we find such sentences as (3.4.7):
(3.4.7) Se læweda man mot oþre siþe wifian, and geong wuduwe
the lay man must other time take-wife, and young widow
must again take-husband but none not must though give
mot eft ceorlian ac nan ne mot swaþeah syllan
them blessing
him bletsung
‘A layman may take another wife, a young widow may marry
again, but, nevertheless, no one can give them blessing.’
(COAELET3 156)
which cannot but be interpreted as containing mot by means of which
permission is granted (the first two occurrences of the verb) or denied (the
third occurrence of the verb). The acceptance of the inferences of permission
results in the specialization of PE possibility by restricting its original semantic
structure “enabling conditions exist” (BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA 1994: 192)
through adding to it an additional characteristic “enabling conditions exist and
come from a specific agent-external source.”
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At this point, since the relatedness of permission to necessity related
meanings may seem tenuous at best, let me justify the reasons for the inclusion
of permission among the issues central to the topic of this study. It is true that
some scholars admit more links between permission and possibility than
between permission and PI/PE necessity. Van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN
(1998) do not even see it fit to designate a separate label for permission on
their semantic map of modality, a tacit assumption that permission is one with
deontic possibility. Importantly, due to this inclusion, permission is rendered
part of the path of possibility which runs only parallel to the path of necessity
on the map. In fact, such treatment of permission testifies to van der AUWERA
and PLUNGIAN (1998) building on earlier tradition in linguistics. In PALMER’S
(1986: 98) view, permission and necessity are shown as opposite poles in
“a basic system of weak and strong deontic modality (at least of directives).”
On the other hand, however, the fact that permission is closely related to the
notion of possibility does not pose any insurmountable stumbling block. The
well known logical equivalence of possibility and necessity in terms of
negation both on the epistemic and non-epistemic plane (cf. LYONS 1977;
PALMER 1979; TREGIDGO 1982):
necessary p = not possible not p
necessary not p = not possible p
possible p = not necessary not p
possible not p = not necessary p
bears upon the equivalence of permission and PE necessity, which leads LYONS
(1977: 832) to state that “if X is not obliged to do a (where a is either an
individual or generic act), he is permitted not to do a; and if he is obliged to do
a, he is not permitted not to do a; [...]. Also, if X is permitted to do a, he is not
obliged not to do a; and if X is not permitted to do a, he is obliged not to do
a [...].” Remarkably, many scholars, for example PALMER 1979; TREGIDGO 1982;
COATES 1983, have treated these correlations as a point of departure in further
investigation into the affinity between permission and PE necessity and in this
respect I intend to follow suit.
Also, it is often emphasized that a relation of implication holds between PE
necessity and permission but not vice versa. That someone is obliged to
perform an act logically implies that the same person is also permitted to
perform this act but, somehow, that somebody is permitted to act stops short of
implying that this person is also obliged to act (cf. LYONS 1977; HERMERÉN
1979; CONRADIE 1987). As for the genesis of this implication, LYONS (1977:
836—837) observes that imperative sentences, usually reserved for
communicating mands, in appropriate contexts may serve to give permission.
Thus, for example, Come in! uttered on hearing a knock on the door, is
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tantamount to permission rather than a mand. Curiously, the implication runs
counter to the attested diachronic development in that the meaning of
permission precedes PE necessity on the paths of the evolution of modal
meanings reconstructed by BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994) and van der
AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998) as well as on the axis of modal meanings
proposed by CONRADIE (1987).
Finally, in order to wrap up the theme of the relevance of permission to
a study of PE necessity, let me quote COATES (1983: 87) who, drawing
upon LYONS (1977) as well as her own research on the PDE modals, states
that:
granting permission has much in common with imposing obligation —
all such personal directives are governed by the addressee-based
condition that the speaker must believe that the addressee is able to
carry it out. However, where mands, such as MUST, commit the
speaker to the desirability of the action concerned, permission granting
utterances do not (see LYONS 1977: 745). Moreover, they are strictly
neutral in terms of the addressee’s wishes, though in practice such
utterances have the implication that the addressee does want to do the
action concerned. (COATES 1983: 87)
Having settled the theoretical issues, I proceed to the practical part, i.e.
a look at the 137 corpus examples of mot expressing permission. The very
number of those instances in the sample, when confronted with the frequency
of other meanings (cf. Table 20), testifies to GOOSSENS’S (1987b: 229) words
that “MOTAN still clearly has a permission core”. As shown in Table 21, it is
only with this permission core that negative clauses with mot get a fair share of
the total number of the occurrences. I find it, therefore, feasible to first
consider the affirmative and interrogative clauses (those where there is an
actual idea of permission) and thereupon the negative clauses (which contain
negated permission, i.e. prohibition). The former group excludes three
occurrences where mot, although not itself negated, appears in a subordinate
clause which is embedded in a negative main clause, which results in an
overall sense of prohibition.
3.4.3.1. Permission in affirmative and interrogative clauses
The range of possible nuances carried by the 81 occurrences of mot with the
meaning of permission is aptly shown through the following examples:
(3.4.8) bebead him, ðus cweðende: Of ælcum treowe ðises
ordered him thus saying: from each tree of-this
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orcerdes ðu most etan.
orchard thou must eat
‘(He) ordered him thus saying: ‘You may eat from every tree
in this orchard.’’
(COOTEST 2.16)
(3.4.9) 7 þus cwæð: Min fæder, mot ic þe ohtes ahsian.
and thus said: My father, must I thee anything ask
‘and thus said, ‘My father, may I ask you something? ’’
(COBEDE 3.266.22)
(3.4.10) Borges mon mot oðsacan, gif he wat, þæt
Guarantee-of-security man may deny, if he knows, that
he ryht deð.
he right does
‘One may deny the guarantee of security provided that he is
certain that it is lawful.’
(COLAW2 41)
(3.4.11) Be oxanhyrde: ... 7 his metecu mot gan mid hlafordes
on ox shepherd and his cow must go with master’s
heorde
herd
‘Concerning ox shepherds: ... and his cow may go along with
the master’s herd.’
(COLAW4 12)
(3.4.12) Se bisceop þa moste under Moyses æ habban wif and
the bishop then must under Moses’ law have wife and
cild for þære gesetnysse
child for that tradition
‘According to Moses’s law, a bishop could have a wife and
child on account of the tradition.’
(COAELET3 76)
(3.4.13) We sceolon (...) leahtras and unlustas forseon, þæt we
we shall vices      and evil-pleasures reject, that we
heofena rice habban motan.
heaven kingdom have must
‘We should reject vices and evil pleasures so that we could
have the heavenly kingdom.’
(COAELET3 22)
As can be noticed, the above examples are arranged so as to reflect a cline
extending from the most subjective and modally strongest examples to the least
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subjective and modally weakest ones. Without a doubt, the cline brings to
mind comparisons with the clines of deontic necessity. Although most of such
comparisons are in essence justifiable, there emerges one pivotal difference.
The very force of deontic necessity, when distilled to the bare essentials by
disregarding subjectivity-inducing parameters such as the speaker’s authority,
speaker’s involvement, etc., varies from context to context ranging from very
strong, almost order-like among the core examples of sceal+infinitive, e.g.
example (3.3.11) to weaker, advice-like among the skirt/peripheral examples of
agan (to) infinitive, e.g. (3.1.16). In other words, the force imposed by the
Antagonist upon the Agonist in a deontic necessity scenario is gradable, some
deontic necessity examples require translation along the lines of ‘it is
obligatory/absolutely essential that’ and some other prefer an ‘it is important
that’ gloss. The force of permission per se is not a gradient. A common
denominator in all permission examples is that, as COATES (1983: 87) notes
speaking of PDE can, they “can be paraphrased with the words ‘permitted’ or
‘allowed.’” This constraint on permission becomes self-evident when one
resorts to SWEETSER’S (1990) comments on the force-and-barrier nature of
permission. Permission-granting means withdrawing a barrier which would
otherwise thwart the Agonist’s actions. Were the Antagonist to restore the
barrier back to place, we would have to do with a proper case of prohibition.
Indeed, it is hardly conceivable that the situation admits any options in
between in the shape of, say, a barrier partly lifted (for similar considerations
concerning Present-Day English, see MATTHEWS 1991: 112—113).
Thus if it is not the force of permission that can be held responsible for the
existence of the cline of permission, some other factors must be considered in
an attempt to account for this cline. The position atop the cline of (3.4.8) and
(3.4.9) is guaranteed by their directive character in the sense of LYONS (1977).
They are both directive in that (3.4.8) carries the speaker’s permission and
(3.4.9) is a request for the hearer’s permission. (3.4.8) approaches an epitome
of a permission-granting directive as the subject is directly addressed in the
second person, the speaker (God) is endowed with authority and cannot be
suspected of lack of involvement. Nor can the speaker in (3.4.9) be assumed to
fail to acknowledge the hearer’s authority. Both examples figure high on
a scale of subjectivity, too. Considering that there are only three such directives
in my sample, including two interrogative clauses, it could be argued that they
are only used in prescribed contexts involving participants of significantly
different status in a society, family, etc. (see WARNER 1993: 164—165 for
similar examples). Examples (3.4.10) through (3.4.12) represent what LYONS
(1977) calls deontic statements to the extent that the speaker in each of them
seeks to report on the validity of permission issued by someone else. In
(3.4.10) and (3.4.11) the state of permission exists in the present and originates
in legal regulations, hence little, if any, involvement of the speaker. As with the
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cases of deontic necessity inspired by some legal body, the subject, when
Agonist, is often generic. The same can be said of (3.4.12), in which the
permission is clearly indicated as holding under specific circumstances in the
past. The source of this permission is the law of Moses, that is to say, an
interface of legal and religious norms, which is index to those two sources
constituting major guidelines for the generation of permission and deontic
necessity in the OE texts. It is also worthy of note that mot with the sense of
permission is on familiar terms with wide scope, consider the instance of the
verb in (3.4.11), where the subject is not exactly the addressee of the
permission, the Agonist being demoted. Another point of interest is that mot
clearly favors main verb complements which prototypically stand for activities
and call for an agent. The type of permission granted via mot usually refers to
dynamic actions to be performed by willful agents, as illustrated in examples
(3.4.8) through (3.4.11). As evidenced in Table 22, the trend continues
unabated regardless of the meaning that the verb goes with.
In example (3.4.13) we witness the use of mot in a subordinate clause,
a sort of environment where the meaning of permission is more likely to be on
the wane. In this particular case, mot comes in a future oriented purpose clause
which has a permission reading tainted with an overtone of a wish. GOOSSENS
(1987b: 231) is far from bewildered by such overtones when he remarks that
“permissions have a natural link with wishes in that whatever one is permitted
is to be consonant with one’s wishes (giving a permission removes an
obstruction for an activity which the permissee wants to carry out/be involved
in, etc.).” The occurrence of mot in purpose clauses correlates with the
integration of the verb into the structure of periphrastic subjunctive. Again,
GOOSSENS (1987b: 232) notes that, despite the apparent indicative mood in
(3.4.13), by the time of Ælfric the distinction between plural indicative and
subjunctive forms falls by the wayside so that the indicative form, in fact,
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Complement
Meaning
Activity verb Non-activity verb Passive structure Total
Permission/prohibition 105
(55.3%)
31
(16.4%)
1
(0.5%)
137
(72.2%)
Permission/deontic necessity 4
(2.1%)
0 0 4
(2.1%)
Deontic necessity 15
(7.9%)
5
(2.6%)
1
(0.5%)
21
(11%)
Other meanings 24
(12.6%)
4
(2.1%)
0 28
(14.7%)
Total 148
(77.9%)
40
(21.1%)
2
(1%)
190
(100%)
Table 22. Distribution of infinitival complements with mot
signals a subjunctive structure. By the same token, as mot joins the ranks of
subjunctive markers along with sceolde (cf. 3.4.3) and mæg (cf. KRZYSZPIEŃ’S
1980), a permission reading becomes less salient in favor of the grammatical
function.
Purpose clauses aside, mot with a weakened idea of permission can be
traced to situations where the meaning of the verb depends for its relevance on
a preceding expression from which a sense of permission can also be derived.
Similar cases embracing sceolde are recognized and reviewed in 3.3.5 under
the heading redundant modality (cf. PLANK 1984). GOOSSENS (1987b: 230),
while focusing on some of such examples, adds a syntactic dimension by
stating that we have to do with “a semantic weakening [of permission — J.N.]
owing to the (syntactic) embedding after a verb of a particular (semantic)
class.” What he means are sentences of the following type:
(3.4.14) On ðam ilcan steode þe God him geuðe þæt he moste
On the same place where God him granted that he must
Engleland gegan.
England subdue
‘On that same spot where God granted him that he
should/might gain England,’
(COCHROE4 1086.72)
Syntactically, þæt he moste Engleland gegan is a direct object of the verb
geunnan ‘to grant’ in the matrix clause. At the root of the semantics of
geunnan is the satisfaction of the indirect object’s, i.e. him, wish and if the
wish happens to be an action, then to answer this wish is to grant permission to
act. Thus there are strong grounds for arguing that a verb such as geunnan
opens up a possibility of a permission reading, which renders the occurrence of
mot in the subordinate clause somehow excessive. Witness also that the notion
of attempting to satisfy the indirect object’s wish encoded in geunnan rules out
deontic necessity as the meaning of mot. Other main clause verbs which have
mot ensuing in the subordinate clause in my sample are: biddan (‘to ask’ four
times), geþafian (‘to grant’ two times), onfon (‘to receive’ two times), gildan
(‘to grant’ one time), wilnian (‘to long for’ one time) and forgiefan (‘to give’
one time). As regards such structures, it is vital to notice that a sequence of
a permission expression followed by mot may extend beyond a matrix
clause-embedded clause configuration. I find one interesting instance:
(3.4.15) ðeah be ðæs apostoles leafe læwede man
though according-to the apostle’s permission lay man
mot for neode oðre siðe wifian.
must for need other time take-wife
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‘Though in accordance with the apostle’s permission,
a layman may marry again if he needs to.’
(COINSPOL 190)
where the permission of mot stems from the idea of permission explicitly
present in the noun leaf ‘permission, license.’ From a semantic perspective,
there is no deviation from the already observed formula in that the meaning of
mot builds upon that of a preceding element, viz. leaf. Syntactically, however,
mot belongs to the VP, a structurally higher constituent than the adjunct
adverbial containing leaf.
3.4.3.2. Prohibition
In this section I aim to review the 56 examples where the permission of mot is
negated, which results in the meaning of prohibition. Needless to say, negated
permission is a clear indication that it is modality that is within the scope of
negation. As a result, in each of the 56 examples we obtain a one-is-
not-permitted-to reading rather than one-is-permitted-not-to, which would be
a concomitant of proposition negation. As hinted at earlier, prohibition of mot
can be realized in two ways, that is to say, either by negating mot itself:
(3.4.16) Na he ne mot beon mid læwedum scrude gescryd.
nor he not must be with lay clothes dressed
‘Nor can he be dressed in lay clothes’
(COAELET3 206)
or, alternately, by negating the verb in the main clause in which the clause with
mot is embedded:
(3.4.17) Nis nanum weofodþene alyfed, þæt he wifian mote,
not-is to-no altar-servant permitted, that he take-wife must,
ac is ælcum forboden.
but is to-all forbidden
‘An altar servant is not permitted to marry. It is forbidden’
(COINSPOL 149)
Prohibition of the former type outnumbers that of the latter type by 53 to 3.
For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the number of explicit
prohibition examples, which the former type might be called, is consistent with
the number of negative clauses in the permission row in Table 21. The three
examples of implicit prohibition, a label adopted for the latter type, are
included among the affirmative clauses in the same table as, formally, mot is
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not negated. Despite this formal difference, it should be stressed that example
(3.4.17) contains a sense of prohibition no less valid than example (3.4.16). In
both cases there is no room for doubt that the action which the Agonist is
implied to be willing to undertake is disallowed. Still, the fact that speakers
choose implicit prohibition over explicit in some circumstances stands to prove
that a sentences such as (3.4.17) need some accounting for. In 3.2.5 a similar
challenge is faced in the case of þearf and, having eliminated negative raising
as a mechanism behind such structures, I argue that a negative marker is
moved from the clause with a pre-modal to the main clause on the grounds of
emphasis. Evidently, the same solution is applicable to mot. By shifting
negation to the main clause in (3.4.17), the speaker/writer makes sure that
prohibition, i.e. modality, is emphasized. The import that the speaker/writer
assigns to the emphasis of the prohibition in this case becomes even more
noticeable when one considers the somewhat redundant addition of ac is ælcum
forboden, which yet more enhances the notion of prohibition. Therefore, it
seems a feasible conclusion that implicit prohibition occurs in sentences
marked for emphasis. Note also that (3.4.17) is an intriguing example of
redundant modality in that the sense of prohibition is revealed in the main
clause and then, in its own turn, mot somehow superfluously follows in the
subordinate clause. Were one to say that mot carries mere permission here, the
meaning would be strikingly incongruous with the prohibition in the main
clause. I conjecture that mot in (3.4.17), owing to the shift of negation to the
main clause, takes over the function of a periphrastic subjunctive marker. If the
modality is marked elsewhere (the main clause), the pre-modal, relieved of its
lexical burden, proceeds to signal non-factuality of the proposition.
Interestingly enough, in the Institutes of Polity I find a sentence which, on
top of being semantically parallel to (3.4.17), contrasts nicely with it. Consider
(3.4.18):
(3.4.18) And preoste is forboden, þæt he beon ne mot, ... æt þam
and to-priest is forbidden, that he be not must, at the
brydlacum,
marriage-ceremony
‘A priest cannot be at the marriage ceremony’
(COINSPOL 193)
The parallelism pivots on the fact that in (3.4.18) prohibition is also expressed
in the main clause and, thereafter, mot in the subordinate clause ensues.
Nevertheless, at this point (3.4.18) deviates from (3.4.17) in that mot, in the
presence of the negative marker, repeats the already-stated prohibition, which
makes (3.4.18) a more prototypical case of redundant modality than (3.4.17)
(witness the indicative form mot in (3.4.18) vs. subjunctive mote in (3.4.17)). It
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might be conclusively reasoned that (3.4.17) becomes an alternative to the
structure in (3.4.18) as the repetition of modality from the main clause gives
way to the use of a pre-modal in the subordinate clause as a marker of the
subjunctive. Unfortunately, any detailed investigation into this issue is outside
the scope of this study.
Sentence (3.4.18) brings us to the 53 explicit prohibition examples. All
these sentences are truly negative with the particle ne accompanying mot. The
vast number of such examples in the sample renders it possible to see a cline
of prohibition running from the most subjective to the least subjective
occurrences. Respective examples follow:
(3.4.19) þu scealt eac yfelne ege an forlætan, woruldearfoða,
thou shalt also evil fear one forsake, worldly-afflictions,
ne most ðu wesan for ðæm ealles to ormod,
not must thou be for these all to discouraged
‘Thou shalt also forsake the evil fear of worldly afflictions,
nor must you be discouraged by all of them’
(COMETBOE 28)
(3.4.20) On þam dæge ge ne motan cweþan æt þære mæssan:
on that day you not must say at the mass:
dominus uobiscum,
dominus vobiscum
‘On that day you must not say ‘dominus vobiscum’ during
the mass’
(COAELET3 34)
(3.4.21) Forþonþe he mot mæssian, þeahþe he munuc ne sy, and
because he may say-mass, although he monk not be, and
munuc ne mot mæssian, butan he mæssepreost sy.
monk not must, say-mass but he priest be
‘Because he may say mass even though he is not a monk, and
a monk cannot say mass unless he is a priest’
(COAELET3 119)
(3.4.22) Sawla ne moton manfremmende in minum leng æhtum
souls not must working-wickedness in my long property
wunigan.
stay
‘souls may not stay long in my property working wickedness’
(COCYNEW 905)
(3.4.23) Hi ne mostan na wifian on nanre wudewan ne on
they not must not marry on no widow nor on
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forlætenan wife be Godes leafe þa ac
abandoned woman according-to God’s permission then but
on clænum mædene.
on pure maiden
‘According to God’s law, they must not marry a widow or an
abandoned woman but a pure maiden’
(COAELET3 130)
It will be clear from these examples that the instances of mot with a sense of
prohibition form a cline analogous to the cline of permission analyzed in
3.4.3.1. The major difference between the clines could be described as
occasioned by a barrier placed by the Antagonist in the way of the Agonist in
the case of prohibition. As noted in 3.4.3.1, permission calls for a scenario
where the barrier is withdrawn, thereby making it possible for the Agonist to
act. Since the other parameters affecting the cline of prohibition match those
pertaining to the cline of permission, I will limit my discussion to a few major
points. Thus, prohibition in my sample has very weak association with
directives as there are only two examples where the speaker is one with the
Antagonist (see (3.4.19)). Otherwise, the sample abounds in deontic statements
which, with the notable exception of (3.4.22), take the subject as the Agonist.
As with permission, in such cases the prohibition most often originates in
religious ethics or a legal code. The Agonist may be specific (see (3.4.20)), yet
is much more frequently generic (see (3.4.21), (3.4.22), and (3.4.23)). The
speaker may relate prohibition issued in the present and holding for the present
with a possible future orientation (see (3.4.19) through (3.4.22)) as well as
prohibition relevant for the past (see (3.4.23)). By way of summary, it bears
remarking that the core of the cline of prohibition is poorly represented, even
more so than that of permission. For instance, my sample evinces no strongly
subjective examples with the speaker overtly marking his or her involvement.
At the same time, as might be expected, most examples swarm toward the less
subjective skirt and periphery.
3.4.4. Permission/prohibition vs. deontic necessity
It will have been noticed that in Table 21 the deontic necessity of mot yields
only affirmative clauses. This may be felt as a statement which calls for an
explanation. The point at issue here is that the distinction between prohibition
and necessity-not-to is anything but watertight. If one bears in mind that
prohibition (or negated permission) belongs in the domain of possibility, then
one of the four points where the paths of necessity and possibility cross could
be invoked, namely the one that says that necessary not p = not possible p
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(cf. 3.4.3). Among corollaries of this equivalence, which have been extensively
studied cross-linguistically (cf. HORN 1989; PALMER 1995, 1997; DE HAAN
1997, van der AUWERA 2001), is the fact that lack of permission, viz.
prohibition-to implicates necessity-not-to. A prohibition reading invites an
inference of or is even synonymous with a reading of deontic necessity-not-to.
There is then nothing of a coincidence in GOOSSENS’S (1987b: 232—233) words
that “a [...] factor that promotes the broadening of MOTAN to include an
obligational sense hangs together with the negative. A denied permission
amounts to an obligation-not-to: under negation the distinction between
permission and obligation is considerably diminished.” A similar line of
reasoning is assumed by MOLENCKI (2003) and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005).
The latter scholars further this point by promoting the assumption that
sometimes permission, especially if granted from a position of power, may be
interpreted as an unpleasant restraining force. The effect of undesirability of
permission in some contexts is compatible with undesirability of a barrier
which stands in the way of the Agonist, i.e. prohibition. An interplay of such
negative associations may contribute to an analysis of the meaning of mot in an
affirmative as an unpleasant compelling force, i.e. deontic necessity rather than
expected withdrawal of the barrier, i.e. permission.
A well known fact crucially at stake when it comes to the shift of mot from
a token of permission/prohibition to that of deontic necessity is the reanalysis
of the past form moste as a present form in Middle English. This fact has been
addressed on a number of occasions as yet another clue that helps understand
the very shift. TRAUGOTT (1989: 40) says that “past permission was interpreted
as implying obligation” and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 125) further this
argument by adding that “it is likely that in OE reports of permission to act
invited the inference that the instruction was performed, or that the action
granted was fulfilled, thereby reducing the options available both to the
permittee and to the subject of the subordinate clause, especially where the
authority is all powerful [...].” Although the relevance of this argumentation
does not raise doubts, it has also been observed that not until Middle English
does moste become a fully accepted present form, which indicates that the
inferencing of deontic necessity from past permission plays a bigger role in
establishing the sense of deontic necessity with mot in Middle English than in
initiating it in Old English. For example, GOOSSENS (1987b: 233) stumbles
upon twelve obligative instances of mot in his 100 example sample, out of
which as many as three contain moste. These results are in line with mine in
that among 21 examples of mot with the sense of deontic necessity (cf. Table
20 and Table 21), moste occurs once and moston twice.
Overall, it seems that the earliest forays of mot into deontic necessity are to
be linked with 1) the possibility of the interpretation of prohibition as deontic
necessity-not-to, 2) the projection of speakers’ negative associations upon the
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permission of mot in general, occasioned by the unfavorable nature of
prohibition. This, to a large extent, answers the question of lack of negative
sentences with mot when it conveys deontic necessity. As the shift from
permission to deontic necessity in mot is underway, the negative form of the
verb may be meant or understood as either prohibition or deontic
necessity-not-to. As both meanings are logically synonymous, the best solution
is to lump all the negative examples together under the heading ‘prohibition’
since it is still permission that is the semantic core of the verb in Old English.
3.4.5. Deontic necessity of mot
That the appearance of the meaning of deontic necessity in the case of mot is
a cause of some bewilderment toward the end of Old English may be gathered
from the following two examples:
(3.4.24) Eala, swær is seo byrðen, þe Godes bydel beran
oh! heavy is that burden, that God’s messenger bear
sceall,
shall
‘Oh! heavy is the burden that God’s messenger has to bear’
(COINSPOL 51)
(3.4.25) Eala, eala, ... swær is seo byrðen þe Godes bydel
oh, oh, heavy is the burden that God’s messenger
beran mot
bear must
‘Oh! heavy is the burden that God’s messenger has to bear’
(COWULF4 61)
The two versions of the same sentence, both written in the eleventh century,
have the same meaning of deontic necessity reinforced by the two different
verbs. Whilst the author of the Institutes of Polity prefers a more conservative
form sceall, in Wulfstan’s Homilies we find mot. This indicates that, at the
beginning of the eleventh century, according to SOLO (1977), mot joins sceal as
a marker of dontic necessity and becomes capable of replacing it. A few
examples presented below and intended as an illustration of the cline of the
deontic necessity of mot will help pinpoint the details of the strength of the
deontic necessity and specify how subjective the use of mot can be:
(3.4.26) Ac man mot on eornost motian wið his Drihten, se þe
but man must on earnest argue with his Lord, this who
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wyle þæt we sprecon mid weorcum wið hine;
wants that we speak with deeds with him
‘but man needs argue on earnest with his Lord, he who wants
us to talk to him with our deeds’
(COAELET4 970)
(3.4.27) manna gehwylc, ... þonne mot he beon ærost ðinga
of-man each then must he be first of-things
gemynegad 7 gewisod þæt he cunne hu he of
warned and instructed that he knows how he from
hæþendome mæge to cristendome ... cuman
heathendom may to Christendom ... come
‘Each man must be first warned and instructed so that he
should know how he may come from heathendom to
Christendom’
(COWULF3 2)
(3.4.28) And gyf man gehadodne mid fæhþe belecge 7
and if man one-in-holy-orders with feud charge and
secge, þæt he wære dædbana [...] ladige mid his
say, that he were one-who-murders clear-himself with his
magum, þe fæhðe moton mid beran
kinsmen, who feud must with bear
‘and if man charges a man in holy orders with enmity and
says that he wanted to kill him [...] let the charged one clear
himself with his kinsmen, who must bear the feud with him’
(COLAW3 5.2)
(3.4.29) Leofan men, we motan swyðe wærlice on ælce wisan
beloved men, we must very cautiously on each manner
us healdan gyf we us sculan wið deofol gescyldan,
us hold if we us shall against devil shield
‘Beloved men, we must act very cautiously in each way if we
should protect ourselves from the devil’
(COWULF3 114)
(3.4.30) Hwæt þonne hæbbe hæleþa ænig, guma æt þæm gilpe, gif
what then have mortal any, man at the glory, if
hine gegripan mot se eca deað æfter þissum
him grip must the everlasting death after this
worulde?
world
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‘But what profit does a mortal possess in this world’s glory, if
he must be gripped by the everlasting death after this life?
(COMETBOE 11.1)
First of all, it cannot escape anyone’s notice that in the sample the obligee in
the subject position never takes the second person pronoun. As a result, no
example is utterly performative. Nor do I find any uncontroversial directives.
Examples (3.4.26) and (3.4.27) are the best candidates as the necessity, in some
part at least, seems to stem from the speaker. On the other hand, the necessity
in both utterances takes the Christian ethics as a background, which makes it
impossible to say to what extent the speaker is an actual source of the necessity
and to what extent he merely states that the necessity is binding on the
Agonist. Note that in both cases the necessity has a rule-like character due to
the generic subject. A generic subject is a common theme inherent to 19 out of
the 21 deontic necessity examples. Mot is then used to report
third-party-generated necessity whose target is a more or less specified group
of people. The necessity in (3.4.27) seems weaker than that in (3.4.26) on
account of a passive structure being employed in the former. As shown in
Table 22, mot of deontic necessity, when compared with the remaining
occurrences of the verb, boasts a higher proportion of main verb complements
which are other than active verbs (6 out of 21 take non-activity/passive verb
complements). This is a factor which weakens the overall force of the necessity
of mot.
The other examples, (3.4.28) through (3.4.30) as well as (3.4.25), rank
among deontic statements, the speakers find it appropriate to report that a state
of necessity exists, thereby considerably diminishing the subjectivity of these
examples. (3.4.28) is an excerpt from a code of law where the speaker’s
authority may be a factor, yet subjectivity and the speaker’s involvement are
clearly ruled out. Still, the best paraphrase for this use of mot seems ‘it is
obligatory/absolutely essential that.’ In (3.4.25) God is the Antagonist whose
order/recommendation is shown to affect God’s messenger. Here mot is seen to
overlap with sceal (cf. (3.4.24)) in that both can serve to express weaker
deontic necessity. (3.4.29) is an example of what COATES (1983: 35) calls
pseudo-exhortation, the speaker including himself among the Agonists, which
yields we in the subject position. This type commonly finds its way to homilies
(compare 3.2.4.3. and 3.3.4.1.) and is to be treated as an oratory technique
although it is more subjective than, say, (3.4.28) which exemplifies a legal
necessity. Mot in the last example, i.e. (3.4.30), which is taken from poetry,
approximates to example (3.3.20) where the necessity conveyed by sceal is
a force of inevitability. As noted with reference to (3.3.20), such examples are
devoid of any subjectivity whatsoever. Nevertheless, two points are noteworthy
in connection with (3.4.30): 1), (3.4.30) is another case of the encroachment of
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mot upon the meaning of sceal, which is critical to the process of displacing
shall by must in the function of an exponent of deontic necessity in later
English (cf. WARNER 1993; TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005), 2) although no
far-reaching conclusions are entitled to follow from just one example in the
sample, it could be argued that, much as in the case of sceal (cf. 3.3.4.1), the
cline of deontic necessity in its periphery verges on more general PE necessity.
A force of inevitability, as in (3.4.30), derives from no particular source and,
therefore, could be described as part of a generally accepted state of affairs,
which is, by definition, a preliminary condition of general PE necessity (cf. van
der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN 1988: 80—81).
Having taken a look at the cline of the deontic necessity of mot, we follow
the routine procedure and cast the examples discussed against the parameters
indicating the gradience of the deontic necessity. The selection and order of the
parameters does not diverge from those in the case of sceal (cf. 3.3.4.1) and
will not be repeated here. The resultant matrix follows in Figure 18.
Seminal to the matrix of mot is a resemblance that it bears to that of agan
(compare Figure 12), which is to be linked with the fact that both verbs are
clearly beginners in Old English when it comes to expressing deontic necessity.
As is the case with agan, or even more obviously so, the cline of mot has an
empty core. There are no strongly subjective cases with necessity leveled at the
Agonist hidden under the second person pronoun. With the notable exception
of (3.4.30), all the examples flock toward the skirt of the cline. Although the
particular skirt examples vary in the details of their ability to respond to the
features ranging from (c) to (g), the stability of the skirt pivots on features d),
i.e. verb is agentive and (f), i.e. controller subject, being almost unwaveringly
embraced. Also, the force of deontic necessity alternates between stronger and
weaker, features (e) and (g) respectively, the latter being predominately the
case. Such alternation, or, to be more precise, movement along a continuum
from strong to weak necessity, can also be seen in the case of sceal, with
a proviso that sceal shows preference for strong necessity (cf. 3.3.4.1). The
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a b c d e f g h i
(3.4.26) – ? ? + – + + – –
(3.4.28) – – + + + + – – –
(3.4.27) – – ? – – + + – –
(3.4.29) – – ? + – + + – –
(3.4.25) – – – + – + + – –
(3.4.30) – – – + – ? – – +
strong necessity/subjectivity weak necessity/subjectivity
(core) (periphery)
Figure 18. Matrix to show gradience of deontic necessity of mot
already mentioned example (3.4.30) belongs in the periphery of the cline. It is,
at the same time, the sole instance whose force of necessity is best described in
terms of feature (i), i.e. paraphrasable by ‘it is inevitable that.’ Another aspect
of exceptionality inherent to (3.4.30) is that the subject (death) is only to be
treated as animate on account of it being personalized. In other words, the
“death” is ascribed human qualities and is therefore an agent in the sentence. It
cannot go unnoticed in this context that mot in my sample is only attested with
narrow scope (see feature (h) in Figure 18), another clue testifying to relatively
short experience of mot with deontic necessity. Interestingly enough, wide
scope which is operative with mot of permission and prohibition (see examples
(3.4.11) and (3.4.22)) does not seem to be automatically projected upon mot of
deontic necessity. TRAUGOTT and DASHER’S (2005: 126) comment on the subject
is that “earlier ME examples of obligation mot- involve an obligee that is
human or at least a body-part (e.g. heart, hand, metonymically used for some
aspect of human cognition or behavior), but in the later ME period the deontic
mot- is extended to contexts in which the obligee is inanimate.”
It has been brought up on a number of occasions (cf. TELLIER 1962; SOLO
1977; WARNER 1993; TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005 among others) that the
meaning of deontic necessity is a late OE development in the semantics of mot.
The matrix in Figure 18 supports the viability of the notion that deontic
necessity is a novelty in the case of mot. There are no subjective core examples
or wide scope examples, which emerge only after long-standing flirtation of
a pre-modal with deontic necessity. Instead, the matrix presents us with densely
populated skirt which is somewhat periphery-oriented by virtue of weaker
necessity being abundantly represented. This picture perfectly matches my
observation made above while commenting on the cline examples, that with
mot we usually observe deontic necessity which the non-Antagonist speaker
communicates to the Agonist, e.g. (3.4.26). The Agonist tends to be generic
and the main verb complement demands that they be an agent.
The cline of necessity aside, I would like to underscore two infrequent uses
of deontic necessity mot, which has a bearing on the holistic picture of mot as
a pre-modal of deontic necessity. The first of them, illustrated in (3.4.31), is to
be seen in a wider framework of redundant modality. Mot of deontic necessity
joins the likes of sceal (cf. 3.3.5) and mot of permission (cf. 3.4.3.1) and of
prohibition (cf. 3.4.3.2) in that it is capable of repeating the necessity which is
already communicated in the main clause by means of the passive structure
wæs beboden:
(3.4.31) Hym wæs beboden, on heora gehealdsumnyssum on Moyses
them was ordered, on their keeping on Moses’
lage, þæt hy moston lufian heora agene frynd, and hatian
law, that they must love their own friend, and hate
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heora fynd;
their enemy
‘In the keeping of Moses’ law, they were ordered to love their
friend and hate their enemy’
(COAELHOM 80)
The other use of mot is linked with the juxtaposition of the verb with adverb
nede(s)/nyde(s) meaning ‘necessarily,’ which in my sample appears once:
(3.4.32) ða gerædde seo cyng 7 his witan     eallum þeodscipe
then advised the   king and his council all nation
to þearfe. þeah hit him eallum lað wære. þæt man
to advantage, though it to-them all loath were, that man
nyde moste þam here gafol gyldan.
necessarily must the enemy tribute pay
‘Then advised the king and his council for the advantage of
all the nation, though they were all loath to do it, that they
must needs bribe the enemy with a tribute.’
(COCHROE4 1006.41)
Apparently, nyde serves to enhance the deontic necessity conveyed by moste
where the pre-modal by itself would be insufficient, which results in a modally
harmonic combination in the sense of LYONS (1977: 807) or HOYE (1997).
According to MOLENCKI (2003), a factor behind the genesis of the construction
may be that, as mot is developing the meaning of deontic necessity in late Old
English, the presence of nede(s) helps disambiguate a necessity reading. As
a matter of fact, the juxtaposition has been investigated at length by MOLENCKI
(2003) and TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005). MOLENCKI (2003) probes into the
history of must needs in English, especially into the emergence of the
epistemic meaning of the structure, which is derived from the adverb in the late
fourteenth century. Importantly, the construction remains harmonic in the
sphere of epistemicity as mot follows nede(s) and develops the meaning of
certainty. Subsequently, the structure becomes a fixed phrase until its demise in
the nineteenth century. The point made by TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005)
concerns the role of nede(s) in the promotion of the past form most- to present
tense use. Basing their study on the ME part of the Helsinki Corpus data,
TRAUGOTT and DASHER (2005: 135) observe that after the year 1420 nede is
coupled exclusively with most-. Working on the same data, MOLENCKI (2003:
75) says that “the ratio of mot(e) nedes vs. most(e) nedes is 10: 18.” The
appearance of obligative nede(s) with past most- successfully blocks the
assumption that a meaning of permission in the past is intended. Rather, one is
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likely to interpret the sequence as implying a state of deontic necessity which,
owing to the force of nede(s), holds in the present.
Finally, there are five instances of mot in my sample with an available
epistemic reading, one of which follows in (3.4.33):
(3.4.33) [me mæig]... 7 raðe æfter ðam, gif hit mot
one may and quickly after that, if it may
gewiderian, mederan settan,
be-fine-weather, madder sow
‘One may quickly afterwards, if the weather may be fine,
plant madder’
(COLAW4 12)
It is commonly agreed that the OE pre-modals do not have any strong leaning
toward epistemic meanings and, as a result, undisputable epistemic cases prove
difficult to find (cf. GOOSSENS 1982; TRAUGOTT 1989; DENISON 1993; WARNER
1993). Cases, including (3.4.33), that are pointed to as exponents of
epistemicity usually have a non-epistemic interpretation as well. TRAUGOTT and
DASHER (2005: 130), while calling (3.4.33) one of a class of “impersonal
constructions in which there is no controlling subject,” describe it as
a convenient environment for the advent of epistemicity of mot. A development
from root/PE possibility to epistemic possibility is predicted by BYBEE, PERKINS
and PAGLIUCA (1994), as shown in Figure 17. (3.4.33) follows this path, that is
to say, if the hearer is unable to imagine any enabler responsible for causing
the weather to be fine, they are likely to believe that the possibility of the fine
weather follows as the speaker’s judgment, hence epistemic possibility.
3.4.6. Indeterminacy between permission and deontic necessity
An affirmative clause containing mot can be indeterminate between a reading
of permission and deontic necessity. Such indeterminacy is a case of ambiguity
à la COATES (1983) as a decision must be made which meaning is intended.
I have identified four such examples in my sample, two of which are given
below:
(3.4.34) gif he ne wille his wæpenu sellan, þonne mot he feohtan
if he not want his weapon give, then must he fight
on hine.
against him
(permission) ‘If he does not want to give his weapon, then he
may fight against him’
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(deontic necessity) ‘If he does not want to give his weapon,
then he must fight against him’
(COLAW2 42.4)
(3.4.35) And gif ungefullod cild færlice bið gebroht to þam
and if non-baptized child suddenly is brought to the
mæssepreost, þæt he hit mot fullian sona mid ofste, þæt
priest, which he hit must baptize soon with haste, that
hit ne swelte hæðen.
it not die heathen
(permission) ‘If unexpectedly a non-baptized child is brought
to a priest, he may baptize him in haste so that it would not
die pagan’
(deontic necessity) ‘If unexpectedly a non-baptized child is
brought to a priest, he must baptize him in haste so that it
would not die pagan’
(COAELET4 71)
ONO (1958: 66) wrestles with a similar case of ambiguity encountered in
Beowulf and, having adduced contradictory translations by various interpreters,
concludes that “whatever the author’s intention may have been, the meaning of
the Old English *motan may be said to be somewhat ambiguous in that it
cannot be determined by context alone.”
3.4.7. Summary of mot
The above sections have demonstrated that mot lies at the heart of the present
study in that it shows relevance for the semantic areas of permission and deontic
necessity. What is important is that these two readings are responsible for 85.3
per cent of the instances of the verb in the sample (cf. Table 20). With all the
meanings conveyed by mot in the sample analyzed, it is possible to reconstruct
the semantic development of the verb and fit it onto the path of possibility shown
in Figure 3 and Figure 17. At the same time, mot, as the only pre-modal,
succeeds in stepping beyond mere possibility onto the path of necessity in that it
becomes available to deontic necessity. Quantitatively, it is permission that
dominates, a conclusion that I share with GOOSSENS (1987b). The number of the
deontic necessity examples is roughly equivalent to that of the PI/PE possibility
examples, which reflects the fact that, from the diachronic perspective, the PI
possibility of mot is on the decline while the deontic necessity is only starting to
expand. With the permission and deontic necessity of mot obviously put in the
spotlight, I have contrasted the two types of the occurrences of the verb in terms
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of such parameters as subjectivity, performativity and scope. Mot of permission,
having a long standing tradition in Old English, is shown to be familiar with
subjective and performative contexts as well as with wide scope on occasion. An
interesting observation is that the modal experience which mot gains in the field
of permission does not have much, if any, bearing upon mot of deontic necessity.
In other words, mot of deontic necessity begins its modal development anew.
Diagnostic of an early phase of the development is the fact that the occurrences
of mot of deontic necessity are attested with mostly weakly subjective and
non-performative contexts and narrow scope only.
3.5. Mæg
Mæg merits inclusion in the present study mainly as a contender of mot for the
meaning of permission. To a large extent, the evolution of mæg/may in English
tells the story of how the verb gradually encroaches more and more upon the
territory of permission, formerly occupied by mot/must (cf. Table 20). In
Present-Day English, as made transparent by COATES (1983: 139), permission is
the core of the non-epistemic meaning of may, yet in Old English the
permission of mæg is usually approached with caution, if not hesitation. B&T
s.v. magan adduces four meanings of mæg, the fourth one being specified as
‘may (because a thing is permissible or lawful, because there is sufficient
cause).’ Both OED and VISSER (1963—1973), which offer a diachronic
approach unlike B&T, illustrate the sense of permission of may with OE
examples, yet, there is no denying that considerably more such examples are to
be found from Middle English onwards. TELLIER (1962) consistently stresses
the fact that in OE mæg and mot converge in the notion of possibility, the
difference being that the possibility of mæg is subject-internally conditioned,
which amounts to ability, whereas the possibility of mot has a motivation
external to the subject, hence the meaning of PE possibility and permission. If
nothing seems to threaten the viability of this system in the language of
Boewulf, the first cracks are noticed by TELLIER (1962: 118) in the prose of
Ælfric in the tenth century. It is when mæg starts to appear in a subordinate
clause which is a complement of the verb unnan, as in TELLIER’S (1962)
example:
(3.5.1) Hyre ge-uþe þa se ælmihtiga wealdend þæt heo untrume
her granted then the almighty lord that she infirm
menn mihte gehælan
men might heal
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It was granted to her by the Almighty Lord that she could
heal infirm people’
(Ainsi II. 128.)
Since the meaning of unnan, ‘to grant, give’ is a suggestion that it is the
authority of God that stands behind the subject of mihte’s ability to heal, one is
inclined to infer PE possibility, if not permission, as the most likely reading of
mihte in this case. In 3.4.3.1 I discuss the use of mot in the same environment,
mot constituting a more natural choice as a pre-modal following unnan (cf.
GOOSSENS 1987b). Despite these occasions on which mæg is seen to oust mot
in Old English, it is not until the thirteenth century that mot of permission
develops considerable frequency. As TELLIER (1962: 147) points out, “de fait
MAI a souvent le sens «permission» qui est justement bien attesté dans une?
uvre comme l’Ancrene Riwle.” [in fact, MAI often has the meaning of
permission well attested in a work such as Ancrene Riwle — J.N.]. That the
frequency of the permission of may subsequently grows apace can be gathered
from KAKIETEK’S (1972) research on Shakespearean use of the modals where
this meaning of may figures prominently alongside ability and epistemic
possibility.
Turning back to the views on the OE permission of mæg, one could invoke
KRZYSZPIEŃ (1980: 51) who, before embarking on an investigation into the
employment of mæg as a subjunctive marker, says that the verb “expressed
either ability which was not dependent on outward conditions, or objective
possibility, or, perhaps, permission.” The most detailed treatments of the
semantics of mæg are offered by GOOSSENS (1987b) and KYTÖ (1991). Both are
corpus-based studies. As with mot, GOOSSENS (1987b) works on a sample of
100 examples of mæg taken from the language of Ælfric with a view to
identifying the links between particular meanings of mæg and, thus establishing
a path of the semantic evolution of the verb. In the OE and ME part of her
research, KYTÖ (1991) focuses on the syntactic and semantic rivalry between
cann and mæg. With the aid of the Helsinki Corpus, she probes into the
parallel shift of cann toward general ability and of mæg from ability toward
neutral (PE in our notation) possibility. Also, an epistemic development of mæg
is looked into. So is the pace at which both verbs lose nominal complements
thereby accelerating the process whereby cann and mæg grammaticalize into
auxiliaries.
The semantic path traveled by mæg to a large extent coincides with that of
mot. The original Indo-European semantics inherited by mæg makes it a verb
of ability/PI possibility which goes in the direction of PE and deontic
possibility. OED and PROKOSCH (1939) point to the Teutonic root *mag- ‘to be
able or powerful’ as responsible for the meaning and shape of mæg. This root
is also visible in the OE noun meaht ‘might, power’ and its PDE continuation
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might. According to PROKOSCH (1939: 193), among the Indo-European cognates
of *mag- there are Old Slavic mogą (Polish móc), Lithuanian magóti ‘be
helpful’ and Greek µήχοςo ‘contrivance.’ In the Germanic branch we find
Gothic mag, Old Norse ma–, Old Saxom mag and Old High German mag. In
Gothic the earlier notion of physical ability in mag is seen to have expanded
into both PI and PE possibility. TELLIER (1962: 33) says that the Gothic verb
“est employé avec toutes les nuances possibles et imaginables de la notion de
«pouvoir»: soit capacité physique ou intellectuelle inhérente au sujet ; soit
éventualité, possibilité, circonstances extérieures (= MOTAN); soit permission”
[is used with all the possible and imaginable shades of the notion of pouvoir
such as physical or intellectual ability of the subject, possibility, external
circumstances (=MOTAN), permission — trans. J.N.]. As regards mag with
a sense of permission, TELLIER (1962) identifies only one uncontroversial
example in Wulfila:
(3.5.2)a Ni magt auk ju anamais fauragaggja wisan.
(Lk 16.2.)
which in the West Saxon Gospels is also rendered by means of mæg:
(3.5.2)b agyf þine scire, ne miht þu lencg tunscire
hand-over thy farm, not may thou longer farm
bewitan
administer
‘Hand over your farm, you may administer over it no longer’
(COWSGOSP 16.2.)
BYBEE, PERKINS and PAGLIUCA (1994: 190) remark that the development of
mag/mæg from physical ability to general ability/PI possibility and further to
PE and epistemic possibility in the Germanic languages is not unparalleled by
similar developments in other languages. They adduce Latin *potere/possum ‘to
be able’ originating in potens ‘strong, powerful,’ whose French and Spanish
cognates pouvoir and poder stand for PE and epistemic possibility. The
particular stages attained by mæg in its semantic evolution in Old English
proceed in accordance with the order shown in Figure 17. The details,
mechanisms and motivations behind the progression are handled in 3.4, 3.4.4,
and 3.4.5 using the example of mot and need not be repeated here.
The sample to be analyzed in the following sections consists of 167
examples of mæg obtained from the following texts in the OE part of the
Helsinki Corpus: Ælfric Catholic Homilies II, A Homily for the Sixth (or
Fourth) Sunday after Epiphany, The Blickling Homilies, Alfred’s Introduction
to Laws, The Benedictine Rule, The Anglo Saxon Chronicle MS A and E, and
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Genesis. The corpus attained contains 79 919 words. Tentative scrutiny of the
semantics of mæg in the sample is demonstrated in Table 23. The premises
adopted here invite comparisons with those underlying GOOSSENS’S (1987b)
approach to the meanings of mæg. He treats possibility as a common
denominator in the semantics of the verb, a variable being the source of
possibility. The source can be subject-internal, subject-external or
indeterminate between the two. Thus, there are the following correspondences
between GOOSSENS’S (1987b) division and mine: internal possibility — PI
possibility, internal/external possibility — PI/PE possibility and external
possibility — PE possibility/permission. I have singled out the three permission
examples, questionable as they may be, as they are, after all, the raison d’être
of the discussion of mæg in this study. Lack of any separate treatment of
epistemic possibility by GOOSSENS (1987b) also stems from the absence of any
uncontroversial instances. Since fuzziness of modal meanings is one of the
theoretical pillars of this undertaking, I have reserved a separate column in
Table 23 for the instances where epistemic possibility seems to prevail. The
following sections offer a close look at some of the examples from the sample
as well as at crucial implications of their appearance. In 3.5.1 I undertake to
highlight the syntactic patterns of mæg. Having handled the syntactic points,
I proceed to analyze and illustrate the three possibility meanings of mæg in
3.5.2. A separate section, namely 3.5.3, is devoted to the forays of mæg into
the domain of permission.
3.5.1. Syntactic considerations
It is commonly stressed that mæg co-occurs with direct objects, prepositional
objects and can be used intransitively, especially when the meaning involved is
PI possibility (see B&T, OED and VISSER 1963—1973 for examples). DENISON
(1993) adds that þæt-clauses are not out of place as complements of mæg. That
all such patterns, which are indicative of main verb behavior, are the exception
rather than the norm is clear from the frequency of their occurrence. KYTÖ’S
(1991: 145) research shows that mæg takes main verb characteristics in 0.8 per
cent of cases in the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus. In my sample I find only
one example of an NP complement and one case of a prepositional
complement after mæg, consider examples (3.5.3) and (3.5.4) respectively:
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Meaning
Pre-modal
PI
possibility
PI/PE
possibility
PE
possibility
Permission
Epistemic
possibility
Total
mæg 67
(40.2%)
36
(21.5%)
56
(33.5%)
3
(1.8%)
5
(3%)
167
(100%)
Table 23. Distribution of meanings of mæg
(3.5.3) þæt drihten, þe ealle þing mæg and ealra þinga wylt,
that lord, who all thing may and all thing wants,
gehæle þone untruman ... broðor.
heal that infirm brother
‘so that Lord, who can do anything and who is willing to do
anything, would heal the infirm brother’
(COBENRUL 28.15)
(3.5.4) hie hindan ofridan ne meahte ær hie on þam
them from-behind overtake not might before they on that
fæstene wæron, þær him mon to ne meahte;
fortress were, where them man to not might
‘he (King Alfred) could not overtake them before their arrival
in the fortress, where they could not be come at’
(COCHROA2 877.3)
(3.5.3) is a straightforward case of PI possibility where an NP complement is
most naturally expected (cf. VISSER 1963—1973: 501—502). The
complementation of meahte in (3.5.4) raises more controversy. Two
interpretations seem to come into play here; on the one hand, to him in him
mon to ne meahte can be taken a complete prepositional complement in itself,
which brings this use of mæg close to pure PI possibility as in (3.5.3). The
whole clause could then be paraphrased as ‘one was not able to attack/come
against them.’ Alternatively, a feasible interpretation of the complementation of
meahte in (3.5.4) could be supplied on the grounds of a verb of motion to be
logically inserted between the pre-modal and the prepositional phrase.
Structures of the same type with sceal are dealt with in 3.3.3 and with mot in
3.4.1. The latter option has the advantage of allowing a reading of mæg in
terms of PE possibility. Note that external factors, viz. the fact that the
opponents are in the fortress, have a bearing upon King Alfred’s army inability
to attack them. (3.5.4) can be contrasted with (3.5.5) where mæg is followed by
the directional adverbs inn and ut. Unlike the former example, (3.5.5) raises no
doubts as to the need for a verb of motion to be inferred:
(3.5.5) bedicodon syððon þa burh uton þæt nan mann
trenched afterwards the city from-without that no man
ne mihte ne inn ne ut.
not might neither in nor out
‘Afterwards they trenched the city from without, so that no
man could go in or out’
(COCHROE4 1016.45)
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A default syntactic pattern of mæg has the verb followed by a plain
infinitive. A considerable number of instances, eighteen to be precise,
circumvent the practice by conforming to the tenets of postverbal ellipsis. In
3.4.1 it is demonstrated that in elliptical contexts mæg can be conjoined with
mot in a binomial expression, which example (3.4.3) is meant to illustrate. In
the present sample there are two instances that subscribe to this pattern.
Otherwise, mæg occurs on its own with the antecedent verb invariably present
in the preceding context, as in:
(3.5.6) an cyrceweard Yware ... nam þa be nihte eall þet he mihte.
one churchwarden Yware took then by night all that he might
‘a churchwarden, whose name was Yware, ...took away by
night all that he could,
(COCHROE4 1070.17)
3.5.2. Mæg with the sense of PI, PE and epistemic possibility
As can be seen in Table 23, the PI possibility of mæg is abundantly
represented. The 67 examples make up the largest semantically uniform group
among the instances in the sample. In accordance with BYBEE, PERKINS and
PAGLIUCA’S (1994) scheme, PI possibility of mæg in these examples stands for
general capacity residing in the agent/subject. This capacity develops out of
physical ability due to bleaching of the physical aspect (cf. 3.4). This type is
illustrated in (3.5.7) below:
(3.5.7) oððe hwa is swa heardheort þæt ne mæg wepan swylces
or who is so hardhearted that not may weep of-such
ungelimpes?
misfortune
‘or who is so hardhearted as not to weep at such misfortune?’
(COCHROE4 1086.16)
It can be noticed that the feature of hard-heartedness is an aspect of the
subject’s psychological construction rather than of his or her physicality. The
PI possibility of mæg does not seem then to be limited to any particular kind of
the subject’s capacity.
Much as in the case of mot, bleaching of PI possibility continues to the
extent that the role of the subject-internal factors as the enabler is gradually
taken over by conditions outside the subject. A major difference between the
development of mot and mæg is that in the latter case the shift can be actually
observed to be taking place in Old English. Compare (3.5.8) and (3.5.9):
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(3.5.8) forðon þe nan wyrhta ne mæg god weorc wyrcean for
because no worker not may good work perform before
Gode buton lufon 7 geleafan.
God but love and faith
‘because no worker can perform any good work before God
without love and faith’
(COBLICK 70)
(3.5.9) Hwæt we nu gehyraþ þæt we magon mid þære soðan
what we now hear that we may with that true
hreowe ece blisse geearnian.
penitence eternal bliss earn
‘we have now heard that we can earn eternal bliss with true
penitence’
(COBLICK 197)
It seems that the meaning of mæg in (3.5.8) marries PI and PE possibility
whereas mæg in (3.5.9) is primarily devoted to expressing PE possibility. In
the context of (3.5.8), both subject-internal and subject-external enabling
conditions are more or less equally feasible. On the one hand, it follows from
the constitution of the human being that he or she is not able to perform any
good work for God except for that performed by means of love and faith. On
the other hand, one may take (3.5.8) to mean that in the God-created reality
it is impossible for the human being to achieve any good but with the help of
love and faith. The two readings coexist in a state of merger in that one does
not preclude the other and vice versa. The possibility in example (3.5.9) is
determined by the subject-external system of penitence and reward. I have
included examples (3.5.8) and (3.5.9) in the categories PI/PE possibility and
PE possibility repectively in Table 23. They serve to show that the meaning
of mæg proceeds from PI through PE possibility until it verges on
permission.
A final point in this section is concerned with the epistemic possibility of
mæg. It has been pointed out by GOOSSENS (1982), KYTÖ (1991), and WARNER
(1993) that the presence of the adverb eaþe ‘easily’ often helps reinforce the
epistemic force of mæg. Among the five epistemic examples in my sample,
mæg is paired with eaþe twice. It is GOOSSENS (1982: 77—78) who voices the
observation that mæg stops short of expressing epistemicity without some
contextual aid. In fact, in the five epistemic instances, a PE possibility
interpretation must be taken into account. Overall, the number of my epistemic
examples in percentage terms, namely three per cent, equals the figures
obtained by KYTÖ (1991: 153) from her research based on the Helsinki Corpus.
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3.5.3. Mæg with the sense of permission
The inference-based mechanism responsible for the specialization of PE
possibility to permission is discussed in good detail in 3.4.3. The same
mechanism can be seen at work in the case of mæg. The following examples
are the three cases of mæg which I have assigned to the permission category in
Table 23:
(3.5.10) þonne wæs se Halga Gast ahafen ofer þa godes
therefore was the Holy Ghost raised over the God’s
leorneras... þæt hie mihton þurh þa gife oþerra manna
disciples that they might through the gifts other men’s
synna adilegian,
sins blot-out
‘therefore the Holy Ghost came upon the disciples of God
[...] so that they might, through that gift, blot out other men’s
sins’
(COBLICK 65)
(3.5.11) þæt gehwa to gedreoge on þæm lytlum fæce gan mæge,
that everyone to relief in that short period go may
‘so that everyone might relieve themselves in that short
period’
(COBENRUL 8.10)
(3.5.12) God secþ þa clænan heortan him on to eardienne;
God seeks the clean heart him on to dwell;
þonne ne mæg þæt Godes templ beon besmiten,
therefore not may that God’s temple be defiled
‘God seeks a pure heart to dwell therein, therefore God’s
temple may not be defiled’
(COBLICK 126)
With much probability, it is with such examples of mæg in mind that GOOSSENS
(1987b: 221) says that “as a rule we get no permission readings (the
involvement of some kind of authority as an enabling factor is at best an
overtone in a few instances).” What should not be missed, however, is that an
overtone of permission, or we might say, an inference of permission varies
from context to context ranging from rather weak to salient. The arrangement
of the examples (3.5.10) through (3.5.12) shows the increasing intensity of the
inference. In (3.5.10) a slight sense of permission emerges alongside
a combination of PI and PE possibility. PI possibility follows from the fact that
the disciples became endowed with an ability to absolve sins. At the same
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time, the endowment occurs as a result of the intervention of the Holy Ghost,
that is to say, the Holy Ghost made it possible for the disciples to absolve sins.
Given the authority of the enabler, the establishment of the possibility may be
interpreted as an act of permission granting. (3.5.11) engenders an environment
with a more visible sense of permission. The example is an excerpt from the
rules of night prayers. Considering the instructive nature of the text, an idea of
permission prevails over a general PE possibility reading. Finally, it seems that
the only interpretation which example (3.5.12) yields is one in terms negated
permission. Note that (3.5.12) is a negative sentence which contains a passive
structure and an inanimate subject. It is one of GOOSSENS’S (1987b: 222)
observations that passive structures and inanimate subjects with mæg “clearly
favor an external reading.” In the homiletic context of (3.5.12), the external
factor is to be associated with the religious doctrine, hence the meaning of
negated permission, viz. prohibition.
3.5.4. Summary of mæg
Admittedly, the reservations held by scholars about the meaning of permission
in the case of mæg find enough justification in the corpus data. Only three
permission cases (1.8 per cent) in a 167 example sample clearly demonstrate
that this meaning plays hardly any role in the semantics of the verb. To say
then that mæg expresses permission in Old English would equal stretching
reality a little. The permission of mæg arises only as an invited inference which
has not been generalized yet. It typically takes a context of PE possibility in
which an Antagonist other than objective external circumstances is conceivable.
The Antagonist, be it a person of authority or an accepted set of rules, becomes
an enabler of the action. As it happens, with one exception, in none of the
examples in the sample the inference of permission is salient enough to occur
independently of a more expected PE or/and PI possibility reading. The above
research indicates that mæg remains a verb largely at the disposal of PI and PE
possibility in Old English yet.
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11 — Expressing...
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Up to now I have been concerned solely with the expression of necessity and
permission by the predecessors of the PDE modals. It would be a fallacy,
however, to assume that these meanings do not extend beyond the pre-modals.
In this chapter I aim to review other verbs that share the semantics of PI, PE
necessity, permission and prohibition with the verbs discussed so far. What is
common to these verbs is that they are “»performative« (»illocutionary«) verbs:
verbs which under specific conditions can be used [...] to have the force of
doing” (TRAUGOTT and DASHER 2005: 190). The specific conditions meant are
“(typically) first person present tense, indicative, active” (TRAUGOTT and
DASHER 2005). As further pointed out by SEARLE (1976; 1979) and TRAUGOTT
and DASHER (2005), the performative nature of the lexical verbs of necessity,
permission and prohibition, brings them close to modals in their performative
use.
Considering that a possible list of OE verbs which to a lesser or greater extent
encroach upon the domain of PI and PE necessity would be difficult to exhaust,
I have confined the list to those verbs which recognize PI and/or PE necessity
as their unquestionably dominant use. Six verbs that are thus included here are
hatan, bebeodan, beodan, neodian, behofian, and beþurfan. The number of the
occurrences of each verb in the DOE corpus has been used to calculate the
incidence of each verb per 100 000 words. The normalized frequencies of the 6
verbs, thus obtained, are given in Table 24 along with the total number the
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occurrences of the verbs retrieved from the DOE Corpus. Such a procedure,
besides having an obvious advantage of comparing the usefulness of the
particular verbs, makes it possible to cast the frequency of these six verbs and
the pre-modals of PI and PE necessity in a comparative framework. Among the
six verbs, hatan can be seen to run significantly ahead of all the others if we
consult the frequencies in Table 24. The second most frequent verb bebeodan
fails to achieve half as good frequency as hatan. Nevertheless, even the
normalized frequency of hatan, which amounts to 57.6, is eclipsed by that of
the most common pre-modal of deontic necessity, i.e. sceal, which equals
340.3 (cf. Table 4). If the uses of sceal other than necessity related are not
taken into account (cf. Table 15 and Table 17), we arrive at the normalized
frequency of the sense of PE necessity of sceal which equals 278.0, a number
which guarantees the status of sceal as the most commonly used verb of
necessity in Old English. The normalized frequencies of þearf and agan (to)
infinitive, 5.0 and 1.2 respectively, would place the verbs at the bottom of the
scale in Table 24. The former number is decreased to 4.8 as 96.2 per cent of
the occurrences of þearf are necessity related (cf. 3.2.1 and Table 1). Note that
verbs of PE necessity (sceal, hatan, bebeodan) regularly recur much more
often than verbs associated with PI necessity (behofian, beþurfan, also þearf).
4.1.1. Hatan
OE hatan, a strong verb of Class 7, is a continuation of PIE *kei?- ‘to set in
motion,’ which in proto-Germanic takes the form of *hait- ‘to call, summon,’
as we learn from WATKINS (ed. 2000). The Germanic cognates such as Gothic
haitan, Old Saxon he–tan, Old Norse heita, Old High German heizan, heizzan
(German heissen), Old Frisian hêta, are regularly recorded with the sense ‘to
name, call’ (cf. B&T and OED). The meaning ‘to bid, command,’ already
present in the Gothic form, seems to have arisen from the active use of the
verb ‘to summon, to be summoned’ rather than from a stative idea ‘ to name,
to be named.’ According to B&T, in Old English there are two verbs hatan:
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Verb N. F. Total number of occurrences
hatan 57.6 3049
bebeodan 21.3 1126
beodan 12.6 665
neodian 8.6 455
behofian 2.6 136
beþurfan 2.2 118
Table 24. Frequency of lexical verbs of PI and PE necessity
one, that used with the meaning 1) ‘to bid, order, command,’ 2) ‘to promise,
vow,’ 3) ‘to call, name, give a name to,’ is a cognate of Gothic haitan whereas
the other, used with the meaning ‘to be called or named, have as a name,’
corresponds to Gothic haitada ‘I am called.’ Subsequently, both verbs merge
into highte in the times of Chaucer.
An insightful study of hatan is undertaken by NAGUCKA (1980) who, unlike
B&T, chooses to talk about one verb hatan and distinguishes between its two
senses 1) ‘to call, name’ and 2) ‘to order, bid, command.’ She, accordingly,
refers to the verb as hatan1 when it is used with the former meaning and as
hatan2 when it depends on the latter meaning for interpretation. A central claim
of NAGUCKA’S (1980: 37—38) paper is that the two senses of hatan cohere in
that with either sense involved the verb is inherently causative and, as such,
follows the same deep structure pattern:
subject NP — causative V hatan — direct object NP — object
complement NP
The major difference is that hatan1 assigns stative meaning to the object
complement NP whereas hatan2, besides turning the object complement NP
into an uninflected infinitive in the surface structure, bestows an active
component upon it. While any further investigation into hatan1 falls outside the
scope of this monograph, the relevant occurrences shown in Table 24 are those
of hatan2 only (henceforth hatan). The following examples are illustrative of
the contexts with hatan in the corpus:
(4.1) se wallenda [...] heht his þegnas hine selfne beran ongean
the ruler bade his servants him self bear toward
þæm fyre 7 asettan,
the fire and lay
‘the ruler ordered his servants to carry him toward the fire and
lay him down,’
(Bede 2 7.118.6)
(4.2) Ic þe halsige 7 beode 7 hate þæt þu gode
I thee entreat and order and command that thou to-god
ælmihtigum hyrsumige
almighty obey
‘I beg and ask and order you to obey almighty God’
(Conf 10.5 20)
Example (4.1) is in keeping with what NAGUCKA (1980: 33) calls “a typical
pattern: NP hatan NP V (infinitive). The NP subject is obligatorily human [...]
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and so is [...] [in most cases — J.N.] the NP object required by hatan. The
next element that must be used with the verb is the infinitive [...].” The direct
object NP is rendered in the accusative form and the infinitive is uninflected,
which makes hatan naturally belong in the class of verbs which require ACI
complementataion, i.e. an accusative NP with an infinitive (cf. CALLAWAY
1913; NAGUCKA 1985; MOLENCKI 1987; 1991 and LOS 1999 for an extensive
study of the origin and application of the ACI in Old English). Building on
LAKOFF (1968), NAGUCKA (1980: 33) further argues that the ACI structure of
hatan is a transformational extension of the þæt-clause complementation,
which one can observe in (4.2).
The meaning of hatan, as evidenced by (4.1) and (4.2), is palpably
engendered within the sphere of deontic necessity, the latter example
illustrating a performative use of the verb. We have to do with a very forceful
necessity generated by the Antagonist (the subject NP) who expressly imposes
it upon the Agonist (the direct object NP in (4.1) and the subject of the
þæt-clause in (4.2)). Ultimately the necessity has the force of a command
leveled at the Agonist. The import of the necessity seems to be underscored in
(4.2) where hatan, is conjoined with another verb of deontic necessity,
bebeodan, (cf. 4.1.2) on the one hand but also with halsian ‘to ask, entreat.’
Halsian, which usually lacks any forceful element in its meaning, takes on an
aspect of gravity and force in the company of bebeodan and hatan. What also
frequently helps reinforce the strength of the deontic necessity of hatan is the
overtly stated difference in the social rank of the Antagonist and Agonist (se
wallenda vs. his þegnas in (4.1). The same point is made by NAGUCKA (1980:
35) when she says that “the authorative character of the subject of hatan [...] is
clearly evident from the context whether immediate or non-immediate.”
Another observation made by NAGUCKA (1980) is that the Agonist may be
unexpressed, which results in a syntactic pattern without the direct object NP
when the identity of the obligee is obvious or of no consequence.
4.1.2. Bebeodan and beodan
If we go further down the scale of frequency presented in Table 24, we stop by
the next two verbs of PE necessity, i.e. bebeodan and beodan. Although both
used with largely the same meaning, they differ markedly when it comes to the
rate of recurrence, bebeodan being nearly twice as popular as beodan in the
DOE Corpus. As might be expected from the similarity of form, both verbs
share the common origin in the PIE root *bheudh- ‘to be aware, to make
aware,’ as noted by WATKINS (ed. 2000). OED points to Sanskrit budh ‘to
present’ and proto-Germanic *beudan ‘to communicate, inform, announce,
proclaim command’ as the subsequent developments of the PIE form while in
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the Slavic branch *bheudh- has a reflex in, for example, Old Church Slavic
bděti and Polish budzić ‘to wake up’ (cf. BAŃKOWSKI 2000 and BORYŚ 2005).
Apart from OE beodan, the proto-Germanic form spawns Gothic biudan, Old
Saxon biodan, Old High German biotan (modern German bieten ‘to offer’),
Old Frisian biada and Old Norse boiða (Swedish bjuda). Bebeodan is one of
a few prefixed derivatives of beodan in Old English (for a review of
forbeodan, another verb derived from beodan, the reader should refer to
4.2.3).13 As a consequence, bebeodan and beodan are both members of Class II
of strong verbs. Curiously enough, out of the two verbs, it is only the less
frequent beodan that continues till Present-Day English. OED cites PDE to bid
as a form which in Late Middle English results from beodan and biddan ‘to
ask’ (PIE *gwhedh- ‘to ask, pray’) merging together. DOE cautions that
already in Old English some forms and uses of beodan and biddan
considerably overlap.
Little differentiated are bebeodan and beodan when it comes to the
meanings they are credited with. The semantic specifications given in B&T to
bebeodan are 1) ‘to command, order,’ 2) ‘to offer, give up, commend,’ 3) ‘to
announce’ whereas with beodan we find 1) ‘to command, bid, order,’ 2) ‘to
announce, proclaim, inspire, bode, threaten,’ 3) ‘to offer, give, grant.’ With the
sense of deontic necessity, which is realized in the ‘to command, order’
specification, clearly taking precedence over the other meanings, it seems
plausible to consider some of the actual uses of the verbs which actualize this
sense:
(4.3) Eadwerd cyning byt ðam gerefum eallum, ðæt ge deman
Edward king commands the reeves all, that you judge
swa rihte domas swa ge rihtoste cunnon,
as just judgments as you most-right can
‘King Edward commands that all reeves should make as just
judgments as they possibly can’
(LawIEw 1)
(4.4) Ne bud þu me na ælmessan to syllan,
not order thou me no alms to give
‘Do not order me to give alms’
(PPs (prose) B8.2.1)
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13 As for the origin of the prefix be-, WATKINS (ed. 2000: 3) notes that it, along with the
preposition bi, be (PDE by), has PIE ambhi- ‘around’ as its source. Be- functions as an intensive
prefix, yet, it may also signal no discernible difference in meaning (cf. B&T) in comparison with
a non-prefixed form.
(4.5) Noe soðlice dyde ealle ða ðing, ðe him God bebead.
Noe indeed did all the things, which him God commanded
‘Indeed Noe did all the things that God ordered him to do’
(Gen 7.5)
On the whole, the same deep structure pattern can be detected with both verbs:
subject NP — bebeodan/beodan — indirect object NP — direct object
NP
which has a number of surface realizations. The subject NP in the nominative
remains a constant element when the sentence is active. A preferred
complementation type in the case of beodan is the indirect object NP in the
dative followed by the direct object which takes the shape of a þæt-clause, as
in (4.3) (cf. MOLENCKI 1991 who, following WARNER 1982 and THRÁINSSON
1979, argues in favor of treating OE complement clauses as NPs). Other
possibilities include the dative NP ensued by the inflected or bare infinitive
((4.4) is illustrative of the former, more frequent, option) as well as the direct
object rendered as an NP in the accusative.14 To be sure, passive sentences with
beodan are rather uncommon. All these options are also available to bebeodan
and in (4.5), for instance, bebeodan comes in a relative clause where the
relative particle ðe stands for the direct object NP ealle ða ðing in the main
clause. Unlike beodan, the lion’s share of the attestations of bebeodan are
traceable to passive structures. Example (3.4.31) in section 3.4.5 fits into this
category. Note that a passive transformation involves the shift of function of the
þæt-clause from the direct object in an active sentence to the subject, as in
(3.4.31).
Generally, the deontic necessity encoded in the meaning of bebeodan and
beodan seems no less obvious than that of hatan. It might be argued that the
necessity of beodan is somewhat weaker than hatan and bebeodan, especially
since the merging process of this verb with biddan is slowly underway thereby
causing beodan to shade into a more reconciliatory sense of ‘asking,’
‘entreating.’ Yet, the prototypical examples above show no trace of that. All the
examples, with the notable exception of (3.4.31), implicate the animate
Antagonist (the subject NP) and Agonist (the indirect object NP). Much as in
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14 In LOS’S (1999: 167—172) view, OE verbs of deontic necessity, which she calls “verbs of
commanding and permitting,” are consistent in that they make use of two different syntactic and
thematic structures. The syntactic structure like that of beodan, that is, one with a dative indirect
object NP and a direct object is diagnostic of a three argument thematic configuration consisting
of Agent, Recipient and Theme. Conversely, the ACI detected in the case of hatan points to
a two-argument thematic frame made up by Agent and Theme only. The accusative NP and the
infinitive that constitute the ACI are construed as one argument, namely Theme.
the case of hatan, that a given Antagonist should plausibly be a source of
necessity stems from his or her high position in a particular social or religious
state of affairs (consider the king vs. his reeves in (4.3) and God vs. those who
believe in him in (4.4) and (4.5)). In (4.4) it can be noticed that with negation,
it is the necessity that is negated rather than the proposition, hence we have to
do with the meaning ‘do not order me to...’ Lastly, a passive structure with
bebeodan as in (3.4.31) diverges from examples (4.3) through (4.5) by the fact
that the Antagonist does not formally appear although his presence and identity
(God) can be logically gathered from the meaning of the sentence. The absence
of the Antagonist results from the þæt-clause taking over the role of the
subject.
4.1.3. Neodian, behofian, and beþurfan
Due to the lowest number of attestations among the verbs scrutinized in 4.1, as
shown in Table 24, neodian, behofian, and beþurfan will be handled together in
this section. The same three verbs alongside þearf have been lumped together
before by LOUREIRO-PORTO (2003; 2005) in her quest for the semantic
forerunners of PDE need. Despite this semantic affinity, neodian, behofian and
beþurfan are very heterogenous as regards their origin. In what follows then
I aim to focus on each verb in its own right with a view to highlighting some
aspects of their pre-OE past as well as their syntactic and semantic
characteristics.
The entry provided by WATKINS (ed. 2000: 57) for the ultimate predecessor
of OE neodian reads PIE *na–u- ‘death, to be exhausted,’ whose suffixed variant
*nau-ti- goes on to produce proto-Germanic *naudi-. The subsequent fate of
this form in the Germanic languages is somewhat obscure. In the explanation
offered by OED, we learn that in Old English there are two relevant nouns nied
(nyd, ned, also nead) and neod, whose meaning is: nied 1) ‘violence, force,
constraint or compulsion,’ 2) ‘necessity,’ and neod ‘desire, earnestness,
pleasure.’ Both nouns are subject to confusion especially given the fact that the
former exhibits a considerable variation of forms, viz. mutated nied, nyd, ned
vs. unmutated nead, neod. Moreover, the gender of the mutated variants
alternates between feminine and neuter depending on the context. B&T,
however, begs to differ. According to the data given there Old English has
three related nouns stemming from *naudi-: neod (ned, nied, nyd) ‘desire,
eagerness, diligence, earnest endeavour,’ neod (nead) ‘necessity,’ and nid (nead,
ned, neod, nied, nyd), which takes a number of necessity and compulsion
related meanings. In LOUREIRO-PORTO’S (2005) view, each of the three nouns
gives rise to a weak verb derived from it, hence neodian, neadian, and nidan.
As for the meanings of the three verbs as specified by B&T, let me draw on
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part of LOUREIRO-PORTO’S (2005: 117) Table 3.3 which succinctly assembles
the relevant dictionary information:
Nevertheless, considering the common origin of the three nouns in one PIE
root, the semantic relatedness of the three verbs derived from them as well as
their ultimate falling together as neden in Middle English (cf. LOUREIRO-PORTO
2005), a commonly assumed approach (e.g. MOLENCKI 2002, van der AUWERA
and TAEYMANS 2004) is to treat neodian, neadian and nidan as variants of one
verb collectively known as neodian. Interestingly enough, other Germanic
languages, with the exception of Old High German which has nôtjan and
nôten, do not seem to foster such variation. B&T and OED adduce the
following verbs as the cognates of neodian: Gothic nauþjan, Old Saxon
no–dian, Old Frisian nêda, Old Norse neyða.
The most common use of neodian can be exemplified using the following
examples:
(4.6) Ða se Hælend nydde ðone unclænan gast ut
then the Savior needed the unclean ghost out
‘Then he forced the unclean spirit to go out’
(Lk (WSCp) 9.42)
(4.7) Forþon hy nedded se towearda winter, þæt heo stille wundeon
because them needed the coming winter, that they still remain
‘Because the coming winter forced them to remain still’
(Bede 4 1.256.12)
(4.8) Næron þa Iuediscan ne se dyrna læwe þurh God
not-were the Jews nor the secret traitor through God
geneadode to ðam gramlican geþeahte
needed to the cruel thoughts
‘Neither the Jews nor the secret traitor were compelled by God
to the cruel thoughts’
(ÆLS (Exalt of Cross) 165)
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Figure 19. Signification of verbs derived from neod, neod (nead) and nid in B&T (based on
LOUREIRO-PORTO 2005: 117)
neodian ‘to be necessary’
neadian ‘to force, compel, constrain’
neadian, neodian ‘to be necessary’
nidan ‘to force, compel, urge’
Syntactically speaking, neodian emerges as a causative verb which follows
the same deep structure pattern as hatan (cf. 4.1.1), i.e.:
subject NP — causative V neodian — direct object NP — object
complement NP
In an active sentence, the subject is assigned the nominative case, the direct
object NP taking the accusative, which can be seen in examples (4.6) and (4.7).
A major difference between hatan and neodian concerns the surface realization
of the object complement. Apart from expected infinitives, be they bare or
inflected, and þæt-clauses, e.g. (4.7), the object complement can be a preposi-
tional phrase — this is the case in (4.8), which exemplifies a passive structure,
though. MOLENCKI (1991: 122) calls structures with a prepositional phrase
complementing the accusative direct object NP ‘closest’ to PDE complex
transitive constructions. With the options available to the surface manifestations
of the object complement being established, example (4.6) stands out as
seemingly being compatible with none of these options. LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005:
189) categorizes such occurrences of neodian as monotransitive and proceeds to
state that such a syntactic pattern has a bearing on the meaning of the verb, that
is to say, the compelling force conveyed by neodian is strictly physical rather
than social. I reason that, given the presence of directional ut after the direct
object, there are grounds for treating this occurrence like those with the
pre-modals where an infinitive of a verb of motion is logically missing between
the pre-modal and the directional adverb or a prepositional phrase (cf. 3.3.3 and
3.4.1 for example). (4.6) is then, I believe, a complex transitive structure with an
object complement in the form of a formally absent but logically necessary
infinitive of a verb of motion. Although this paragraph is not the proper locus for
the discussion of the semantics of neodian, I would like to add here that the
above syntactic construal of (4.6) paves the way for interpreting the force
involved in social terms as well, besides physical. As LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005:
189) puts it, example (4.6) can be translated as “Then the Savior pushed the
impure spirit out.” Given the missing infinitive, the sentence could be analyzed
as “The Savior ordered/forced verbally the impure spirit to go out.,” the spirit
being, after all, a reasonable creature.
Turning back to syntax, as evidenced by (4.8), neodian is to be found in
passive structures. In such cases, the direct object NP becomes the nominative
subject NP whereas the former subject NP can be either unexpressed or
rendered as an optional PP such as þurh God in (4.8).
As for the semantics of neodian, the contexts presented in examples (4.6)
through (4.8) clearly indicate deontic necessity. Each time there are two
participants, namely the Antagonist (the subject NP in an active sentence) and
Agonist (the direct object NP in an active sentence) who remain engaged in
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a state of hostility due a necessity exerted by the Antagonist and imposed
upon the Agonist. Needless to say, the Agonist typically finds the force
unpleasant yet, as calculated by LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005: 170), in 98 per cent
of cases the necessity must be described as strong. A novelty in comparison
with hatan, bebeodan and beodan, is that the necessity is not to be associated
exclusively with the act of speaking. Note that the deontic necessity inherent
to these verbs is verbally announced and thereby has the force of a command.
The necessity of neodian goes beyond that. As stated above, on the
interpretation of (4.6) preferred by LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005: 189) we get
a physical force involved, or perhaps, a divine power to drive out evil spirits.
In (4.8) the lack of necessity concerns the fact that God created no
circumstances which would make the Jews and the secret traitor foster cruel or
tormenting thoughts. What is worth remarking is that the identity of the
Antagonist (God) in this example is known due to the optional PP (þurh God)
being included, (4.8) qualifying as a passive structure. Finally, we come to
probably the most interesting case, the necessity of neodian in (4.7). Notice
that not only is the Antagonist (se towearda winter) inanimate but also, as
such, unaware of its being a source of any necessity. The necessity exists only
because the Agonist is reported to have experienced it. Summing up, it can be
said that in the above instances no notion of a verbal command seems to be
primarily the case. The deontic necessity of neodian is a diversified and
general obligation, reminiscent of that of sceal. Admittedly, I do not aspire to
have exhausted all the aspects of the meaning of neodian here. A meticulous
reader is again referred to LOUREIRO-PORTO (2005), who goes as far as to
consider very rare cases of PI necessity with neodian.
The other two verbs, namely behofian (PDE behove) and beþurfan seem to
have a less complex past. Behofian, an OE weak verb of Class II, is a form
derived from the noun behof ‘need, use, benefit.’ As we learn from WATKINS
(ed., 2000: 37), the noun itself is part of the Germanic inheritance and has been
reconstructed as proto-Germanic *bi-ho–f ‘that which binds,’ ‘requirement,
obligation.’ *bi-ho–f results from putting together the intensive prefix *bi and
*ho–f-, the latter being a Grimm’s Law-affected continuation of PIE *ko–p-, ‘a
lengthened-grade variant’ (WATKINS, ed., 2000: 37) of PIE *kap- ‘to grasp.’ The
Germanic cognates of behofian are Middle Low German behoven, Middle
Dutch behoeven and Swedish behöva. As for the semantics of OE behofian, the
entry for the verb in B&T reads ‘to have need of, to need, require.’ The other
verb to be covered in this section is beþurfan. As explained in 3.2, beþurfan
formally ranks as a preterite-present verb, a corollary of its genesis being in
attaching the prefix be- to the pre-modal þearf. As the details of the pre-OE
origin and Germanic development of þearf are touched upon in 3.2, there is no
need to repeat them here. This introductory picture of beþurfan will not be full,
however, without invoking what B&T has to say about the meaning of the verb.
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In accordance with the information retrieved from the dictionary, beþurfan
means ‘to need, have need, want, to be in want, to require.’
A more insightful analysis of the syntax and semantics of behofian and
beþurfan will be facilitated by a glance at the typical uses of the verbs:
(4.9) La hwæt, we behofigaþ þæt we usse earan ontynen 7
lo what, we need that we our ears open and
usse heortan to þam godspellican larum
our hearts to the gospel teaching
‘Lo, we need/ought to open our ears and hearts to the gospel’s
teaching’
(HomU 8 (ScraggVerc 2) 102)
(4.10) stundmælum þenian ænig þæt ne behofige biddan ænig þinc.
one-by-one pass any that not need ask any thing
‘Let anything be passed (to one another) so that no one need
ask for anything’
(BenR 38.69.14)
(4.11) þu wast hwæt ic beþearf ærþamþe þe ic bidde.
thou knowest what I need before thee I ask
‘You know what I need before I ask you’
(ArPrGl 1 1 45.33)
The syntactic properties of both verbs are by and large similar. Sentences
with either verb usually subscribe to the following deep structure pattern:
subject NP — behofian/beþurfan — direct object NP
The nominative subject NP seems indispensible with behofian (see ALLEN 1997
and LOUREIRO-PORTO 2005 for arguments against acknowledging impersonal
structures with behofian). If behofian in the surface structure is followed by
a direct object NP, which accounts for 114 out of the 136 occurrences of the
verb, the NP can take a genitive, accusative or dative form. Optionally, the
deep structure direct object can be realized as a þæt-clause (sixteen times, e.g.
(4.9)), an inflected infinitive (four times) or a bare infinitive (two times, e.g.
example (4.10)). Beþurfan exhibits more syntactic variation. The most common
scenario assigns the function of the subject to a nominative NP and that of the
direct object to a genitive or accusative NP. Infrequently, one finds an
extrapolated þæt-clause in the role of the subject and a dative NP as the
complement of the verb. Importantly, beþurfan in the DOE Corpus shows no
compatibility with infinitival complements. To be sure, passive structures are
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not integrated into the set of possible surface realizations of either behofian or
beþurfan in the corpus.
As might be expected, the value ‘to need’ present in B&T’s paraphrase of
the meaning of behofian and beþurfan signals PI necessity. Both verbs are
primarily concerned with the expression of PI necessity. As observable in the
case of þearf (cf. 3.2.4.1), typically, a semantic construal of PI necessity
requires only one participant whose needs are focused on. A force-dynamic
account of PI necessity would invoke the idea of the divided self of the
participant, that is to say, what the participant needs (the Agonist) is confronted
with his or her sense of responsibility, fear, inertia, etc. (the Antagonist).
Canonically, the participant is the subject of behofian and beþurfan, as can be
seen in all the examples above (in 4.10 the subject appears in the preceding
context). The semantic role of the direct object is to shed light on what it is
that the participant needs. Examples (4.9) through (4.11) exemplify different
kinds of internal needs: a religious need in (4.9), lack of a physical need in
(4.10) and an unspecified general need in (4.11). This arrangement is notably
altered when a þæt-clause is the subject of beþurfan. In such a case, it is the
subject clause that stands for what is needed, the participant being identified by
the dative NP. Also, it will be instructive to look again at example (4.9) as
potentially open to a PE necessity interpretation. Witness that the necessity for
Christians to keep their eyes and heart open to God’s teaching does not have to
be viewed only as an internal need but also as an external requirement. This
stands to show that with beþurfan, infrequently as it happens, we find instances
that blend PI and PE necessity as well as ones that are indicative of PE
necessity only (cf. LOUREIRO-PORTO 2005: 196, Table 3.34).
I have selected five verbs that fall into this category: forlætan, lætan,
forbeodan, alysan, and lysan. Inclusion of a given verb has been guaranteed by
the majority of its occurrences centering on the expression of permission or
prohibition. Consequently, I have excluded verbs such as bewerian, in the case
of which the meaning of prohibition verges on marginality or is only
inferential. Table 25 shows the normalized frequencies of the five verbs per
100 000 words in the DOE Corpus as well as the number of their occurrences.
At this point, it seems plausible to compare these frequencies with those of the
two relevant preterite-presents mot and mæg. Obviously, the normalized
frequencies in Table 25 are nowhere near the results obtained for mot and mæg,
i.e. 74.4 and 221.5 respectively (cf. Table 4). These raw numbers, however,
4. Verbs of necessity other than the pre-modals174
undergo significant modification when seen in light of the findings connected
with the distribution of meanings of mot and mæg, as presented in Table 20
and Table 23. With the borderline examples also taken into account, mot
occurs with the meaning of permission/prohibition in 74.3 per cent of cases
whereas mæg takes the same meaning in 1.8 per cent of its occurrences. If
these percentages are cast against the normalized frequencies of the verbs, we
arrive at the normalized frequencies of the permission/prohibition meanings of
mot and mæg, which are 55.3 and 3.0 respectively. Put simply, this is a clear
indication that mot is the single most popular verb of permission/prohibition in
Old English while mæg joins the ranks of verbs of rather mild popularity such
as forbeodan and alyfan.
4.2.1. Forlætan and lætan
The reasons for discussing forlætan and lætan in the same section are three-fold.
They both occupy the position atop in terms of frequency in Table 25, they are
morphologically related and they express permission if not negated. According
to WATKINS (ed., 2000), both verbs go back to the PIE root *le–- ‘to let go,
slacken.’ OED adduces *læt as the proto-Germanic development of the PIE root.
In the case of both forlætan and lætan we find cognates in the Germanic
languages. Thus the forms corresponding to the former are Old Saxon forlátan,
Old High German firlâzan (modern German verlassen) or Old Norse fyrirlata
whereas lætan is related to Gothic le–tan, Old Saxon látan, Old Frisian le–ta, Old
Norse lata and Old High German lâzan (modern German lassen). If the same
roots hint at the kinship of the two verbs, it is in the prefix for of forlætan that
the main morphological difference between the verbs is marked. Forlætan and
lætan belong to Class VII of strong verbs, of which WEŁNA (1996: 72) says that
“originally, this class included verbs with reduplicated preterites” and hence the
Northumbrian preterite forms forleort and leort.
In the case of both verbs, other than permission readings are admitted. As
for forlætan, B&T quotes the following meanings: 1) ‘to let go, permit, suffer’,
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Verb N. F. Total number of occurrences
forlætan 50.2 2657
lætan 25.2 1336
forbeodan 5.5 290
alyfan 4.8 254
lyfan 0.8 44
Table 25. Frequency of lexical verbs of permission and
prohibition
2) ‘to relinquish, forsake, omit, neglect’. Lætan, on the other hand, is credited
by B&T with a larger set of meanings: 1) ‘to let, allow, permit, suffer’, 2) ‘to
let [alone], let go, give up, dismiss, leave, forsake, let [blood]’, 3) ‘to let,
cause, make, get, have, cause to be’, 4) ‘to make a thing appear, make as if, to
make out, profess, pretend, estimate, consider, think, suppose’. It might be
argued that the sense of permission of forlætan and lætan arises from the idea
of forsaking and tolerating already present in the PIE root. Typical permission
contexts of both verbs are illustrated below:
(4.12) Se mildheorta drihten þe læt scinan his sunnan ofer þa
he mildhearted Lord who lets shine his sun over the
rihtwisan. and unrihtwisan gelice.
righteous and non-righteous likewise.
‘The mildhearted Lord who lets his sun shine over both the
righteous and the non-righteous.’
(ÆCHom I, 28 413.100)
(4.13) Ne nimð hig nan man æt me ac læte hig fram me sylfum.
not takes it no man from me but I-let it from me self.
‘No one takes it away from me, I let go of it myself.
(Jn (WSCp) 10.18)
(4.14) ne wæs he forlæten þæt he ofer him deadum gefege:
not was he allowed that he over him dead rejoice
‘He was not allowed to rejoice over his death.’
(Bede 1 7.40.7)
The most frequent pattern has the Antagonist occurring as the subject of lætan,
as can be seen in (4.12) and (4.13), the identity of the source of permission
being thus explicitly provided. The Agonist is left with the function of the
indirect object in form of an accusative NP whereas the nature of the thing
permitted is elucidated by the bare infinitive in (4.12), although we should bear
in mind that inflected infinitives do occasionally appear. It naturally follows
then that both lætan and forlætan are included by MOLENCKI (1987, 1991)
among verbs which take the ACI complementation. In example (4.13), lætan
misses the infinitive, which is to be understood as a verb of motion. This
brings lætan close to the pre-modals which, when followed by a prepositional
phrase or a directional adverb, do not require that the infinitive be present
(cf. 3.3.3, 3.4.1, and 3.5.1). In the passive structure in (4.14) the Antagonist-
Agonist configuration approaches that of the pre-modals in that the Agonist
takes over the role of the subject with the Antagonist remaining backgrounded.
MOLENCKI (1991: 28) points out that a passive transformation in the case of
forlætan turns the indirect object NP in the accusative into the subject NP
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in the nominative. Note also that the verb, as shown in (4.13), can be
complemented by a þæt-clause.
The meaning of permission of both verbs seems to be quite general and is
not necessarily to be associated with verbal permission. In example (4.13) the
idea of permission is very weak, if not virtually absent. Lætan is closer here to
the meaning of ‘to let go, release,’ which goes back to that of the PIE root *le-.
It is interesting to note that the sense of permission fails in this example as the
indirect object NP hig does not indicate any real Agonist. Conversely, lætan in
example (4.12) is an obvious, albeit figurative, case of a permission meaning.
The figurativeness stems from the nature of the Agonist (the sun) which,
although not usually ascribed consciousness, is visualized as the permissee able
to control the process of shining. What is not surprising in the context of
permission is the difference in the status of the Antagonist (God, the Creator)
and the Agonist (the sun, an object created). The last example, (4.14), which
contains forlætan, brings to mind the most prototypical sense of permission,
that is, interpersonal or social. In fact, due to the negation of the permission,
(4.14) epitomizes a case of prohibition. The animate and conscious Agonist
(he) was not allowed to act as he wished by the Antagonist, whose identity
remains undisclosed.
4.2.2. Lyfan and alyfan
Taking their morphological relatedness as a key factor, I have reserved the
present section for other two verbs of permission among those shown in Table
25. The origin of both lyfan and prefixed alyfan is to be found in PIE *leubh-
‘to care, desire; love’, the same root that has spawned PDE belief and love.
WATKINS (ed. 2000) and OED regard the inference of ‘pleasure, approval’
present in the sense of ‘care’ and ‘love’ as conducive to the development of the
meaning of permission. In Old English, apart from the two related verbs, there
is noun leaf (PDE leave) which stems from the same PIE root and is used with
the meaning ‘permission.’ Other Germanic languages share similar evolution of
the PIE root, which in proto-Germanic has been reconstructed as *laubo–. As
specified by OED, the Germanic cognates of lyfan are Gothic (us)laubjan, Old
High German lýfan (modern German (er)lauben) and Old Norse løyfa. In Old
English both lyfan and alyfan are members of Class I of weak verbs.
Turning to the semantic side of lyfan and alyfan, let me resort to B&T
again. As for the former, the dictionary points to the sense of permission as the
only area in which the verbs can be employed (‘to give leave, allow, permit’).
With alyfan, the field of application seems wider in that apart from the
expected idea of permission (‘to give leave, permit’), we find an extension
connected with giving and handing (‘to grant’). Having consulted the
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dictionary, let us take a look at some of the actual occurrences of the verbs in
the corpus:
(4.15) God lyfde Adame þæt he moste brucan ealra wæstma,
God allowed Adam that he must enjoy all fruit
‘God allowed Adam to eat all the fruit’
(WHom 6 44)
(4.16) Moyses for eower heortan heardnesse lyfde eow eower wif
Moses for your hearts’ hardness allowed you your wife
to forlætenne.
to leave
‘Moses allowed you to leave your wife because of the hardness
of your hearts.’
(Mt (WSCp) 19.8)
(4.17) Ða alefde Pilatus him þæt.
then permitted/gave Pilate him that
‘Then Pilate gave him that/allowed him to take it (the Lord’s
body)’
(HomS 24.1 (Scragg) 24.1 353)
(4.18) And nis nanum men alefed for nanre neode þis fæsten to
and not-is no man allowed for no need this fast to
abrecane
break
‘And no one is allowed to break this fast on any account’
(HomS 44 76)
A general observation follows that both lyfan and alyfan appear in surface
structures which go back to the following deep structure:
subject NP — lyfan/alyfan — indirect object NP — direct object NP
Accordingly, in an active structure, examples (4.15) through (4.17), the
Antagonist is the nominative subject NP and the Agonist is the dative NP with
the sentential function of the indirect object. Example (4.15) epitomizes a case
of redundant modality already extensively looked upon in 3.3.5 and 3.4.3.1,
where moste in the complement clause builds on the idea of permission made
explicit by lyfde in the main clause. Syntactically speaking, it is worth noting
that the direct object of lyfan is a þæt-clause. In (4.16) and (4.17) we can see
yet different kinds of direct objects. In the former, the indirect object is ensued
by an inflected infinitive, inflected infinitives markedly outnumbering bare
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infinitives as the direct objects of both verbs. Alyfan in (4.17), on the other
hand, assigns the function of the direct object to the pronominal NP hyt. The
last example (4.18) is a passive structure, which accounts for 69 per cent of the
occurrences of alyfan (passives with lyfan are extremely rare). The passive
occurrences alternate between such as (4.18), where there is no pronominal
subject, and those which take hit as the subject. Consider, however, that, in
absence of hyt as the subject, it is the non-finite clause containing the inflected
infinitive in (4.18) that is the actual subject which “remains extraposed
probably due to its ‘heaviness’” (MOLENCKI 1991: 28). Unlike with forlætan, in
a passive structure with alyfan, the function of the Agonist as the indirect
object NP in the dative stays intact.
The sense of permission is salient in all the examples above but (4.17).
Judging by example (4.17) and the likes in the corpus, alyfan may be
conjectured to lose the meaning of permission in favor of the sense ‘to grant,
give’ when the direct object of the verb is an NP. I venture the hypothesis that
the meaning ‘to grant, give’ of alyfan develops first and accompanies direct
object NPs. At this stage, the NPs stand for more or less concrete objects.
Once the verb starts taking clausal direct objects, a thing granted may be an
action. Obviously, granting an action implies that the action is permitted, which
allows time for the invited inference of permission to be strengthened. Witness
that the strengthening of the inference is facilitated by the fact that the
Antagonist-Agonist configuration before and after the appearance of the
inference is the same. Once settled, the idea of permission that stands behind
lyfan and alyfan seems rather homogenous. In all the active sentences
presented above both participants, the Antagonist and Agonist, are explicitly
present. As we have seen earlier with the verbs of necessity, e.g. hatan in 4.1.1,
the discrepancy between the positions of the participants in a religious or social
community is underscored. The Antagonist is always a person of authority and,
thus, expected to grant or deny permission (God in (4.15), Moses, a religious
leader in (4.16) or Pilate in (4.17)). I reason that the permission of lyfan and
alyfan is quite formal and requires that both participants be animate. The main
semantic significance of a passive structure with alyfan is the possibility of
concealing or leaving out the identity of the Antagonist. In (4.18) lack of
permission is stated without disclosing the Antagonist who can, after all, be
identified as God due to the context.
4.2.3. Forbeodan
As will be clear from Table 25, the verb of negated permission, i.e. prohibition,
is greatly outnumbered by the occurrences of the verbs of permission. As for
the origin of the verb, forbeodan (PDE forbid) is derived from another OE verb
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beodan ‘to command’ (cf. 4.1.2), which, as specified by WATKINS (ed., 2000:
11), originates in the PIE root *bheudh- ‘to be aware, make aware.’ OED notes
that the prefixed form forbeodan used with the meaning of prohibition has
cognates in other Germanic languages, some of which are Gothic faurbiudan,
Old Norse fyrirbioða and Old High German far-, forpiotan (modern German
verbieten). Forbeodan is a strong verb of Class II.
The verb allows little beyond the use with the meaning of prohibition, as
we learn from B&T. The significance of forbeodan is described as ‘to forbid,
prohibit, restrain, suppress.’ Forbeodan can appear in quite a wide range of
structures, two of which are illustrated below:
(4.19) þone fulan mete þe Moyses forbead Godes folce to
the impure food that Moses forbade God’s people to
þicgenne,
eat
‘The impure food that Moses forbade the People of God to eat.’
(ÆLS (Maccabees) 34)
(4.20) him bið forboden ðæt he offrige Gode hlaf,
to-him is forbidden that he offer to-God bread
‘He is forbidden to offer bread to God.’
(CP 11.73.15)
In (4.19) and (4.20) common patterns of the active and passive sentences with
forbeodan are shown. Both can be integrated into largely the same framework
as that observed in the case of lyfan and alyfan (cf. 4.2.2). In an active
sentence, as in (4.19), the Antagonist invariably occupies the subject position in
the form of a nominative NP. The other participant, i.e. the Agonist, as can be
seen in the same example, can be identified with the role of the indirect object
NP in the dative. Occasionally, as also noted by DOE, the indirect object NP
takes an accusative form. There is also a possibility that the Agonist is absent,
which adds an aspect of general validity to the prohibition imposed. As for the
type of the direct object, forbeodan has three options available: preferably an
inflected infinitive15, as in (4.19), an accusative NP and a þæt-clause. A passive
construction with forbeodan moves the direct object, be it a þæt-clause as in
(4.20), a nominative NP or an infinitive, to the formal position of the subject
even though heavy clausal subjects tend to be extraposed in the mode already
observed with alyfan (cf. 4.2.2). The transformation of an active structure into
a passive one leaves the status of the Agonist as a dative NP intact.
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15 LOS (1999: 179—180) argues that the occurrences of uninflected infinitives after
forbeodan and alyfan are not to be found except for glosses and texts translated from Latin.
Because of the negation of permission incorporated into the meaning of
forbeodan, this verb has much in common with the verbs of deontic necessity
discussed in 4.1. The prohibition, as seen in the examples, is formal and carries
the force of a command. In example (4.19) prohibition occurs as a regulation
introduced by the religious leader (Moses) and affects the whole group of
people. It is a deontic statement as there is a past time reference. So is example
(4.20) even though it refers to the present. On account of the third person
Agonist and an implicit Antagonist, the example lacks any performative force.
It is noteworthy that the action forbidden in (4.20) also has a religious
character. Judging by other examples in the DOE Corpus, it can be concluded
that the prohibition of forbeodan is rather homogenous in that it usually
requires a context in which someone issues a formal ban on an action which
a conscious Agonist is taken to be willing to perform.
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In the body of this study I have focused on the verbal means employed to
express non-epistemic necessity in Old English. Combining the elements of the
functional and cognitive approaches to the modal semantics, I have conducted
a corpus-based analysis of five pre-modals and eleven lexical verbs with a view
to reconstructing the system of obligation expression in Old English. Much
more attention has been paid to the pre-modals for a number of reasons: 1)
they usually far outnumber the lexical verbs, 2) they can be seen at the
interface of semantics and syntax in that they are just being slowly
grammaticalized into auxiliaries, 3) modals tend to exhibit ‘(relative) semantic
imprecision and opacity’ (MATTHEWS 2003: 50).
A résumé of the investigation undertaken in the present monograph can be
given by showing the positioning of the pre-modals and the relevant lexical
verbs on the continuum of deontic modality proposed by DE HAAN (1997: 15).
In Figure 20 and Figure 21 the meanings of the pre-modals and the lexical
verbs respectively are projected upon the continuum.
Figure 20 has the following implications:
1. Old English has one exponent of strong deontic necessity, that is sceal. It
proves the only pre-modal to embrace performative contexts of strong PE
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weak strong
permission weak PE/deontic necessity strong deontic necessity
agan
þearf
sceal
mot
mæg
Figure 20. OE pre-modals on continuum of deontic modality
necessity more than just occasionally. The subjectivity of such examples is
revealed through the fact that the speaker is the Antagonist and he or she is
actually involved in the act of imposing the necessity. In other words, the
gradience of the deontic necessity of sceal has a consistent core. The empty
space left at the strong end of the continuum marks the fact that the core
examples are still exception rather than rule and that there are no strongly
subjective instances. It should be remembered, however, that in the majority
of cases sceal expresses a strong force of necessity in non-performative and
thus mildly subjective contexts — such instances have been shown to make
up the skirt and periphery of the deontic necessity of sceal.
2. The deontic necessity of þearf lags far behind sceal, which can be attributed
to a network of reasons: even if þearf has a potential for performative use in
that the verb frequently occurs with the second person pronoun, þearf
prefers non-activity verb complements. It has been hypothesized that the
preference goes back to the earlier meaning of þearf, that is, PI necessity.
Secondly, þearf is typically in need of a contextual hint if it is to convey
speaker-generated necessity. Thirdly, the very force of the deontic necessity
of þearf is, unlike in the case of sceal, a weak obligation.
3. The deontic necessity of agan and mot is far from deeply rooted in Old
English yet. Both verbs are only starting to make inroads into this new
semantic area. This materializes into a number of features: the force of
necessity tends to alternate between a stronger and weaker obligation, both
verbs are typically precluded from appearing in performative contexts
(a visible sign of which is the absence of second person pronouns with
mot), the Antagonist is institutional or doctrinal rather than the speaker.
Interestingly, agan in its weaker deontic necessity uses provides an
equivalent to the notion SHOULD in Present-Day English, which, according
to DE HAAN (1997: 126—129), occupies the middle of the continuum.
A concomitant of a verb taking up the middle position is that its meaning
does not change in negative clauses regardless of whether modality or
proposition is negated.
4. Overall, it is still weaker deontic necessity in weakly subjective contexts that
the occurrences of the four pre-modals capitalize on. The Antagonist tends to
be institutionalized rather than individualized. The necessity imposed or
reported usually follows from a set of accepted rules or legal regulations.
5. Out of the two permission pre-modals, mæg proves only marginally relevant
as its meaning of permission comes to the surface as an inference invited by
a context of PI or PE possibility. Mot, on the other hand, is capable of
signaling a variety of contexts ranging from subjective performatives to
deontic statements devoid of subjectivity. Concurrently, the latter prevail.
Mot being the only pre-modal available to both permission and deontic
necessity, a rigorous formal separation has been evident between the
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instances of the former and of the latter. Performativity, subjectivity and
wide scope attested with the permission of mot are not instantly transferable
to the deontic necessity instances of the verb.
Throughout the discussion of the pre-modals, a special emphasis has been
put on the interaction of the pre-modals and negation. With agan and þearf,
negative and non-affirmative contexs engender most of the occurrences of the
verbs. Mæg, mot, and þearf regularly negate modality while sceal negates the
proposition. As mentioned above, agan, when carrying weaker necessity,
negates either modality or the proposition without impinging on the meaning.
In the contexts of stronger necessity, it is the proposition that is in the scope of
negation.
Turning to the lexical verbs, in Figure 21 I have assembled the deontic
continuum with the positions of the necessity-related lexical verbs marked on
it. No room on the continuum is made for behofian and beþurfan as these two,
being tokens of PI necessity, stay outside the continuum. Although classed with
the verbs of permission in 4.2, forbeodan takes place among the verbs of
necessity in Figure 21, which rests on the equivalence of negated permission,
i.e. the meaning of forbeodan, and necessity-not-to.
The following points should be made concerning Figure 21:
1. In the group of the verbs of necessity, hatan, bebeodan and forbeodan
occupy more or less the same position, which indicates that they are all
potentially performative verbs and they signal a strong force of necessity
tantamount to a command or strong request. It is among these verbs that the
strongest force of deontic necessity resides. Still, performative and really
subjective uses are hard to find, hence the space left at the strong end of the
continuum. Beodan despite being frequently used on a par with the first
three verbs, also shows inclinations toward weaker necessity. Conversely,
neodian has very little potential for performative use as it is associated with
a physical force rather that a verbal command.
2. Forlætan, lætan, alyfan, and lyfan are largely synonymous. In all of these
verbs some traces of earlier, non-modal meanings mingle with the sense of
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permission weak PE/deontic necessity strong deontic necessity
forlætan hatan
lætan bebeodan
alyfan forbeodan
lyfan beodan
neodian
Figure 21. Lexical verbs on continuum of deontic modality
permission. Thus one can detect the idea of giving, granting in alyfan and
lyfan and the idea of letting go, releasing in lætan and forlætan.
It is possible to point to two major contrasts between the pre-modals and
the lexical verbs:
1. The pre-modals have a wider range of subjective uses, the meaning of
a pre-modal is a gradient likely to express the force of necessity spanning
from weak to strong, non-performative to performative. A lexical verb can
be used performatively or non-preformatively, the force of necessity staying
relatively stable. The meaning of a lexical verb is more precise due to the
presence of the Antagonist in an active clause and the necessity being more
semantically constrained.
2. The use of the pre-modals typically indicates an institutionalized Antagonist,
e.g. religion, law, code of behavior. The Antagonist of a lexical verb in an
active clause is more likely to be an individual. As a rule, the pre-modals
convey necessity based on socially accepted regulations while lexical verbs
indicate individual-generated necessity in active clauses and regulation-
based necessity in passive structures.
3. Although the meaning of, say, permission of a lexical verb extends into
other semantic areas, e.g. the permission of alyfan shades into the sense of
giving and granting, I have not identified any case of modal polysemy with
the lexical verbs. Their meanings do not move along the deontic continuum
as actively as those of the pre-modals.
There is obviously room for further research especially in the field of
lexical verbs of necessity, permission, and prohibition. This brings us to the
problem of the discrepancy in the amount of appeal that the modals and other
exponents of modality have for researchers. Indeed, even the OE pre-modals
seem to have more to offer to those who study both semantics and syntax.
Once within the branches of modality, the meanings of the pre-modals tend to
expand forming gradients and traveling along the paths which can be
reconstructed. The concomitant process of grammaticalization ties in with this
semantic change. Lexical verbs, such as the ones discussed in this study, seem
unattractive in comparison. Each of them has a relatively small portion of
modal semantics at its disposal. Needless to say, the operation of
grammaticalization is not a significant factor in the evolution of the lexical
verbs of necessity.
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Wyrażanie przymusu w języku staroangielskim
Konstrukcje z czasownikami premodalnymi i leksykalnymi
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Celem niniejszej monografii jest charakterystyka przymusu wyrażanego za pomocą czasow-
ników dostępnych w tekstach staroangielskich. Zagadnienie to naturalnie wpisuje się w rozwa-
żania na temat modalności, jej semantycznej natury i urzeczywistnienia w języku. Punktem
wyjścia jest lokalizacja przymusu w teoriach modalności, wyodrębnienie czasowników będących
przedmiotem badań oraz sprecyzowanie miarodajnej metody pozwalającej na porównanie przy-
musu charakterystycznego dla każdego z czasowników.
Pojęcie przymusu, a raczej szersze pojęcie konieczności, którego przymus jest integralną czę-
ścią, staje się obok możliwości, fundamentem koncepcji modalności LYONSA (1977). Wyodrębnie-
nie przymusu w tym i innych ujęciach modalności sprowadza się do przyjrzenia się konieczności
nieepistemicznej, która obejmuje konieczność zewnętrzną, konieczność wewnętrzną, a także po-
zwolenie/zakaz. Pozwolenie/zakaz, choć formalnie przynależą do możliwości nieepistemicznej, są
także w centrum mojego zainteresowania dzięki pozostaniu w logicznej zależności z konieczno-
ścią. Stojąc na stanowisku, iż konieczność, podobnie jak inne znaczenia modalne, realizuje się
przede wszystkim w znaczeniu czasowników, w dalszej części pracy koncentruję się na dwóch
grupach czasowników staroangielskich: pięciu czasownikach premodalnych i jedenastu czasowni-
kach leksykalnych. Znacznie większy nacisk położony jest na analizę znaczeń czasowników
pre-modalnych, które — morfologicznie zaklasyfikowane jako czasowniki przeszło-teraźniejsze
— są zalążkiem systemu modalnego w późniejszym angielskim w rozumieniu PALMERA (2003).
Przystępując do badań znaczeń wyodrębnionych czasowników, przyjmuję następujące założe-
nie: znaczenia modalne tworzą zbiory nieostre (zob. COATES 1983), co oznacza, iż w danym wy-
padku znaczenie czasownika może mieć cechy desygnujące go bliżej centrum zbioru bądź bliżej
peryferii zbioru. Centrum znaczenia konieczności daje się określić przez zbiór cech, m.in. siłę
nacisku wywieranego przez antagonistę (źródło nacisku) na agonistę (osobę poddaną naciskowi)
(zob. TALMY 2000), stopień subiektywności znaczenia, określenie czy w danym przypadku mamy
do czynienia z kontekstem performatywnym czy też nie.
Stosując wskazane parametry w części badawczej, dochodzę do wniosku, że system wyra-
żania przymusu za pomocą czasowników premodalnych dopiero się wykształca. Spośród pięciu
czasowników premodalnych, jedynie sceal ze względna konsekwencję używany jest performatyw-
nie, subiektywnie, wyrażając znaczną siłę nacisku wygenerowaną przez antagonistę. Podobnie jak
w wypadku pozostałych czasowników premodalnych, przykłady użycia sceal ze znaczeniem ko-
nieczności zewnętrzenej tworzą kontinuum rozciągające się od centrum do peryferii. Dwa cza-
sowniki, agan i mot wykazują cechy świadczące o początkowym etapie funkcjonowania ze
znaczeniem konieczności zewnętrzenej: sporadycznie pojawiają się w kontekstach performatyw-
nych i w zależności od konkretnego przypadku, wykazują znaczne wahania pomiędzy słabszą
a mocniejszą siłą nacisku.
Podstawową różnicą w użyciu czasowników premodalnych i leksykalnych jest większa precy-
zja konieczności czasowników leksykalnych, które również częściej wyrażają konieczność narzu-
coną przez zindywidualizowanego raczej niż zinstytucjonalizowanego antagonistę.
Część badawcza niniejszej pracy opiera się na badaniu tekstów staroangielskich zebranych
w korpusach elektronicznych. Wykorzystane zostały dwa różne korpusy tekstów: The Old English
Part of The Helsinki Corpus i The Dictionary of Old English Corpus.
206
L’expression de l’obligation dans le vieil anglais
Les constructions avec des verbes pré-modaux et lexicaux
R é s u m é
Le but de cette monographie est de tracer la caractéristique de l’obligation, exprimée à l’aide
des verbes présents dans des textes en vieil anglais. La question s’inscrit naturellement dans la
réflexion sur la modalité, sa nature sémantique et sa réalisation dans la langue. La localisation de
l’obligation dans des théories de modalité, la distinction des verbes — objets de recherche et la
détermination d’une méthode objective qui permet la comparaison de l’obligation typique pour
chaque verbe sont le point de départ de cette étude.
La notion d’obligation ou plutôt celle de nécessité dont l’obligation est une partie intégrale,
devient, en plus de la possibilité, le fondement de la conception de modalité de LYONS (1977). La
distinction de l’obligation dans cet aspect de modalité, ainsi que dans les autres, se résume
à aborder la nécessité non-épistémique, qui englobe la nécessité externe, la nécessité interne et
aussi la permission / l’interdiction. La permission / l’interdiction, bien qu’elles appartiennent for-
mellement à la possibilité non-épistémique, se trouvent-elles aussi dans le domaine de nos re-
cherches car elles restent dans une relation logique avec la nécessité. En pensant que la nécessité,
tout comme d’autres significations modales se réalise avant tout dans le sens du verbe, nous nous
concentrons sur deux groupes de verbes du vieil anglais : cinq verbes pré-modaux et onze verbes
lexicaux. Nous posons un accent plus grand sur l’analyse de significations des verbes
pré-modaux qui, morphologiquement classés comme verbes perfecto-présents, sont un ferment du
système modal dans l’anglais moderne d’après PALMER (2003).
En abordant l’étude de significations des verbes choisis j’adopte le raisonnement suivant : les
significations modales forment des ensembles flous (voir COATES 1983) ce qui veut dire que dans
un cas concret la signification du verbe peut avoir des caractéristiques qui le placent soit près du
noyau de l’ensemble, soit sur sa périphérie. Le noyau de la signification de la nécessité se laisse
définir par un ensemble de traits caractéristiques, entre autres la force de pression exercée par
l’antagoniste (source de pression) sur l’agoniste (personne sur laquelle la pression est exercée)
(voir TALMY 2000), le degré de subjectivité de la signification, la détermination si dans un cas
précis il s’agit d’un contexte performatif ou non.
En appliquant ces paraèmtres dans la partie analytique, nous arrivons à la conclusion que le
système d’expression de l’obligation à l’aide des verbes pré-modaux s’esquisse à peine. Parmi
cinq verbes pré-modaux, seul sceal est utilisé avec une certaine conséquence de manière perfor-
mative, subjective, en exprimant une grande pression exercée par le protagoniste.Tout comme
dans le cas d’autres verbes pré-modaux, les exemples d’utilisation de sceal avec la signification
de nécessité extérieure forment un continuum étendu du noyau aux périphéries. Deux verbes :
agan et mot manifestent des traits qui suggèrent une première étape de fonctionnement avec la si-
gnification de nécessité extérieure : ils apparaissent sporadiquement dans des contextes performa-
tifs et, selon le cas, affirment des fluctuations importantes entre la force de pression.
La différence premèire dans l’emploi des verbes pré-modaux et lexicaux est la précision plus
grande de la nécessité des verbes lexicaux, qui expriment aussi plus souvent la nécessité imposée
par un antagoniste plutôt individualisé qu’institutionnalisé.
La partie analytique de l’étude s’appuie sur l’examen des textes en vieil anglais, regroupés
dans des corpus électroniques. Nous avons appliqué deux corpus de textes différents : The Old
English Part of the Helsinki Corpus et The Dictionnary of Old English Corpus.
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